STATE v. BROWN

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Docket Number

21093

Attorney(S)

Veronica G. Small, Asst. Public Defender, Charleston, for appellant. Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Sally G. Young, Columbia, and Sol. Capers G. Barr, III, Charles for respondent.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Isaac Brown, Jr., was found guilty of robbery and subsequently appealed the conviction. The appeal centers on alleged errors in the trial judge's instructions to the jury. The case reached the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which reviewed the issues raised by appellant regarding the jury charge and the trial judge's comments on the grand jury.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial judge's jury instruction improperly over-emphasized the element of lack of the victim's consent to the taking, thereby negating the necessity for the jury to find felonious intent.
Whether the trial judge's comments concerning the grand jury and its role prejudiced the jury against the appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The jury charge on robbery improperly emphasized the victim's lack of consent, effectively removing the jury's need to find felonious intent.
The trial judge's comments on the grand jury's function prejudiced the jury against him.

Respondent's Arguments

The charge correctly included lack of consent as a necessary element of robbery consistent with established law.
The jury was adequately instructed on the element of intent, including that intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial judge's curative instruction regarding the grand jury's role remedied any potential prejudice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Young v. State, 259 S.C. 383, 192 S.E.2d 212 (1972)	Definition that robbery is larceny with force.	Supported the characterization of robbery as larceny plus force, underpinning the jury charge.
State v. Sweat, 221 S.C. 270, 70 S.E.2d 234 (1952)	Larceny requires felonious taking and carrying away of another's goods without consent.	Confirmed that lack of consent is a necessary element of larceny and thus robbery.
50 Am.Jur.2d Larceny, §§ 8, 23	Legal principles defining larceny and the necessity of lack of consent.	Provided authoritative support for the elements of robbery and larceny.
State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d 328 (1977)	Standards for jury charges and impermissible comments on facts violating state constitution.	Used to evaluate whether the jury charge improperly commented on facts.
State v. Arnold, 127 S.C. 80, 120 S.E. 747 (1924)	Correctness of jury instructions in conformity with evidence.	Supported the conclusion that the charge was a correct statement of law.
State v. Gates, 269 S.C. 557, 238 S.E.2d 680 (1977)	Jury instruction standards and correctness of legal charges.	Reinforced the appropriateness of the trial judge’s instructions.
West's South Carolina Digest, Appeal and Error, Key Numbers 169 and 216 (2)	Precedents regarding trial errors and curative instructions.	Referenced to support the ruling that the curative instruction resolved the issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the trial judge's instructions in light of the established legal definition of robbery as larceny with force, which necessarily includes the victim's lack of consent. The Court rejected appellant's contention that emphasizing lack of consent eliminated the need to prove felonious intent, noting that the charge as a whole adequately instructed the jury on intent, including that it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found that the judge’s instructions were correct statements of law consistent with the evidence.

Regarding the trial judge's comments on the grand jury, the Court acknowledged that the remarks were an abstract charge unrelated to the facts and thus unfortunate. However, since the appellant's counsel did not move for a mistrial and accepted a curative instruction clarifying the jury's role as the sole fact-finder, the Court concluded that no prejudicial error requiring reversal was presented.

Holding and Implications

The Court AFFIRMED the conviction of Isaac Brown, Jr. for robbery.

The decision confirms that jury instructions emphasizing lack of victim consent in robbery cases are proper when accompanied by adequate instructions on felonious intent. Additionally, abstract comments on grand jury function that are promptly and adequately cured by the trial judge do not constitute reversible error. This ruling directly affects the parties by upholding the conviction and does not establish new precedent beyond the application of existing principles.

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The STATE, Respondent, v. Isaac BROWN, Jr., Appellant.

November 27, 1979.

GREGORY, Justice:

Appellant Isaac Brown, Jr., was found guilty of robbery and appeals. Error is assigned to the trial judge's jury instructions in two particulars. We affirm.

Appellant's first contention is that the charge on the offense of robbery improperly over-emphasized the element of lack of the victim's consent to the taking. He argues that such emphasis effectively eliminated the jury's need to find the element of felonious intent, and in the context of this case, amounted to an indirect and impermissible comment on the facts. We disagree.

The common-law offense of robbery is essentially the commission of larceny with force. Young v. State, 259 S.C. 383, 192 S.E.2d 212 (1972); 50 Am.Jur.2d Larceny, § 8. Larceny involves the felonious taking and carrying away of the goods of another, State v. Sweat, 221 S.C. 270, 70 S.E.2d 234 (1952), which must be accomplished against the will or without the consent of the other. 50 Am. Jur.2d Larceny, § 23.

Thus, it is clearly not error for a trial judge to embrace lack of consent in his charge to the jury on the offense of robbery.

Viewing the charge as a whole, State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d 328 (1977), we conclude that the trial judge's inclusion of lack of consent was not an impermissible charge on the facts of the case in violation of Article V, Section 17 of our State Constitution, but rather a correct statement of the law, State v. Arnold, 127 S.C. 80, 120 S.E. 747 (1924), in conformity with the evidence. State v. Gates, 269 S.C. 557, 238 S.E.2d 680 (1977).

The robbery charge also contained sufficient instruction to the jury on the element of intent so as to apprise them of the need to find this element in order to convict.

The trial judge stated: "The offense of robbery includes the offense of larceny. And hence, to constitute robbery it must be proved that the taking was with the intent to steal." And further in the charge:

Now, I told you that it required the intent. In every criminal offense there must be a concurrence, an act and an intent. Intent is a material element of the offense which like all others must be proved, proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

In determining the question, you are to consider all of the facts and circumstances in the case which touch on the conduct of the Defendant, as well as any declarations or admissions, if any. Criminal intent may be implied from the acts, conduct, declarations and admissions, if any, of a Defendant. Considered in relation to the charge made, they may establish criminal intent.

In our view, this was an adequate charge on intent. The instructions pertaining to the offense of robbery were correct statements of the law, and we perceive no error.

Appellant also takes exception to commentary by the trial judge at the beginning of the charge regarding the function and role of the grand jury and its return of a true bill in criminal proceedings. Appellant argues that these comments prejudiced the trial jury's decision as to his guilt or innocence.

Rather than moving for a mistrial in response to these comments, appellant's counsel sought and received the following curative instruction:

The Court: Mr. Foreman and members of the jury, I am going to go back to what the grand jury is. The grand jury as a usual process, it hears only witnesses that would be the usual kind that would be presented by the State, that is in the prosecution. They don't hear from any Defendant or any defense witnesses. They are not a trial jury, as I told you. You are the trial jurors. You determine and it is for you alone to determine the guilt or innocence of an individual, is he or is he not guilty of the charges contained in the Indictment. What a grand jury does is immaterial to you. If it was a no bill, as I said, nobody would be brought in here faced with a charge. If he is brought in here, the paper brings him in, and he has entered the plea of "Not Guilty" and I charge you that that places the burden on the State to prove the Defendant guilty.

We agree with appellant that the comments, which really amounted to an abstract charge unrelated to the facts of the case, were unfortunate. However, by this additional instruction the trial judge readily granted the only relief which appellant sought at trial. Thus, this exception presents no issue for decision by this Court on appeal. See cases collected in West's South Carolina Digest, Appeal and Error, Key Numbers 169 and 216 (2).

Affirmed.

LEWIS, C.J., and LITTLEJOHN, NESS and RHODES, JJ., concur.