FERGUSON v. STOTT

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Docket Number

No. 39942.

Attorney(S)

J. William Holliday, Kahoka, for defendant-appellant. Tom B. Brown, Brown Phillips, Edina, for plaintiff-respondent.

Judges

KELLY, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Marian Ferguson Stott and C. Dean Ferguson were married for 27 years before their marriage was dissolved in December 1974. The marital breakdown was attributed to Marian's relationship with another man, whom she married shortly after the divorce. The divorce was handled by an attorney known to both parties. A property settlement agreement was prepared and executed, which included a quit-claim deed from Marian conveying real estate to Dean. This settlement was incorporated into the final divorce decree.

Subsequently, a clerical error was discovered in the quit-claim deed, and Marian refused to execute a corrected deed. In January 1977, Dean filed an action seeking reformation of the original deed and to compel Marian to execute a proper deed. Marian filed a counterclaim seeking to set aside the property settlement on grounds of fraud and undue influence allegedly practiced by Dean and his attorney.

The trial court ruled in favor of Dean, ordering correction of the deed and requiring Marian to convey her interest in the property. Marian appealed the denial of her counterclaim.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Marian Ferguson Stott was defrauded of her marital property rights through fraud and undue influence by Dean Ferguson and his attorney in the execution of the property settlement agreement.
Whether the property settlement agreement is so unfair and disproportionate as to "shock the conscience" of the court, rendering it void as against public policy.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Appellant contends she was defrauded and unduly influenced into signing the property settlement, which deprived her of her rightful marital property.
She asserts the property settlement is grossly unequal, with respondent receiving four times the property she did, and that the agreement is unfair, unjust, and inequitable.
Appellant claims she signed the agreement without explanation of the new "no-fault divorce law" and without meaningful discussion with the attorney, other than being told it was fair.

Respondent's Arguments

Respondent and the attorney presented a conflicting version of events, disputing the claims of fraud and undue influence.
They argue that the property settlement was fair and that the evidence does not support rescission.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976)	Standard of appellate review requiring deference to trial court findings unless no substantial evidence exists, or law is erroneously declared or applied.	The court applied this standard to affirm the trial court's judgment, finding substantial evidence supported the findings and no error in law.
Arp v. Arp, 572 S.W.2d 232 (Mo.App. 1978)	Statutory principle that marital property division need not be equal, but must be just and equitable.	The court relied on this to reject appellant's argument that the disparity in property division alone warranted rescission.
Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. banc 1978)	Principles governing fairness and validity of property settlements in dissolution proceedings.	The court noted it did not apply Thummel because appellant’s brief was filed before the decision was issued.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the conflicting evidence regarding the alleged fraud and undue influence. It emphasized the deferential standard of review under Murphy v. Carron, requiring affirmance unless the trial court’s findings lack substantial evidence or misapply the law. The court noted that the statute mandates only a just, not equal, division of marital property, citing Arp v. Arp. The court distinguished the present case from a direct challenge to the trial court’s approval of a settlement, focusing instead on an attack on the settlement itself. Given the conflicting testimony and the trial court’s credibility determinations, the appellate court found no basis to overturn the judgment. The court also declined to apply the principles of Thummel v. King due to timing of the appellant’s briefing.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying appellant’s counterclaim and ordering reformation of the quit-claim deed with appellant’s conveyance of the property interest to respondent.

The direct effect is that the property settlement agreement remains enforceable, and the deed will be corrected to reflect the intended conveyance. The decision does not establish new precedent but reinforces the deferential standard of appellate review in contested property settlement disputes and the principle that property divisions need only be just and equitable, not equal.

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C. DEAN FERGUSON, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. MARIAN FERGUSON STOTT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

KELLY, Judge.

Appellant, Marian Ferguson Stott, defendant in the trial court, brings this appeal from an adverse judgment on her counterclaim whereby she prayed the trial court to set aside a property settlement she and the respondent, C. Dean Ferguson, her former husband, had entered into to dispose of their marital property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, on the grounds that it had been induced by fraud practiced upon her by respondent.

