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Memorandum Opinion Summary — Waddy, District Judge (July 27, 1977)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs are Reserve Officers of the U.S. Army holding ranks of Major and Captain who were, or would be, released from active duty pursuant to Army Regulations (AR) 624-100 and 635-100 because of non-selections by temporary promotion selection boards convened in 1975 and 1976. Plaintiffs alleged defects in the 1975 promotion selection process and applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) seeking correction to eliminate the 1975 non-selections.

The ABCMR rejected plaintiffs' allegations except for a preliminary determination that the 1975 Selection Boards had not included Reserve Officer membership and that this omission "raise[d] some doubt" about whether plaintiffs received proper consideration. The ABCMR recommended that the Secretary reconstitute the 1975 Boards to include Reservists and have plaintiffs reconsidered. The Secretary approved and Reconstituted Boards convened in summer 1976; plaintiffs had also been considered, but not selected, by properly constituted 1976 Temporary Promotion Selection Boards before the Reconstituted Boards met.

The Reconstituted Boards again did not select the plaintiffs. The ABCMR concluded it was reasonable to presume plaintiffs would not have been selected even if the original 1975 Boards had included Reservists and thus denied plaintiffs' applications. The Secretary approved that decision and notified plaintiffs they would be terminated from active duty 90 days from receipt of notification. Plaintiffs filed these consolidated actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On January 31, 1977, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The matter before the Court was defendants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs' cross-motion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appropriate standard of review for the ABCMR's decision and the Secretary's action is whether they were arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence or contrary to law and regulations.
  2. Whether the original 1975 Selection Boards were void ab initio because they lacked Reserve Officer membership and therefore lacked jurisdiction to issue non-selections for the purpose of release from active duty, such that retroactive validation by Reconstituted Boards is impermissible.
  3. Whether the composition defect in the 1975 Selection Boards requires reversal without a showing of prejudice, or whether a showing of prejudice is required (i.e., whether the defect was harmless because plaintiffs would not have been selected even by properly constituted boards).
  4. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to relief on other alleged procedural errors (e.g., reservation of 15 percent of vacancies for the secondary zone and, for certain plaintiffs, alleged failure to make proper factual findings).
  5. Whether defendants' handling of relief to others similarly situated (including settlements in other cases) raises an equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The original 1975 Selection Boards were improperly constituted because they lacked Reserve Officer membership, rendering their non-selections void ab initio and not subject to retroactive validation by subsequent actions.
  • Plaintiffs asserted they need not show specific harm or prejudice resulting from the improper composition in order to prevail.
  • Plaintiffs alleged additional procedural defects: improper reservation of 15 percent of promotion vacancies for the secondary zone and, for certain plaintiffs, that the Boards failed to make required factual findings.
  • Plaintiffs argued that disparate treatment in granting relief to other officers (or settlements in other cases) deprived them of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Defendants conceded the 1975 Boards lacked Reserve Officers and were improperly constituted, but contended that the ABCMR's denial of relief should be upheld because the Reconstituted Boards demonstrated plaintiffs would not have been promoted even if properly constituted (a "harmless error" or "but for" approach).
  • Defendants relied on the method of reconstituting boards (described as advisory "Relook" or "Mirror" Boards) as appropriate to determine whether the composition error was prejudicial.
  • Defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to show the composition error "necessarily" led to non-promotion and thus relief was not warranted.
  • Defendants asserted that settlement of separate cases or payment in other matters does not constitute a concession of legal merit and does not create an equal protection violation for plaintiffs here.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1976) Standard of review for ABCMR/Secretary actions: whether they were arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence or contrary to law and regulations. The Court stated this is the appropriate standard to apply on the cross-motions for summary judgment.
Henderson v. United States, 175 Ct.Cl. 690 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016, 87 S.Ct. 1373, 18 L.Ed.2d 455 (1967) Holds that where a mandatory regulation governing board composition is violated, the board may be without jurisdiction and its proceedings void ab initio. The Court recognized Henderson as authority plaintiffs relied upon but declined to extend its narrow rule here absent a showing of prejudice and given different factual circumstances (i.e., reconstitution and reconsideration).
Ricker v. United States, 396 F.2d 454, 184 Ct.Cl. 402 (1968) Violation of statutory mandate as to board composition can render proceedings fatally defective where the legality of board composition affects substantial rights. The Court acknowledged Ricker but distinguished it from the present cases because Reconstituted Boards were convened here to test prejudice; thus the Court would not apply Ricker's rule automatically without a showing of prejudice.
Knehans v. Callaway, 403 F. Supp. 290 (D.D.C. 1975) Supports a "but for" or harmless-error approach: a plaintiff must show the composition error necessarily led to non-promotion. The Court relied on Knehans to support defendants' position that plaintiffs failed to show the composition error necessarily caused non-selection.
Colm v. Kissinger, 406 F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1975) Recognizes reconstituting a selection board as one method of rectifying procedural defects and determining whether prejudice resulted. The Court cited Colm for the proposition that reconstitution is an appropriate method of determining prejudice from procedural defects.
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) Principle of allowing the decisionmaker to show the outcome would have been the same absent an alleged improper factor ("but for" or burden-shifting approach). The Court relied on Mt. Healthy to support the view that the Reconstituted Boards could be used to determine whether plaintiffs would have been selected regardless of the composition defect.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 379 F.2d 453 (1967) Courts should be reluctant to reverse agency decisions for error that is not prejudicial. The Court cited Braniff to support the proposition that agency decisions should not be reversed for non-prejudicial errors.
Jones v. Alexander, Civil Action No. 77-10-COL (M.D.Ga., May 20, 1977) Similar conclusion reached regarding reconstitution and relief in analogous circumstances. The Court noted a similar conclusion reached by Chief Judge Elliott in that case, consistent with the Court's disposition here.
Mary M. Sliman v. United States, 553 F.2d 104 (Ct.Cl. 1976) Referenced as a separate case whose settlement plaintiffs relied on to argue disparate treatment/equal protection. The Court observed Sliman was factually distinct and concluded settlement or compromise there did not create an equal protection violation here.
Autera v. Robinson, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 419 F.2d 1197 (1969) Settling or compromising a disputed claim by payment is not a concession of the legal merits of the claim. The Court cited Autera to reject plaintiffs' equal protection claim premised on settlements elsewhere.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the controlling standard of review (arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law and regulations) as articulated in Nolen v. Rumsfeld. The threshold issue was whether the original 1975 Selection Boards were void ab initio because they lacked Reserve Officer membership; plaintiffs argued such defect required automatic invalidation without showing prejudice.

