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Smart Summary

People v. Powell, Docket No. 78-322 (Mich. Ct. App. May 21, 1979)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant pled guilty on May 24, 1977, to armed robbery (MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797) and to possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2)). He was sentenced to 20 to 39 years on the robbery charge and to the mandatory consecutive two-year possession term. On appeal, defendant argued that the factual basis presented at his plea did not support his felony-firearm conviction and that being convicted on both counts violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the factual basis elicited during the plea proceedings supported defendant's conviction under the felony-firearm statute (MCL 750.227b).
  2. Whether conviction for both armed robbery (MCL 750.529) and felony-firearm (MCL 750.227b) violates the Federal and state constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The factual basis elicited at the plea hearing did not establish that defendant personally possessed a firearm, and therefore did not support a conviction under the felony-firearm statute.
  • Conviction on both armed robbery and felony-firearm is impermissible double punishment because it would require proof of the same facts for both offenses.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich. App. 654; 272 N.W.2d 605 (1978) The language of the felony-firearm statute contemplates "personal" possession of a firearm by the defendant. Majority relied on Walter Johnson to conclude that MCL 750.227b requires personal possession and that the record showed the felony-firearm conviction here rested on the codefendant's possession.
People v Chamblis, 88 Mich. App. 734; 279 N.W.2d 541 (1978) Cited in connection with the double jeopardy analysis. Majority cited Chamblis to support the view that convicting and punishing on both underlying felony and felony-firearm can violate double jeopardy where the same facts must be proved.
People v Tavolacci, 88 Mich. App. 470; 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979) Argues that MCL 750.227b does not require proof of personal possession. Quoted in the dissent (Cynar, J.) as authority for the position that the statute need not be limited to personal possession.
People v Doemer, 35 Mich. App. 149, 151-152; 192 N.W.2d 330 (1971) Support for the proposition that one can be convicted as an aider and abettor to the offense of felony-firearm. Cited in the dissent to support the view that aider-and-abettor liability applies to felony-firearm charges.
People v Spry, 74 Mich. App. 584, 594; 254 N.W.2d 782 (1977) To convict as an aider and abettor, a person must assist another with knowledge that a criminal act is contemplated. Cited in the dissent to describe the mens rea and conduct requirements for aider-and-abettor liability.
People v Penn, 70 Mich. App. 638, 649; 247 N.W.2d 575 (1976) Also cited for principles governing aider-and-abettor liability. Referenced in the dissent alongside Spry to explain the requisite assistance and knowledge for aider and abettor convictions.
People v Haack, 396 Mich. 367, 376-377; 240 N.W.2d 704 (1976) When pleading guilty to aiding and abetting, there must be a substantial factual basis for the plea and the plea must represent a well-considered and well-advised choice. Cited in the dissent to emphasize that the record must provide a substantial factual basis for an aiding-and-abetting guilty plea to felony-firearm.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The majority reasoned as follows:

  1. Defendant's plea hearing testimony showed the felony-firearm sentence was imposed based on the codefendant's possession of a firearm rather than on defendant's personal possession.
  2. The court agreed with People v Walter Johnson that the felony-firearm statute (MCL 750.227b) is best understood to require "personal" possession by the defendant.
  3. Given that conclusion, the court found that proving armed robbery and proving felony-firearm in this case would require proof of the same facts; thus convicting and punishing on both counts would offend the prohibitions against double jeopardy under the Federal and state constitutions.
  4. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction under MCL 750.227b and affirmed the armed robbery conviction under MCL 750.529.

The opinion contains a separate dissent (Cynar, J.), which disagreed with the majority's statutory interpretation. The dissent argued that MCL 750.227b does not require personal possession and that one may be convicted as an aider and abettor for felony-firearm (citing People v Tavolacci, People v Doemer, and aiding-and-abetting authorities). The dissent also reviewed the defendant's plea statements (including that he observed the codefendant with a gun and combined with the codefendant in use of the gun) and concluded the guilty plea to both charges was supported by the record and should be affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court reversed defendant's conviction under MCL 750.227b (felony-firearm) and affirmed defendant's conviction for armed robbery under MCL 750.529.

Consequences: The direct effect is that the felony-firearm conviction and its mandatory consecutive two-year term were vacated, while the armed robbery conviction and sentence were left intact. The opinion rests on statutory interpretation and double jeopardy analysis under existing authorities; the court did not announce a broader new rule beyond its application of precedents in this case.

PEOPLE v. POWELL

D.E. HOLBROOK, P.J.

Defendant pled guilty May 24, 1977, to charges of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to from 20 to 39 years on the robbery charge and to the mandatory consecutive two-year possession term. The defendant appeals of right, alleging that the factual basis elicited during his plea proceedings does not support his conviction for possession of a firearm and that his conviction on both counts violates the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy.

The testimony elicited in support of the defendant's plea indicates that he was sentenced under MCL 750.227b as a result of his codefendant's possession of a firearm. We agree with the holding of People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich. App. 654; 272 N.W.2d 605 (1978), that the language of the felony-firearm statute clearly contemplates "personal" possession of a firearm by the defendant.

Further, we find that it would be necessary to prove the same facts to convict defendant under the armed robbery charge and to convict defendant under the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony charge. Conviction of both offenses offends the double jeopardy provision of the Federal and state constitutions prohibiting being twice convicted and punished for the same offense. See People v Walter Johnson, supra (dissent by KAUFMAN, J.) and People v Chamblis, 88 Mich. App. 734; 279 N.W.2d 541 (1978).

For these reasons, defendant's conviction under MCL 750.227b is reversed. Defendant's conviction for armed robbery under MCL 750.529 is affirmed.

D.E. HOLBROOK, JR., J., concurred.

CYNAR, J. (dissenting).

I do not believe that MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2) requires proof of personal possession of the firearm. See my opinion in People v Tavolacci, 88 Mich. App. 470; 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979). I believe that one can be convicted as an aider and abettor to the offense of felony firearm. See MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979 and People v Doemer, 35 Mich. App. 149, 151-152; 192 N.W.2d 330 (1971). See also Judge KAUFMAN'S opinion in People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich. App. 654; 272 N.W.2d 605 (1978).

To be convicted as an aider and abettor one must assist another in the commission of a crime with knowledge that a criminal act is contemplated. People v Spry, 74 Mich. App. 584, 594; 254 N.W.2d 782 (1977), People v Penn, 70 Mich. App. 638, 649; 247 N.W.2d 575 (1976). When one pleads guilty to aiding and abetting an offense, there must be a substantial factual basis for the plea and the plea must represent a well-considered and well-advised choice by the defendant. People v Haack, 396 Mich. 367, 376-377; 240 N.W.2d 704 (1976).

Appellant stated he and his codefendant intended to commit a robbery to "get some money". They entered the car and said: "This is a stick up." Powell had a knife in his hand and the victim gave them a dollar. Powell, while in the car, observed Reynolds with a gun. He described in detail Reynolds' use of the gun during the robbery, but he said he had not seen the gun until they were in the victim's automobile. Powell stated he kept the money taken in the robbery and indicated that he had a vivid memory of the robbery and that he combined with the codefendant in the use of the gun in perpetration of the robbery.

On the basis of these facts, the defendant's guilty plea to the charge of armed robbery and felony-firearm is supported by his testimony and should be affirmed.

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PEOPLE v. POWELL
(May 21, 1979)