The facts, briefly stated, were that Marian Ferguson Stott and C. Dean Ferguson were husband and wife for 27 years when their marriage was dissolved in December, 1974. It is uncontradicted that the marital difficulties leading to the dissolution of their marriage were caused by the wife's falling in love with another man who, at the time, was also married. A very short time after appellant's divorce became final she married this other man, who, in the interim, had also obtained a divorce from his spouse.

The divorce of the Fergusons was handled by an attorney known to both. In fact, when initially contacted, he had the daughter of the couple in his employ. At that time this counsel suggested they have other attorneys handle the matter for them. After their initial interview with counsel a reconciliation was effected, but it was of short duration and respondent set up an appointment for them with the same attorney, despite the fact he did not desire a divorce. A property settlement — the one in issue — was prepared and executed by the parties and at the dissolution hearing appellant executed a quit-claim deed to the real estate owned by the parties, conveying same to respondent. The property settlement was admitted into evidence at the dissolution hearing and made a part of the decree dissolving the parties' marriage. The date of the hearing and granting of the dissolution was December 18, 1974. On January 21, 1975, appellant entered into a marriage with Mr. Stott.

Because of a clerical error in the quitclaim deed of December 18, 1974, and the refusal of appellant to execute a second quit-claim deed to the same property curing this defect, respondent instituted this action in January, 1977, seeking an order of the court reforming the original quit-claim deed and compelling appellant to execute a new deed so that a proper description of the property conveyed in the original quit-claim deed should appear.

It was in this action that appellant filed her counterclaim.

The trial court entered a decree for the respondent on his cause of action and ordered the description of the property in the property settlement in the dissolution of marriage action be corrected; that appellant convey forthwith her right, title and interest in the described land and to execute any and all instruments necessary to effect and carry out properly such conveyance so respondent would enjoy a fee simple title in said property. Appellant has appealed from that portion of the judgment denying her counterclaim.

The scope of review in this case is controlled by the parameters set out in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32[1] (Mo. banc 1976), and the judgment of the trial court must be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law, and a reviewing court should exercise the power to set aside a decree or judgment on the ground that it is "against the weight of the evidence" with caution and with a firm belief that the decree or judgment is wrong.

Appellant's Points Relied On are that the trial court erred in finding in favor of the plaintiff-respondent on appellant's counterclaim in that (a) appellant was defrauded of her marital rights in the property accumulated by the parties during the marriage by the fraud and undue influence executed upon her by respondent and his attorney; and (b) the amount of the property received by appellant pursuant to the property agreement is so little compared to the amount received by respondent under the property settlement agreement that it should shock the conscience of the court and said property settlement agreement is not a fair, just and equitable division of the marital rights and is void as being in violation of public policy.

The first allegation of trial error preserves nothing for review because it does not comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04(d), being merely a conclusionary statement.

Appellant's second Point, despite the fact that it too is in conclusionary form, presents the question whether the property settlement agreement should shock the conscience of this court because it is not a fair, just and equitable division of the marital property acquired by the parties during their marriage.

We do not apply the principles enunciated in Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. banc 1978) because the opinion in that case was handed down on September 12, 1978, and the brief of appellant was filed in this court on August 18, 1978.

Appellant argues that respondent received four times the marital property as that allotted to appellant by the settlement agreement and that she signed it without any explanation of the effect of the "no-fault divorce law" and without any discussion with the attorney handling the divorce proceedings relative to the terms of the agreement other than his advising her that he thought it was a fair settlement.

The evidence on these points is in conflict, appellant presenting one version and respondent and the attorney another.

With respect to the disparity in the property distribution, the statute does not require that the court make an equal division of the marital property, but only a just division. Arp v. Arp, 572 S.W.2d 232, 235[8] (Mo.App. 1978). Furthermore, we are not asked here to decide whether the trial court in the dissolution proceedings abused its discretion in approving the settlement agreement arrived at by the parties to that proceeding. We have here an attack on the settlement agreement itself, and the evidence on the grounds for recission are in conflict. We must defer to the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses and we cannot say that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings of the trial court nor that the decree is wrong.

Judgment affirmed.

STEPHAN, P. J., and STEWART, J., concur.