Case Summary: State of Indiana ex rel. Walter Raymond White v. Marion Superior Court Criminal Division No. 3 and The Honorable Charles C. Daugherty, No. 579S119 (June 27, 1979)

Factual and Procedural Background

Relator Walter R. White was indicted on two counts of murder and tried in the Marion Superior Court. A jury was impanelled on March 12, 1979, and the trial proceeded for two days. The last witness called on the second day was Dr. Josefino C. Aguilar, a pathologist who had performed autopsies on the two alleged victims. During his testimony Dr. Aguilar refused, in the jury's presence, to answer questions posed by the deputy prosecutor on one occasion, by defense counsel on four occasions, and by the trial court on two occasions. When recalled the following morning and ordered by the court to answer court-propounded questions, Dr. Aguilar twice refused, explaining that the Prosecutor's Office had not accorded him the treatment he believed an ordinary expert witness would receive and that he would therefore testify only to facts and not provide expert opinion.

In response to the refusals, the trial court found Dr. Aguilar in direct contempt, imposed a $50 fine and a five-day jail sentence. Because these events occurred in the presence of the jury and, in the court's view, adversely affected the jury, the trial court declared a mistrial. Relator then filed an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandate and prohibition to require the Marion Superior Court to discharge him, arguing that a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions and Indiana Code § 35-41-4-3 (Burns 1979).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether this Court should grant an original writ of mandate and prohibition to require discharge of the relator on the ground that a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions and IC § 35-41-4-3.
Whether the trial court's declaration of a mistrial, after a witness's refusals and a contempt finding, constituted an abuse of discretion such that an original writ (rather than appeal) was the appropriate remedy.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State ex rel. Gibson General Hospital v. Warrick Cir. Ct., 247 Ind. 240, 214 N.E.2d 655 (1966)	Original actions are viewed with extreme disfavor.	The Court cited this case to support its general proposition that original actions (writs) are disfavored.
State ex rel. Wm. H. Block Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Marion Cty., 221 Ind. 228, 47 N.E.2d 139 (1943)	Writs of mandate and prohibition will be issued only where the trial court has an absolute duty to act or refrain from acting.	The Court relied on this principle to emphasize the narrow circumstances in which writs should issue.
State ex rel. Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Delaware Cir. Ct., 245 Ind. 154, 196 N.E.2d 752 (1964)	Where the matter lies within the trial court's discretion, an original writ is not appropriate because an appeal is an adequate remedy.	The Court applied this principle to conclude that discretionary decisions at trial should be reviewed on appeal rather than by original writ.
State ex rel. Jones v. Smith, 220 Ind. 645, 46 N.E.2d 199 (1943)	Same principle as Socony Mobil: discretionary matters are not proper for original writs when appeal is adequate.	Used to reinforce the availability of appeal as the proper remedy when trial court discretion is implicated.
State ex rel. Rooney v. Lake Cir. Ct., 236 Ind. 345, 140 N.E.2d 217 (1957)	The orderly procedure of trial should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.	The Court invoked this case to support deference to the trial court's management of proceedings.
Bean v. State, 267 Ind. 528, 371 N.E.2d 713 (1978)	The granting or denial of a motion for mistrial falls within the trial court's discretion and is reversible only for abuse of that discretion.	The Court cited this authority to justify that mistrial decisions are ordinarily subject to appellate review, not original relief.
Short v. State, 250 Ind. 459, 237 N.E.2d 258 (1968)	Same principle as Bean: mistrial rulings are within the court's discretion and are reviewed for abuse.	Reinforced the conclusion that the trial court's mistrial ruling was a discretionary matter appropriate for appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps, reflecting only the reasoning explicitly stated in the opinion:

The Court recited the procedural posture: a temporary writ hearing was held on April 24, 1979; that writ was taken under advisement and the temporary writ was unanimously denied on April 27, and the Court now addresses the petition for a permanent writ.
The Court summarized the trial events: a pathologist repeatedly refused to answer questions in the jury's presence; the court twice ordered him to answer; upon continued refusal the court held him in direct contempt, fined and jailed him, and then declared a mistrial because of the adverse impact on the jury.
The relator's requested relief was described: discharge on double jeopardy grounds (constitutional and statutory) to prevent retrial.
The Court articulated controlling procedural principles: original actions (writs of mandate and prohibition) are disfavored and will issue only where the trial court has an absolute duty to act or refrain from acting.
The Court distinguished matters that lie within a trial court's discretion: when a matter is discretionary, an appeal is the adequate legal remedy and original writs will not be considered.
The Court applied these principles to the present facts: the decision to grant a mistrial falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, particularly when the trial judge determines unfair or prejudicial conduct occurred. Because the mistrial decision was discretionary, the appropriate remedy to challenge it is by appeal, not by an original writ.
On that basis the Court concluded the question presented—seeking review by original action of the trial court's discretionary mistrial ruling—was not a proper subject for an original writ and denied the petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition for a writ of mandate and prohibition is denied.

