Opinion by JUDGE PIERCE.Page 329
Plaintiff, Coronado Development Corporation, an Arizona corporation, filed a complaint in the district court seeking review of a decision of defendant, Real Estate Commission of Colorado, which ordered the suspension of plaintiff's subdivision developer's registration and certification for a period of 90 days. Thereafter, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the action was moot because plaintiff had already served the 90 day suspension.
Appealing the order of dismissal, plaintiff contends that the expiration of the imposed period of suspension did not render the action moot since plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer injury to its reputation and good will. We agree and reverse the order of dismissal.
The suspension of plaintiff's registration and certification was based on a finding that plaintiff had violated § 12-61-405(1)(a) (e), C.R.S. 1973, which provides that the registration of a developer may be suspended if the commission determines that the developer:
"(a) Does not have a reputation for competency, honesty, and fair dealing;
. . . .
"(e) Has engaged in illegal or unethical practices with respect to the promotion, sale, or lease of real estate."
We find no Colorado civil case which is in point on this issue. However, in the analogous area of criminal law, the Colorado Supreme Court, recognizing that "[a] sullied name and reputation is the natural by-product of an erroneous conviction," has held that an executed sentence does not necessarily render appellate proceedings moot. Pueblo v. Clemmer, 150 Colo. 546, 375 P.2d 99 (1962); Jackson v. People, 151 Colo. 171, 376 P.2d 991 (1962).
[1] Here, plaintiff was found to have violated statutory provisions which relate directly to its reputation for honesty and fair dealing. Furthermore, in its petition for review, plaintiff specifically complained of the continuing harmful effect which the commission's decision had on its reputation. Finally, plaintiff notes that the decision would be a matter of public record. Section 12-61-112, C.R.S. 1973. Under these circumstances, plaintiff's action to review the decision of the Real Estate Commission was not moot even though the period of suspension had expired. Cf. Jackson v. People, supra.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate plaintiff's complaint.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE ENOCH concur.