MADAFFARI v. WILMOD CO, N.Y. Misc., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Mokotoff, Viders Mondshine (Michael E. Rosoff of counsel), for plaintiff. Griffin Scully (Gerald M. Griffin of counsel), for Wilmod Company, Inc., defendant. Flynn Gibbons for Ethen Celelei and another, defendants. Dwyer Duffy (Charles P. Duffy of counsel), for Borneo Sumatra Trading Company, third-party defendant. Miller, Harten Harten (Milton H. Miller of counsel), for Triangle Aluminum Products Co., third-party defendant.

Judges

LOUIS GROSSMAN, J

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Cosmo Madaffari, employed by third-party defendant Triangle Aluminum Products Co., Inc. ("Triangle"), was injured on April 17, 1974, while working at Triangle's premises in Bayside, New York. Plaintiff initiated an action against the premises' owners, Ethen and Meral Celelei, and Wilmod Company, Inc. ("Wilmod"). The action against the property owners concerned scaffolding on the roof, with Wilmod responsible for anchoring the scaffold using defective nails supplied by third-party defendant Borneo Sumatra Trading Co. ("Borneo"). Multiple cross-complaints and counterclaims were filed among the parties.

A tentative partial settlement was reached among Triangle, plaintiff, and Celelei whereby Triangle's insurer would pay plaintiff a set amount, plaintiff would stipulate as to his share of the recovery, and both plaintiff and Celelei would release Triangle. Plaintiff would continue his suit against Wilmod, and Wilmod would pursue its claim against Borneo. Triangle moved for summary judgment dismissing Wilmod's third-party complaint and Borneo's cross-complaint against Triangle, seeking an order of discontinuance with prejudice conditioned on the settlement's finalization.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a general release or settlement between the plaintiff and a third-party defendant (Triangle) discharges other tortfeasors or affects their claims against each other under New York General Obligations Law § 15-108.
Whether the third-party defendant Triangle is entitled to an order of discontinuance with prejudice upon such a settlement.
How the principles of contribution and apportionment apply among joint tortfeasors when one tortfeasor settles and is released by the plaintiff.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mielcarek v Knights, 50 A.D.2d 122	Establishes that a tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff and obtains a release is entitled to discontinuance with prejudice and need not participate further in the trial against remaining tortfeasors.	The court applied this precedent to support granting Triangle's motion for discontinuance with prejudice conditioned on the settlement's finalization.
Driscoll v New York City Tr. Auth., 53 A.D.2d 391	Allows the remaining tortfeasors to present evidence of the released tortfeasor's conduct and to have the jury instructed on apportionment of liability even if that tortfeasor is not present at trial.	The court held that Triangle's name and actions must remain in the case for jury consideration and apportionment despite the discontinuance of Triangle's active participation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the application of New York General Obligations Law § 15-108, which governs the effect of releases or covenants not to sue among joint tortfeasors. The statute preserves the injured party's rights while reducing claims against other tortfeasors by the amount of the release or the released tortfeasor's equitable share of damages. It also protects the released tortfeasor from contribution claims by others.

The court extended these principles logically to the settlement between the plaintiff and a third-party defendant, Triangle, noting that Triangle is considered a tortfeasor under the statute despite being a third-party defendant due to Workers' Compensation Law restrictions. Because the settlor tortfeasor (Triangle) is entitled to credit for its equitable share or amount paid, other tortfeasors do not need to seek contribution from it.

Accordingly, Triangle is entitled to an order of discontinuance with prejudice, conditioned on the settlement's finalization. However, Triangle's name and conduct must remain in the case and pleadings so that the remaining tortfeasors can present evidence of Triangle's liability and have the jury instructed on apportionment, ensuring a fair division of fault.

Holding and Implications

The court granted third-party defendant Triangle Aluminum Products Co., Inc.'s motion for summary judgment, treating it as a motion for an order of discontinuance with prejudice, conditioned on the finalization of the tentative settlement.

The direct effect is that Triangle will be dismissed from active participation in the case upon settlement, but its liability and role remain part of the case for apportionment purposes. No new precedent was established; rather, the court applied and extended existing statutory principles and case law to the present procedural posture involving third-party defendants.

