Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN.
Plaintiffs' C.R.C.P. 106 action was dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party. On appeal by plaintiffs, we reverse.
The City of Arvada initiated an ordinance for the rezoning of approximately nine acres of land in the City, and following a public hearing, the City Council passed the ordinance rezoning the area from RM (24 units per acre) to RMD (12 units per acre). The ordinance was adopted on December 20, 1976, and on January 19, 1977, plaintiffs, landowners in the affected area, filed their action, seeking to set aside the ordinance.
Named as defendants were the City of Arvada and the City Council of Arvada. Thereafter several persons who also owned land either within, or immediately adjacent to, the rezoned area were permitted to intervene as parties defendant. On May 19, 1977, plaintiffs moved for substitution of parties, stating that at the time the complaint was filed Donald Harmelink, who was a named plaintiff, and Lee Fieccobrino, who was not so named, were joint owners of a parcel of the rezoned land, that Fieccobrino was now the sole owner of the property, and that thus he should be substituted for Harmelink.
Thereupon, the defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground that Fieccobrino was an indispensable party who had not been timely joined. Relying, inter alia, on Hidden Lake Development Co. v. District Court, 183 Colo. 168, 515 P.2d 632 (1973), the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Thus, the issue to be determined is whether Fieccobrino was an indispensable party. We hold that he was not, and that dismissal of the action was improper.
[1] Hidden Lake, supra, and its numerous progeny hold that a C.R.C.P. 106 proceeding must be perfected within the time prescribed by the rule or applicable statute. "Perfection" requires the timely joinder of all indispensable parties. Norby v. City of Boulder, 195 Colo. 231, 577 P.2d 277. An applicant for a rezoning change is an indispensable party. Norby, supra; Hidden Lake, supra. Here the City of Arvada, which initiated the ordinance, and the City Council, the agency, were both joined as defendants. Hence, the requirements of Hidden Lake were met.
[2] The rights of those who approve the rezoning are generally held to be protected by the governmental agency which enacted the ordinance, see Denver Chapter Colorado Motel Ass'n, Inc. v. City County of Denver, 150 Colo. 524, 374 P.2d 494 (1962), but may be permitted to intervene as defendants if their rights are not otherwise protected. Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d 96 (1963).
[3] On the other hand, any landowner in the rezoned area may challenge the validity of the rezoning ordinance, The Dillon Companies, Inc. v. The City of Boulder, 183 Colo. 117, 515 P.2d 627 (1973), and any landowner in the rezoned area has "an interest relating to the property" which entitles him to intervene as a party plaintiff under C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). The Dillon Companies, supra. However, it is not necessary for one objecting to the ordinance to join as plaintiffs all other objectors for, as stated in Crozier v. County Commissioners, 202 Md. 501, 97 A.2d 296, 37 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1953):
"If one has alleged special damage and is entitled to sue: '. . . it neither adds nor detracts from that right if he brings others with him or attempts to represent those who have not appeared. His right is based upon his own injury and damage, not upon that of his neighbors or fellow citizens' [ Weinberg v. Kracke, 189 Md. 275, 55 A.2d 797.]"
See, e.g., Bird v. Colorado Springs, 176 Colo. 32, 489 P.2d 324 (1971).
Here, plaintiffs, Claude A. and Eileen M. Stanton, who are also landowners in the rezoned area, and who have remained parties throughout the proceedings, are proper parties in their own right, with standing to sue. Consequently, the right to maintain the action was present, Denver Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School District No. 1, 188 Colo. 310, 535 P.2d 200 (1975), and thus even if the absence of the co-tenant had deprived Harmelink of standing, which we do not decide, dismissal of the action in its entirety was error.
[4] Therefore, the action was timely perfected since the indispensable parties were before the court. Further, the motion for substitution of Fieccobrino, not having any effect on the jurisdiction of the court, should have been granted.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the complaint and to substitute Fieccobrino as a party plaintiff.
JUDGE PIERCE and JUDGE KELLY concur.