The Court acknowledged and described the plaintiffs' reliance on Henderson and Ricker, which hold that certain violations of mandatory composition requirements can render boards without jurisdiction. However, the Court distinguished those cases from the present facts because here the Secretary, with ABCMR involvement, expressly addressed the composition defect by ordering Reconstituted Boards (including Reserve membership) to reconsider officers to determine whether prejudice resulted. The Court emphasized that in Henderson and Ricker no comparable remedial reconstitution and reconsideration occurred.

The Court accepted defendants' and the ABCMR's approach of using Reconstituted (advisory) Boards to determine prejudice, citing Colm, Knehans, and the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mt. Healthy as supporting a "but for" or harmless-error framework: where a procedural defect is shown, a remedial re-evaluation can be used to determine whether the defect prejudiced the plaintiff. Because the Reconstituted Boards applied the same criteria and likewise did not select the plaintiffs, the ABCMR concluded the original non-selections were "neither erroneous nor unjust."

The Court found that plaintiffs had not demonstrated prejudice from the composition error and that it was not so obvious that the defect necessarily caused the non-selections. The Court further reviewed plaintiffs' other procedural allegations (e.g., reservation of 15 percent for secondary zone, failure of certain boards to make proper factual findings) and concluded the ABCMR's consideration and denial of relief on those points was not arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence or contrary to law. Finally, the Court rejected plaintiffs' equal protection argument based on settlements in other cases, citing that compromise or payment is not an admission of legal merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment in the four consolidated cases and denied plaintiffs' cross-motions. In the Court's words, the ABCMR's decision, and the Secretary's approval thereof, to deny plaintiffs' relief after reconstituting the 1975 Selection Boards to determine prejudice, was not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.

Implications: The direct consequence is that plaintiffs' requests for correction of military records and injunctive or declaratory relief were denied and the Secretary's action was upheld. The Court declined to expand the narrow holdings of Henderson and Ricker absent a showing of prejudice and distinguished those cases on their facts; thus the decision did not adopt a rule that an improper composition automatically voids selections irrespective of prejudice. The Court noted no broader legal precedent was being announced beyond its application of the harmless-error/reconstitution approach in these circumstances.

Michael F. DILLEY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Clifford ALEXANDER et al., Defendants. Raymond W. FONTAINE et al., Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WADDY, District Judge.

These consolidated cases came on before the Court on June 8, 1977, for a hearing on defendants' motion filed in all four cases for summary judgment and plaintiffs' cross-motion thereto. Plaintiffs are Reserve Officers of the United States Army holding ranks of Major and Captain who have been, or will be, released from active duty pursuant to Army Regulations (AR) 624-100 and 635-100 by reason of two non-selections by Promotion Selection Boards convened in 1975 and 1976 for temporary promotion to the next higher grade. Defendants are Clifford Alexander, Secretary of the Army, and the United States of America.

Clifford Alexander is substituted as a defendant pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1).

Alleging various defects in the promotion selection process, plaintiffs applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) requesting that their records be corrected to eliminate the non-selection by the 1975 Selection Boards. Following an administrative review and hearing, the ABCMR issued initial findings and conclusions rejecting all of plaintiffs' allegations except the contention that the 1975 Selection Boards were improperly constituted because they did not include Reserve Officer membership. As to this contention, the ABCMR made a preliminary determination that

. . . it is apparent that the absence of Reservists from the . . . 1975 Selection Board may have deprived [plaintiffs] of consideration in a manner intended, that although the applicants have not shown that they have been harmed because there was no Reserve Officer on the Board, the failure to have a Reserve Officer as a member of the Selection Board raises some doubt as to whether the applicants were accorded proper consideration for promotion . . . Record at 27.

As a means of resolving that doubt it recommended that the Secretary reconstitute the 1975 Boards with the proper membership and that plaintiffs be reconsidered for promotion by such Reconstituted Boards. The Secretary approved the ABCMR's recommendations and in accordance with those recommendations "Reconstituted Boards" were convened during the summer of 1976 to reconsider plaintiffs for temporary promotions. Before these Reconstituted Boards were convened, however, plaintiffs had been considered, but not selected by appropriate and duly constituted 1976 Temporary Promotion Selection Boards.

Defendants refer to these boards as "Relook" or "Mirror" Boards, and characterize them as being purely advisory in nature.

Plaintiffs were again not selected for promotion by the 1975 Reconstituted Boards. After considering the results of the 1975 Reconstituted Boards, the ABCMR concluded that it was ". . . reasonable to presume that had [plaintiffs] been considered by properly constituted boards, they would not have been selected for promotion" and that plaintiffs' non-selections by the original 1975 Selection Boards were "neither erroneous nor unjust." Exhibit C to the Complaints; Record at IX-CXXXIII. The ABCMR thereupon rendered its final decision denying plaintiffs' application.

The final decision of the ABCMR was approved by the Secretary and plaintiffs were thereafter individually notified by form letter that they would be terminated from active duty 90 days from receipt of notification. These consolidated actions were then filed seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On January 31, 1977, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction which sought to prevent their scheduled releases from active duty.

