Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
  • Robert Y. Pelgrift, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant). Daniel Shepro, with whom was Philip Baroff, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Judges
  • PER CURIAM.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
  • Robert Y. Pelgrift, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant). Daniel Shepro, with whom was Philip Baroff, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Judges
  • PER CURIAM.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Laurel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation — Supreme Court of Connecticut (June 28, 1977)

Factual and Procedural Background

On January 23, 1974, the Commissioner of Transportation filed an assessment of damages and benefits for the taking of a portion of plaintiff Laurel, Inc.'s property for improvements to the Merritt Parkway. The plaintiff sued, contending that the entire parcel had effectively been taken because the condemned portion included the only access to a road permitted from the parcel.

On May 17, 1974, the Superior Court enjoined the commissioner from taking a portion of the parcel and declared the condemnation proceedings void ab initio. After a subsequent hearing the Superior Court opened its judgment and ordered the commissioner to condemn the entire parcel.

On appeal the Superior Court's judgment was reversed in part: the appellate court held there was no constitutional "taking" of the remainder because, although value was greatly diminished, some legal access and value remained possible for certain residential uses. That opinion (Laurel, Inc. v. State, 169 Conn. 195, 362 A.2d 1383) directed the Superior Court to reinstate the condemnation proceedings and stated that "the parties upon remand may proceed under General Statutes 13a-76, with all rights attendant thereto, as of the date of judgment by the Superior Court."

Pursuant to that mandate, the Superior Court reinstated the condemnation proceedings on August 29, 1975. The plaintiff appealed from the assessment of damages on September 30, 1975. The defendant filed a plea in abatement contending the appeal was untimely because General Statutes 13a-76 prescribes a six-month period for appealing an assessment and the plaintiff had not appealed within six months of the assessment. The Superior Court overruled the plea in abatement and referred the matter to a state trial referee for a hearing on damages. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning error in overruling the plea in abatement and in ordering the reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Superior Court erred in overruling the defendant's plea in abatement that the plaintiff's appeal from the assessment of damages was untimely under the six-month limitation of General Statutes 13a-76.
  2. Whether the Superior Court's reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings or its subsequent orders improperly enlarged the six-month limitation period in violation of article first, §1 of the Connecticut Constitution (a claim tied to equal protection-type concerns).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant asserted that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not bring its appeal within six months of the assessment, as required by General Statutes 13a-76, and therefore the plea in abatement should have been sustained.
  • The defendant additionally claimed that the Superior Court's judgment (reinstating proceedings and allowing the appeal) effectively enlarged the six-month limitation period, violating article first, §1 of the Connecticut Constitution (an argument framed in equal-protection-type terms).

Appellee's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff relied on this court's prior opinion in Laurel, Inc. v. State, which ordered reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings and specified that the parties "may proceed under General Statutes 13a-76, with all rights attendant thereto, as of the date of judgment by the Superior Court." The plaintiff contended that this language preserved its right to appeal from the assessment within six months of the date of the prior Superior Court judgment, making its September 30, 1975 appeal timely.
  • The plaintiff's position rests on the interpretation that the remand effectively fixed the plaintiff's procedural rights (including the six-month appeal window) as of the earlier judgment date, and that the prior opinion is binding as law of the case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Laurel, Inc. v. State, 169 Conn. 195, 362 A.2d 1383 The court's prior appellate disposition of this same controversy; the opinion ordered reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings and specified that parties "may proceed under General Statutes 13a-76, with all rights attendant thereto, as of the date of judgment by the Superior Court." The Supreme Court relied on its prior mandate to conclude that the plaintiff retained its procedural rights (including the right to appeal the assessment within the six-month period measured from the earlier Superior Court judgment) and thus its appeal was timely.
Gray v. Mossman, 91 Conn. 430, 99 A. 1062 Law of the case doctrine — prior appellate rulings in the case are binding on the parties and the trial court on remand. The court invoked Gray to support the proposition that its former opinion is the law of the case and therefore obligatory, reinforcing that the remand language should be honored and that the plaintiff's appeal timeline followed from that remand.
Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 52 A.2d 702 Interpretation of article first, §1 of the Connecticut Constitution as having a meaning similar to the federal equal protection clause. The case is cited to explain the constitutional provision the defendant invoked; the court used it to frame the defendant's argument but did not find precedent holding that equitable relief to a specific party violates that provision.
Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 355 A.2d 1 Example of a case involving a special legislative act granting privileges to an individual that were denied to the public at large. The court distinguished Hillier from the present situation, noting that Hillier involved a special act of the legislature and thus was not controlling on whether equitable relief granted by a court to a particular party violates article first, §1.
Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 Referenced in a footnote as relating to constitutional provisions (article first, §20) often compared to the federal equal protection clause. Cited in a note to provide context for constitutional comparison; not applied directly to the disposition of the timeliness issue in this opinion.
State v. Rao, 171 Conn. 600, 370 A.2d 1310 Similarly referenced in a footnote regarding constitutional comparisons to federal equal protection principles. Included in the footnote for context; not central to the court's analysis of the plea in abatement in this opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the procedural history and the specific language of its earlier opinion directing reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings. The dispositive analytical step was accepting the earlier opinion's mandate — which expressly preserved the parties' rights "as of the date of judgment by the Superior Court" to proceed under General Statutes 13a-76 — as controlling on remand.