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COSMO MADAFFARI, Plaintiff, v. WILMOD COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants WILMOD COMPANY, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff,

LOUIS GROSSMAN, J

Motion for an order granting summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint of the third-party plaintiff, Wilmod Company, Inc. ("Wilmod"), against third-party defendant Triangle Aluminum Products Co., Inc. ("Triangle"), and the cross complaint of third-party defendant Borneo Sumatra Trading Co. ("Borneo") against third-party defendant Triangle.

Plaintiff was employed by Triangle. On April 17, 1974, plaintiff was injured while in Triangle's employ at premises in Bayside, New York. He instituted an action against Ethen and Meral Celelei ("Celelei"), owners of the premises, and Wilmod. The basis of the action against the owners of the property relates to scaffolding in use on the roof of the premises. Wilmod was responsible for the anchoring of the scaffold which proved defective due to defective nails. Borneo supplied the nails to Wilmod. Various cross complaints and counterclaims were interposed between the parties.

At this juncture, a tentative partial disposition has been agreed to between Triangle, plaintiff and Celelei. Triangle's carrier would pay to plaintiff a set amount. Plaintiff would agree to a stipulation relating to his share of the recovery. Plaintiff and Celelei would give general releases to Triangle. Plaintiff would then continue his lawsuit against Wilmod and Wilmod would continue its action against Borneo.

The complication which caused Triangle to bring this motion is that Wilmod and Borneo have stated that their actions against Triangle will continue to exist despite the proposed settlement.

Movant brings this motion based upon section 15-108 Gen. Oblig. of the General Obligations Law, which reads in pertinent part, as follows:

"Release or covenant not to sue.

"(a) Effect of release of or covenant not to sue tortfeasors. When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given to one of two or more persons liable or claimed to be liable in tort for the same injury, or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms expressly so provide, but it reduces the claim of the releasor against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, or in the amount of the released tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages under article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules, whichever is the greatest.

"(b) Release of tortfeasor. A release given in good faith by the injured person to one tortfeasor as provided in subdivision (a) relieves him from liability to any other person for contribution as provided in article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules." (Emphasis added.)

Although, at this time, there exists only a tenative settlement between the plaintiff, Madaffari, and third-party defendant Triangle, the court will, for purposes of discussion, treat it as a finalized settlement.

This section providing that a general release given to one tort-feasor does not discharge any other tort-feasor unless the release so provides not only preserves the rights of the injured party, but also preserves any right of contribution which another tort-feasor may have against the released tort-feasor. Also, this section applies only to the right to contribution between joint tort-feasors and has no effect on any rights to indemnity which may exist between the parties.

Although there is no mention in the section itself or in the case law presently existing of the effect of a settlement between an original plaintiff and a third-party defendant, the court believes that application of the principles set forth in section 15-108 of the General Obligations Law to such settlements would be a logical extension of the intent of the section. This is especially true in the case at hand, since the only reason that Triangle is not an original defendant is because of the Workers' Compensation Law, which barred such an action by the plaintiff. The language of the third-party complaint and the cross complaint clearly identify Triangle as a tort-feasor within the intent of section 15-108 Gen. Oblig. of the General Obligations Law.

Since, under subdivision (a) of this section, any other tort-feasors are entitled to credit for the amount of the settlor's equitable share of the liability or the amount actually paid by the settlor for the release, there is no need for the remaining tort-feasors to claim contribution from the settler. A tort-feasor who settles with and obtains a release from the plaintiff and as to whom the plaintiff is willing to discontinue its action is entitled to an order of discontinuance with prejudice and is not required to attend and participate as a party defendant in the trial of the action against the remaining tort-feasors. (Mielcarek v Knights, 50 A.D.2d 122.)

While Triangle, the settlor tort-feasor, would not have to be physically present in the continued trial of this action, their name could not be totally deleted from the case nor from the pleadings. The remaining tort-feasors would be entitled to put before the jury both the name and the actions of Triangle and have the court charge the jury on the law relating to apportionment between joint tort-feasors where one of the tort-feasors is not present in the court, in order to secure from the jury a fair verdict relative to the division of culpability in the happening of the instant accident. (Driscoll v New York City Tr. Auth. 53 A.D.2d 391.)

Accordingly, third-party defendant Triangle's motion for summary judgment is considered by the court as a motion for an order of discontinuance with prejudice and, as such, is granted upon the condition that the heretofore mentioned tentative settlement is finalized.

MADAFFARI v. WILMOD CO