The parties agree that the appropriate standard of review in these cases now before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment is whether the ABCMR's decision and the action of the Secretary thereon were arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence or contrary to law and regulations. Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1976).

Plaintiffs have raised several independent arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment. The Court must focus first, however, on plaintiffs' threshold contention that the original 1975 Selection Boards had no jurisdiction to issue non-selections for the purpose of release from active duty because the composition of those Boards did not comply with statutory and regulatory mandates. It is contended that the actions of the original 1975 Selection Boards were void ab initio and not subject to retroactive validation by subsequent actions taken by the 1975 Reconstituted Boards. Plaintiffs assert that they need not attempt to show specific harm or prejudice resulting from the improper composition in order to prevail on the merits.

Plaintiffs rely on two Court of Claims cases in support of their contention that the original 1975 Selection Boards were without jurisdiction: Henderson v. United States, 175 Ct.Cl. 690 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016, 87 S.Ct. 1373, 18 L.Ed.2d 455 (1967), and Ricker v. United States, 396 F.2d 454, 184 Ct.Cl. 402 (1968).

In Henderson, one of the voting members of an Air Force Faculty Board convened for the purpose of determining whether petitioner should be dropped from a pilot training program was junior in rank to petitioner in direct violation of mandatory Air Force regulations. Plaintiff filed suit to recover back pay and allowances. The Court of Claims ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding that the Faculty Board was without jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's case and its proceedings void ab initio, and that the Correction Board's denial of plaintiff's application for relief was arbitrary. 175 Ct.Cl. at 701-702.

Similarly, in Ricker, a member of a Navy Continuation Board had been a member of that Board the previous year, although pursuant to the Hump Act, no officer was to serve on two consecutive boards. See 10 U.S.C. § 5702. Plaintiffs sued for the difference between their retired pay and active duty pay. Finding that the legality of the composition of a military board affects substantial rights of military men, the Court held this violation of a statutory mandate rendered the continuation proceedings fatally defective. 396 F.2d at 457.

Defendants concede that the original 1975 Selection Boards did not have Reserve Officers as members and were therefore improperly constituted. They contend, however, that the decision of the ABCMR to deny plaintiffs relief and the Secretary's action thereon must be upheld because the advisory Reconstituted Boards demonstrated that plaintiffs would not have been promoted even if Reserve Officers had been included as members of the original 1975 Boards, and that therefore, the composition error was harmless. Relying on Knehans v. Callaway, 403 F. Supp. 290 (D.D.C. 1975), defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to show the composition error " necessarily [led] to a non-promotion decision." 403 F. Supp. at 296 (emphasis in original). It is further asserted that under Colm v. Kissinger, 406 F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1975), and Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), the ABCMR's advisory use of the Reconstituted Boards was an appropriate method for determining whether the composition error was prejudicial.

Under applicable statutes and Army regulations, it is clear that membership in Selection Boards shall, where practicable, include at least one Reserve Officer. See 10 U.S.C. § 266, 277; AR 624-100; and Department of Defense Instruction No. 1205.4 (June 23, 1959).

The Court agrees with defendants that this issue cannot be adequately resolved without considering whether the composition defect was prejudicial and therefore declines to expand the narrow rule of law articulated in Henderson, supra, and Ricker, supra, absent any showing of prejudice and without regard to the factual circumstances of these cases.

Inasmuch as these consolidated cases are distinguishable from Henderson and Ricker, analysis should not, as plaintiffs contend, begin and end with the composition of the original 1975 Selection Boards. Here, recognizing that applicable statutes and regulations had not been complied with, the Secretary issued a directive providing that Reconstituted Boards, which were to include members of the Reserves, were to reconsider all officers within the primary zone for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel (AUS) and Major (AUS) in 1975 for the purpose of determining whether or not the composition error resulted in prejudice. When the Reconstituted Boards convened in the summer of 1976, they utilized the same criteria which had applied to the original 1975 Selection Boards. No similar steps were ever undertaken in either Henderson or Ricker.