The court reasoned that those rights necessarily included the plaintiff's procedural right to appeal an assessment of damages within the six-month period provided by 13a-76, measured from the date prescribed by the remand. While the remand language might be described as ambiguous in form, the court concluded that its intent was clear because the opinion explicitly stated the plaintiff was "entitled to a determination of its damages in an appeal from the assessment under General Statutes 13a-76."

The court invoked the law of the case principle (Gray v. Mossman) to hold that its former opinion was binding on both parties and on the trial court on remand; therefore the Superior Court did not err in overruling the plea in abatement. The court treated the defendant's constitutional objection (that the Superior Court's order impermissibly enlarged the six-month limitation in violation of article first, §1) as unpersuasive because no Connecticut case had held that a court's granting of equitable relief to a specific party amounts to such a constitutional violation. The defendant's principal precedent (Hillier v. East Hartford) was distinguished as dealing with a special legislative act, not a court's equitable remand or relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court held that there was no error in the Superior Court's overruling of the defendant's plea in abatement and in its reference of the matter to a state trial referee for a hearing on damages. The court concluded the plaintiff's appeal was timely in light of the prior remand and the law of the case.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff's appeal from the assessment of damages is treated as timely and the Superior Court's reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings and its reference for assessment stand.
  • The parties are entitled to proceed under General Statutes 13a-76 with the rights preserved by the court's prior mandate.
  • The opinion rests on application of the law of the case and an interpretation of the court's prior remand; the decision does not purport to announce a broad new rule invalidating statute of limitations periods generally or to create a new constitutional doctrine regarding equitable relief to specific parties.

Decision released June 28, 1977. Counsel of record: Robert Y. Pelgrift and Carl R. Ajello for the appellant; Daniel Shepro and Philip Baroff for the appellee.

Show full summary ...

LAUREL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF TRANSPORTATION

PER CURIAM.

On January 23, 1974, the commissioner of transportation filed an assessment of damages and benefits from the taking of a portion of the plaintiff's property for improvement of the Merritt Parkway. The plaintiff brought suit alleging that the entire parcel had been effectively taken because the portion condemned included the only access to a road permitted from the parcel. On May 17, 1974, the Superior Court enjoined the defendant commissioner from taking a portion of the parcel and decreed the condemnation proceedings void ab initio. At a subsequent hearing the court opened its judgment and ordered the commissioner to condemn the entire parcel. On appeal the judgment was reversed on the ground that there was no "taking" of the remainder, in the constitutional sense, because the portion taken by the state, although it greatly diminished the value of the remainder, had not destroyed all value in the remainder. Legal access to the parcel could still be obtained if the parcel were to be used for certain residential purposes other than that begun by the plaintiff, i.e., the construction of condominiums. Laurel, Inc. v. State, 169 Conn. 195, 362 A.2d 1383. The court stated: "The plaintiff is not without remedy. It is entitled to a determination of its damages in an appeal from the assessment under General Statutes 13a-76. The Superior Court in Fairfield County is ordered to reinstate the condemnation proceedings as initiated by the defendants and known as State Highway Commissioner v. Laurel, Inc., et al., file No. 6108, and the parties upon remand may proceed under General Statutes 13a-76, with all rights attendant thereto, as of the date of judgment by the Superior Court." Id., 207.

On August 29, 1975, the Superior Court reinstated the condemnation proceedings. On September 30, 1975, the plaintiff appealed from the assessment of damages. The defendant filed a plea in abatement, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff had not brought its appeal within six months of the assessment, the period prescribed by 13a-76 of the General Statutes. This plea was overruled. From the judgment of the court refer ring the matter to a state trial referee the defendant appealed to this court, assigning error in overruling the plea in abatement and error in ordering the reference, claiming that the court was without jurisdiction.

The court did not err in overruling the plea in abatement. The plaintiff's appeal is timely because the prior judgment of this court in Laurel, Inc. v. State, supra, ordered reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings and specified that "the parties upon remand may proceed under General Statutes 13a-76, with all rights attendant thereto, as of the date of judgment by the Superior Court." Those rights included the plaintiff's right to appeal from the assessment within six months of the date of the Superior Court judgment. Although it may be argued that the wording of the remand was ambiguous, the intent was clear, because the opinion clearly stated that the plaintiff was entitled to a determination of its damages in an appeal. This court's former opinion is the law of the case, obligatory on both the parties and the trial court. Gray v. Mossman, 91 Conn. 430, 434, 99 A. 1062.

The defendant claims that the Superior Court judgment enlarges the six-month limitation period, in violation of article first, 1, of the Connecticut constitution. This provision, held to have a meaning like that of the equal protection clause of the federal constitution, Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 515, 52 A.2d 702, declares that "no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." No case has yet held, however, that the granting of equitable relief to a specific party before a court constitutes an infringement of this provision. The case on which the defendant relies pertains to a special act of the legislature granting an individual privileges denied to the general public. Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 110, 355 A.2d 1.

Article first, 20, of the Connecticut constitution is the provision more often compared to the federal equal protection clause. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 639, 376 A.2d 359; State v. Rao, 171 Conn. 600, 601, 370 A.2d 1310.
Use AI to get other relevant cases.
Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

Comments

LAUREL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF TRANSPORTATION
(Jun 28, 1977)