HUNEYCUTT v. HUNEYCUTT

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Docket Number

No. 8858

Attorney(S)

Guild, Hagen Clark, Ltd., Reno, for Appellant. Hoy Miller, Chtd., Reno, for Respondent.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from portions of a divorce decree concerning the distribution of property. The appellant seeks to remand the case to the district court to pursue motions for relief from judgment under NRCP 60(b) and for a new trial under NRCP 59(a), based on newly discovered evidence of community property that was not included in the original property distribution. The court addresses the procedural posture of whether such motions can be pursued in the district court after an appeal has been filed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the district court retains authority to consider motions for relief from judgment or a new trial under NRCP 60(b) and NRCP 59(a) after a notice of appeal has been filed.
Whether it is appropriate for the appellate court to remand the case to the district court to consider such motions prior to resolution of the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Layton v. State, 89 Nev. 252, 510 P.2d 864 (1973)	District court lacks authority to grant a new trial after notice of appeal is filed; may certify inclination to grant new trial to appellate court.	The court analogized the procedure in criminal cases to civil cases, emphasizing the district court’s limited authority after appeal and the proper process for remand.
Smith v. Pollin, 194 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1952)	Federal civil procedure mandates that district courts cannot grant new trials once appeal is pending; motions should be heard and certified before remand.	The court adopted this federal procedural approach as appropriate for civil cases in Nevada, requiring motions to be heard first in the district court.
Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 553 P.2d 464 (Hawaii 1976)	Endorsed procedure of district courts hearing motions post-appeal and certifying inclination to grant relief before remand.	The court cited this case to support the soundness and efficiency of the procedure, reinforcing the rejection of premature remand.
Ryan v. United States Lines Company, 303 F.2d 430 (2nd Cir. 1962); Ferrell v. Trailmobile, Inc., 223 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1955); Herring v. Kennedy-Herring Hardware Company, 261 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1958); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1960); Greear v. Greear, 288 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1961); Aune v. Reynders, 344 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1965); Duriron Company v. Bakke, 431 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1967)	Federal circuits and states adopting the procedure that district courts cannot grant new trials after appeal but may hear motions and certify inclination.	These cases collectively demonstrate widespread acceptance of the procedure the court applies, reinforcing its legitimacy and appropriateness.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the procedural framework under NRCP 59(a) and 60(b), which parallel federal rules, noting that neither set addresses motions after an appeal is filed. Drawing on precedent from criminal cases (Layton v. State) and federal civil cases (Smith v. Pollin), the court held that the district court lacks authority to grant a new trial or relief once an appeal is pending but may hear motions and certify its inclination to grant relief. This certification would then justify a remand from the appellate court. The court found this approach to be sound, efficient, and widely adopted in federal circuits and other states. Consequently, the court concluded that the appellant’s motion to remand was premature and improper, as the district court had not yet heard the motions or indicated willingness to grant relief.

Holding and Implications

The appellant's motion to remand is denied.

The direct effect of this decision is that the appellant must first file and have her motions heard in the district court. Only if the district court certifies an inclination to grant relief may the appellate court consider remanding the case. This ruling clarifies procedural protocol for post-appeal motions under NRCP 59(a) and 60(b) in Nevada but does not establish new substantive precedent beyond procedural guidance. The case remains on appeal without interruption for remand at this stage.

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KRISTIN E. HUNEYCUTT, APPELLANT, v. HARRY CARR HUNEYCUTT, RESPONDENT.

OPINION

Per Curiam:

This appeal, which is in progress, is from the portions of a divorce decree distributing property. The case is before us on appellant's motion to remand so that she may pursue motions in the district court for relief from judgment under NRCP 60(b) and for a new trial under NRCP 59(a).

At this juncture, and in the posture of this proceeding, we are not concerned with the time constraints imposed by the two rules.

In support of the motion, appellant alleges she has just discovered new evidence regarding a substantial amount of community property which existed at the time the divorce was granted, but was not included in the property distributed by the trial court. The motion to remand is denied.

NRCP 59(a) and NRCP 60(b) are patterned after the same numbered Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither set of rules addresses the mechanics of pursuing such motions after an appeal is filed; and, the issue has not been before us in a civil case.

In a criminal case, where we were asked to remand because of a claim that new evidence had been discovered after the appeal had been lodged, we stated: "The district court has no authority to grant a new trial once the notice of appeal has been filed. It may, however, hear the motion, and certify that it is inclined to grant it. At that juncture remand would be appropriate." Layton v. State, 89 Nev. 252, 254, 510 P.2d 864, 865 (1973). Our decision in Layton relied on federal court interpretation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 after which our "new trial" statute (NRS 176.515(3)) was patterned. See the cases cited in Layton at 254, 510 P.2d at 865.

The federal courts have also adopted the same procedure for making such motions after an appeal is filed in civil cases. See Smith v. Pollin, 194 F.2d 349, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1952), where the court said:

It is clear that the District Court could not grant a motion for a new trial in a case which is pending in this court upon appeal. Jurisdiction of the case is in this court while the appeal is pending. So the rule of law applicable to civil cases is exactly the same as the specific statement in Criminal Rule 33. That being so, we think that the procedure already established for criminal cases can be established for civil cases also.

Reported cases indicate that six (6) other federal circuits and at least two (2) states (Hawaii and Alaska) have adopted the Smith procedure for civil cases. This procedure has been characterized as "sound in theory and preferable in practice." 11 Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civ. § 2873 (1973). "We agree with the view . . . that the described procedure `is proper and calculated to be most economical of the effort of courts and parties.'" Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 553 P.2d 464, 466 (Hawaii 1976). Therefore, it is unnecessary and improper for appellant to apply to this court for remand. Her motions should be filed and heard in the district court. If that court is inclined to grant relief, then it should so certify to this court and, at that juncture, a request for remand would be appropriate.

Ryan v. United States Lines Company, 303 F.2d 430 (2nd Cir. 1962); Ferrell v. Trailmobile, Inc., 223 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1955); Herring v. Kennedy-Herring Hardware Company, 261 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1958); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1960); Greear v. Greear, 288 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1961); Aune v. Reynders, 344 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1965); Duriron Company v. Bakke, 431 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1967); Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 553 P.2d 464 (Hawaii 1976).

Appellant's motion to remand is denied.