The ABCMR proceeded to award full relief to those officers selected for promotion by the Reconstituted Boards, and denied relief to those officers, including plaintiffs, who were not selected, concluding that their non-selections by the original 1975 Selection Boards were "neither erroneous nor unjust."

Some officers who had not been selected by the original 1975 Boards were selected by the Reconstituted Boards.

In Colm v. Kissinger, supra, two foreign service officers challenged their involuntary retirements resulting from selection-out procedures. Although the Court in Colm declined to grant relief for reasons not relevant to these cases, the Court recognized that one method of rectifying procedural defects and determining whether the defect in a promotion process caused prejudice is to reconstitute the original selection board. 406 F. Supp. at 1256.

Defendants' "but for" approach to these cases under Knehans v. Callaway, supra, is further strengthened by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, supra. In that case a school teacher was not re-hired because, in part, of conduct the Court considered protected by the First Amendment. The Court remanded for the purpose of affording the School Board the opportunity to prove that plaintiff therein would not have been re-hired, even in the absence of the protected First Amendment conduct. 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576.

Having discovered a procedural irregularity in the 1975 promotion selection process, the ABCMR, with Secretarial approval, took reasonable and appropriate steps to determine whether any officers had been prejudiced by that error, and awarded appropriate full relief in those cases in which prejudice was found to exist.

Plaintiffs herein have shown no prejudice by reason of the composition error, and it is not so obvious that the composition defect necessarily led to the non-promotion decision that the ABCMR should be reversed. Knehans v. Callaway, supra. Courts have long expressed the concern that decisions of agencies should not be reversed for error that is not prejudicial. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 379 F.2d 453 (1967).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the decision of the ABCMR, and the Secretary's approval thereof, to deny plaintiffs' relief on the grounds the original 1975 Selection Boards were improperly constituted after reconstituting the 1975 Selection Boards for the purpose of determining the existence of prejudice, was not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.

A similar conclusion was reached by Chief Judge Elliott in Jones v. Alexander, Civil Action No. 77-10-COL (M.D.Ga., May 20, 1977).

Plaintiffs further contend that with respect to both the original and the Reconstituted 1975 Selection Boards, there was an improper reservation of 15 percent of the number of promotion vacancies for members of the secondary zone, and that with respect to the Fontaine plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 77-0008, and the Powell plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 77-0143, neither of these Boards made the proper factual findings. Plaintiffs also assert that the Secretary's failure to void the original 1975 non-selections resulted in a material error being present in plaintiffs' records before the 1976 Selection Boards. The record indicates that the ABCMR fully considered each of these allegations and declined to grant relief thereon. The Court has likewise considered those allegations, and upon review of the record herein, concludes that the ABCMR's decision, and the action of the Secretary thereon, were not arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence or contrary to law and regulation. Nolen v. Rumsfeld, supra.

Plaintiffs' final contention, that the action of defendants in not requiring a showing of harm by others similarly situated upon the same issues deprives them of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, grows out of the settlement of the case of Mary M. Sliman v. United States, 553 F.2d 104 (Ct.Cl. 1976). This Court believes that plaintiffs' attempts to manufacture an equal protection claim are without merit inasmuch as the compromise of a disputed claim by acceptance or offering of money payment is not a concession of the legal merits of the case. See Autera v. Robinson, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 419 F.2d 1197 (1969). Moreover, the Sliman action was a separate and factually distinct case, the only common issue being whether Reserve Officers should have been included as members of the respective promotion boards.

Wherefore, upon consideration of the foregoing, and it appearing to the Court that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, defendants' motion for summary judgment filed in these four consolidated cases will be granted, and plaintiffs' cross-motion will be denied in each case.

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DILLEY v. ALEXANDER, (D.D.C. 1977)
(Jul 27, 1977)