Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Attorney(S)

Guy W. Wolf III, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state). Jerrold H. Barnett, public defender, with whom were Joette K. Rub in, assistant public defender, and, on the brief, Phillip N. Armentano, public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

Judges

PER CURIAM.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: State of Connecticut v. Jose Gonzalez (Supreme Court of Connecticut, Dec. 5, 1978)

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Jose Gonzalez, was charged by information with burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes Sec. 53a-103. The case was tried to the court (Judge Adorno) in the Court of Common Pleas in the thirteenth geographical area, and the trial court entered judgment of guilty. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Session of the Superior Court (judges A. Healey, Parskey and Santaniello), which found error, set the judgment aside and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of not guilty. The state sought and obtained certification to appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The central factual question at trial, as described in the opinion, was whether the defendant had made an entry into a building — an element necessary to sustain a burglary conviction under Sec. 53a-103. The opinion states that the evidence on the entry question was entirely circumstantial.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made an illegal entry into a building, an essential element of burglary in the third degree under General Statutes Sec. 53a-103.
Whether permissible inferences drawn from entirely circumstantial evidence in this case reasonably and logically supported a finding of entry beyond a reasonable doubt.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 214 A.2d 362	Permissible inferences from evidence must follow reasonably and logically from all the facts.	The court cited Taylor when describing the standard that inferences relied upon by the State must be reasonable and logical in light of all facts; it concluded the State's inferences did not meet that requirement in this case.
State v. Kohlfuss, 152 Conn. 625, 211 A.2d 143	Evidence must be sufficient to show affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that an illegal entry occurred to constitute burglary.	The court invoked Kohlfuss to underscore that proof of an illegal entry is an affirmative requirement and must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; the court found that requirement unmet here.
State v. McGinnis, 158 Conn. 124, 256 A.2d 241	There is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to probative force.	The court acknowledged this principle from McGinnis but nonetheless concluded that, despite the acceptability of circumstantial proof in principle, the circumstantial evidence in this case was insufficient to prove entry beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Annunziato, 145 Conn. 124, 139 A.2d 612	Definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt: proof that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except the one it supports (i.e., consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion).	The court applied this standard in assessing the sufficiency of the State's circumstantial evidence and concluded the proof did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.
State v. Smith, 156 Conn. 378, 242 A.2d 763	Illustrative precedent where substantial evidence established that an entry had in fact occurred.	The court distinguished the present facts from Smith, noting that in Smith there was substantial evidence of entry, whereas here the evidence did not reach that level.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focused narrowly on whether the proof established the essential element of illegal entry. The opinion identifies the following analytical steps, grounded in the authorities it cites:

The Court recognized that the evidence on the entry question was entirely circumstantial.
The Court reiterated the governing rule that, while there is no legal distinction in probative force between direct and circumstantial evidence (citing State v. McGinnis), the prosecution still must prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
It applied the standard for reasonable doubt articulated in State v. Annunziato: culpability requires proof that precludes every reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with guilt.
Relying on State v. Taylor, the Court considered whether permissible inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence followed reasonably and logically from all the facts; it found that they did not.
The Court compared the present record to State v. Smith (an example in which substantial evidence established entry) and concluded the present facts were distinguishable because Smith contained substantial evidence of entry while the present case did not.
On the basis of these principles and their application to the record, the Court agreed with the Appellate Session's conclusion that the State had failed to sustain its burden to prove illegal entry beyond a reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

The Appellate Session's judgment setting aside the conviction and directing that a judgment of not guilty be rendered was affirmed.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: the trial court's guilty judgment was set aside and the case was to be resolved by entry of a judgment of not guilty, consistent with the Appellate Session's directive.
Broader implications: the opinion applies established Connecticut standards regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the use of circumstantial evidence, but it does not announce a new rule of law; the decision turns on the court's conclusion that the particular circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient to establish entry beyond a reasonable doubt.

Source: Opinion text provided (Supreme Court of Connecticut, Dec. 5, 1978). All summaries and characterizations above are limited to information expressly stated in that opinion.

Show full summary ...

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSE GONZALEZ

PER CURIAM.

After a trial to the court, the defendant was found guilty of burglary in the third degree in violation of 53a-103 of the General Statutes. In an appeal by the defendant, the Appellate Session of the Superior Court found error, set the judgment aside and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of not guilty. On the granting of certification, the state appealed to this court from that judgment.

"[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-103. BURGLARY IN THE THIRD DEGREE: CLASS n FELONY. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to crime a crime therein."

The case turned upon the issue of whether there was an entry by the defendant into a building. The evidence on this question was entirely circumstantial. The Appellate Session concluded that the state failed to prove such an entry beyond a reasonable doubt; that permissible inferences from the evidence did not follow reasonably and logically from all the facts; see State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 78, 214 A.2d 362, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921, 86 S.Ct. 1372, 16 L.Ed.2d 442; and that the argument that entry was proven by inference was without substance.

The evidence must be sufficient to show affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an illegal entry to constitute a. burglary under the statute. Cf. State v. Kohlfuss, 152 Conn. 625, 638-39, 211 A.2d 143. Although there is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned; State v. McGinnis, 158 Conn. 124, 129, 256 A.2d 241;" [a] conclusion of guilt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof to that extent is proof which precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support, and is consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion." State v. Annunziato, 145 Conn. 124, 136, 139 A.2d 612. The facts of the present case may be distinguished from those in State v. Smith, 156 Conn. 378, 381-82, 242 A.2d 763, where there was substantial evidence establishing that an entry had in fact occurred.

Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, we agree with the conclusion of the Appellate Session that the state had failed to sustain its burden.

STATE v. GONZALEZ