Implications:

The Supreme Court of Indiana refused to intervene by way of original writs because the trial court's declaration of mistrial was a discretionary decision; such discretionary rulings are generally addressed by appellate review rather than by original mandamus or prohibition.
The direct effect of the decision is denial of relator's requested writ; the opinion indicates that an appeal is the adequate remedy to challenge the trial court's mistrial ruling and does not grant the requested discharge. The opinion does not set aside the trial court's actions nor does it resolve the relator's double jeopardy claim on the merits.
The opinion does not announce any new precedent beyond reiterating existing principles that original writs are narrowly granted and that mistrial rulings rest in the trial court's discretion and are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.

Concurrence: DeBruler, Hunter, Pivarnik and Prentice, JJ., concurred. The opinion was filed June 27, 1979, and reported at 391 N.E.2d 596.

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STATE OF INDIANA EX REL. WALTER RAYMOND WHITE v. THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL DIVISION, NO. 3 AND THE HONORABLE CHARLES C. DAUGHERTY

WRITS — Mandate and Prohibition. — Original actions are viewed with extreme disfavor. Writs of mandate and prohibition will be issued only where the trial court has an absolute duty to act or refrain from acting. Where the matter lies within the discretion of the trial court, application for writs of mandate and prohibition will not be considered since the legal remedy of an appeal is adequate.

GIVAN, C.J.

On April 24, 1979, this Court conducted a hearing on a temporary writ of mandate and prohibition. The matter was taken under advisement and on April 27, the petition was unanimously denied. We now deny the application for a permanent writ.

Relator Walter R. White was charged with two counts of murder in the Marion Superior Court. On March 12, 1979, a jury was impanelled and the trial was commenced. Two days of testimony and evidence followed. The final witness on the second day of trial was Dr. Josefino C. Aguilar, a pathologist at Wishard Memorial Hospital. Dr. Aguilar had performed the autopsies on the two purported victims. During his testimony, Dr. Aguilar refused, in the presence of the jury, to answer questions propounded by the deputy prosecutor on one occasion, by defense counsel on four occasions and by the court on two occasions. The next morning, March 14, Dr. Aguilar was recalled to the stand. When the court ordered him to answer questions propounded by the court, he twice refused. Aguilar stated that the reason for his refusal was that the "Prosecutor's Office, time and, time again, refuse to give the courtesy that they would give an ordinary expert witness. . . ." Hence, he stated, he would testify only as to facts and would not give his expert opinion on any issues. Thereupon, the court found him in direct contempt of court, levied a fine of $50.00 and sentenced him to five days in jail. Following this series of events, all in the presence of the jury, the court declared a mistrial in view of the adverse impact on the jury. Relator now requests this Court to order the Marion Superior Court to discharge him on the ground that a retrial would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions and IC § 35-41-4-3 [Burns 1979].

Original actions are viewed with extreme disfavor by this Court. State ex rel. Gibson General Hospital v. Warrick Cir. Ct., (1966) 247 Ind. 240, 214 N.E.2d 655. Writs of mandate and prohibition will be issued only where the trial court has an absolute duty to act or refrain from acting. State ex rel. Wm. H. Block Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Marion Cty., (1943) 221 Ind. 228, 47 N.E.2d 139. Where the matter lies within the discretion of the trial court, this Court will not consider applications for writs of mandate and prohibition since the legal remedy of an appeal is adequate. State ex rel. Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Delaware Cir. Ct., (1964) 245 Ind. 154, 196 N.E.2d 752; State ex rel. Jones v. Smith, (1943) 220 Ind. 645, 46 N.E.2d 199.

The orderly procedure of the trial should be left to the sound discretion of the court trying the case. State ex rel. Rooney v. Lake Cir. Ct., (1957) 236 Ind. 345, 140 N.E.2d 217. The granting or denial of a motion for mistrial falls within this rule and will be reversed only where an abuse of judicial discretion is demonstrated. Bean v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 528, 371 N.E.2d 713; Short v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 459, 237 N.E.2d 258.

The respondent in the case at bar had the discretion to grant a mistrial when, in his sound judgment, unfair or prejudicial conduct had occurred at the trial. The remedy of appeal is adequate to challenge the trial court's discretion in this matter. The question presented is therefore not a proper subject for an original action.

The petition for a writ of mandate and prohibition is hereby denied.

DeBruler, Hunter, Pivarnik and Prentice, JJ. concur.

NOTE — Reported at 391 N.E.2d 596.

STATE EX REL. WHITE v. MARION SUP. CT