ROBERTS, Justice.
A jury convicted appellant, Richard Brightwell, of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, resisting arrest and possession of firearms without a license. The trial court struck the verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Appellant filed post-verdict motions but, before argument, the court permitted trial counsel to withdraw. New counsel filed additional motions. The court denied all motions and sentenced appellant on the murder conviction to imprisonment of ten to twenty years and fined him $500.00 and costs. The court suspended sentence on the other charges. Appellant contends that (1) insufficient evidence exists to support the verdict of guilty of murder of the third degree; (2) replacement of trial counsel on post-verdict motions denied him effective assistance of counsel and equal protection; (3) the prosecutor committed reversible error when he cross-examined appellant concerning his failure to call certain witnesses; (4) the court erroneously charged the jury that appellant had the burden of proving self-defense; and (5) the verdict of guilty of both murder of the third degree and voluntary manslaughter was contrary to law. We affirm.
We hear the appeal from the judgment of sentence on the conviction of murder of the third degree pursuant to the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. II, § 202(1), 17 Pa.C.S.A. § 211.202(1) (Supp. 1978). The Superior Court, pursuant to the Act, § 503(c), 17 Pa.C.S.A. § 211.503 (c), has transferred to this Court the appeals from judgments of sentence on the other convictions.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976), the evidence shows that appellant and his girlfriend, Nannie Brown, quarrelled because appellant supposedly was seeing another woman. Appellant moved out of their residence and into a local YMCA. On June 24, 1974, appellant sought out Brown at a service station, where he discovered her in a phone booth. Appellant called for her to come out, but she refused. Appellant then began to approach her. Brown drew a pistol, pointed it at the ground and fired. Appellant retreated to his car and drove away. Ten minutes later, appellant returned with a gun. Brown ran into the station garage, pursued by appellant. It is unclear whether Brown fired another shot as appellant advanced towards her. Appellant entered the garage, grabbed Brown, threw her to the floor and announced, "Bitch, this is it." Appellant leveled his gun at her head and fired five shots, striking her four times. Appellant then ran outside and fled in his car. This evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of murder of the third degree. See Commonwealth v. Walley, 466 Pa. 363, 353 A.2d 396 (1976); Commonwealth v. Walker, 447 Pa. 146, 288 A.2d 741 (1972).
Appellant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel, before arguing post-verdict motions, withdrew to assume a position in the district attorney's office. Appellant, however, has not indicated how he was denied effective representation. He does not point out any issue new counsel failed to raise or otherwise describe some course of conduct counsel should have pursued but did not. Indeed, new counsel filed supplemental post-verdict motions raising the issues upon which appellant now relies, whereas trial counsel filed only boiler-plate motions. Appellant has therefore failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that counsel failed to perform some act necessary to effective representation. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
During cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked appellant whether there was any reason why he had not contacted a certain witness and had him testify. Appellant immediately objected and requested a mistrial. The court denied the motion but thoroughly cautioned the jury that it was to disregard the question and at all times keep in mind that the defense need not present any evidence in its favor because the burden of proof always rests upon the Commonwealth. This instruction was sufficient to dispel any prejudice caused by the prosecutor's improper question. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 477 Pa. 180, 383 A.2d 882 (1978) (cautionary instruction cured prejudice of prosecutor's remark implying that defendant threatened witnesses); Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680 (1974) (immediate instruction cured prosecutor's comment implying that defendant declined to call witness because the testimony would not be favorable); see generally Taylor v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978) (emphasizing importance of careful instructions).
"Q: Is there any reason why you have not contacted him to bring him in?
MR. SMITH: Objection. May we see Your Honor at side bar?
THE COURT: Yes."
After the side-bar discussion, the Court instructed the Jury:
"THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am going to specifically instruct you and also caution you at the present time that you are to totally exclude from your minds the last question.
Let me say that this defendant, as well as any defendant under our system of jurisprudence, has absolutely no obligation, no duty whatsoever to present any testimony, no duty or no obligation to present any witnesses.
Every defendant, as does this defendant, walks into this courtroom presumed to be innocent; and the Commonwealth has the burden throughout the entire trial to prove the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and that burden never shifts whether the defendant testifies, presents any testimony, or what happens. That burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt remains with the Commonwealth throughout the entire trial.
I trust that you will bear in mind all of those principles and the fact that the defendant has no duty or obligation to present testimony."
Appellant next contends that the court erroneously charged the jury that appellant had the burden of proving self-defense. At one point in the charge, the court stated, "If he [appellant] had failed in proving self-defense then you will turn your attention . . .." The court's charge, in its entirety, however, clearly placed the burden of proving all elements of the crime upon the Commonwealth and expressly instructed that the jury could find appellant guilty only if the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had not acted in self-defense. Thus, the court did not err. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529, 345 A.2d 645 (1975); compare Commonwealth v. Lesher, 473 Pa. 141, 373 A.2d 1088 (1977) (no correct instruction on self-defense required reversal) and Commonwealth v. Heatherington, 477 Pa. 562, 385 A.2d 338 (1978) (same).
"THE COURT: Even though self-defense is what we call an affirmative defense, it is the burden of the Commonwealth throughout the entire case to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Where a defendant sets up self-defense, as was done in this case, to justify or excuse a killing, the evidence relied upon, whether it comes from his side of the case or from the Commonwealth's side, or from both, must be weighed by you in determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden of proof. Hence you may find the defendant guilty only if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not justified under the circumstances in reasonably believing that the use of deadly force was then and there necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily injury. On the other hand, if you are not so satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt then you may find that self-defense has been established, that the killing was justifiable and, therefore, acquit the defendant on all of the homicide charges."
Finally, appellant asserts that the jury could not lawfully return a verdict of guilty of both murder of the third degree and voluntary manslaughter. This issue has not been preserved for appellate review. When the jury returned its verdict, and before the court accepted it, the court called counsel to side bar and informed them that "it is my understanding that the verdict in this case would be recorded as guilty of murder in the third degree. . . . Do you agree on that?" Both counsel agreed. The court then announced that appellant had been found guilty of murder of the third degree. Again, appellant did not interpose an objection. Had appellant objected and the court determined the verdict was inconsistent, the court could have directed the jury to retire and reconsider its verdict. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 369 Pa. 120, 85 A.2d 171 (1952); Commonwealth v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 117 A. 211 (1922). By waiting until post-verdict motions to raise the issue, appellant deprived the court of an opportunity to correct any error. Consequently, appellant may not now complain of inconsistency in the verdict. Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974).
"THE COURT: Gentlemen, so that there will be no doubt, I will question the jury if you have any questions about this, but it is my understanding the verdict in this case would be recorded as guilty of murder in the third degree. Since voluntary manslaughter is automatically incorporated in that, third degree is a higher degree.
Do you agree on that?
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
MR. COLL: Yes sir.
THE COURT: Therefore, the remaining indictments are obviously guilty, resisting arrest and possession of firearms. Is that agreed?
MR. COLL: Yes, sir.
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right.
(End of side-bar discussion.)
THE COURT: Mr. Smith, will you bring the defendant forward, please.
(Defendant before the Bar of the Court.)
THE COURT: Mr. Brightwell, you have been found guilty by the jury of various crimes or offenses, namely, third degree murder and possession of firearms without a license, and resisting arrest. . . ."
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.