Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: In affirming we restate the familiar rule that habeas corpus may not "be utilized to review claimed errors already passed upon in an earlier appeal * * * — nor issues which could have been raised on appeal but were not" (People ex rel. Knox v. Smith, 60 A.D.2d 789; see, also, People ex rel. Stephens v. Smith, 64 A.D.2d 1008; People ex rel. Burts v. Henderson, 64 A.D.2d 1009; People ex rel. Fowler v Smith, 60 A.D.2d 790; People ex rel. White v. La Vallee, 47 A.D.2d 982; People ex rel. Thomas v. Mancusi, 42 A.D.2d 824). Insofar as our decision in People ex rel. Pendleton v. Smith ( 54 A.D.2d 195) appears to be otherwise, we note that such decision was clearly required by the unusual facts presented in that application. While Pendleton's appeal was pending, a ruling of the Supreme Court was handed down, which, in effect, nullified his conviction on double jeopardy grounds. That Supreme Court decision was the circumstance which justified habeas corpus relief and permitted our departure, "by reasons of practicality and necessity", from the traditional orderly posttrial appeal procedure (see People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257, 262). In the present applications, the relators allege only errors, both legal and constitutional, which either were or should have been raised by appeal and their petitions allege no reason of "practicality and necessity" why the claimed errors were not raised by direct appeal. The writs, therefore, were properly dismissed.