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IN RE GOULD.

Former Bankruptcy Act — Amendment of Schedules — Discharge of Debts — Prejudice of Creditors

BRITTON, Bankruptcy Judge

A court need not reopen a case on application by the bankrupt "for . . . good cause" in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 515, if the creditor, would be prejudiced. By permitting the bankrupt to amend his schedule to include a debt two years after his discharged the creditor would "irretrievably" lose the rights it would have enjoyed, such as the privilege to participate in the selection of the trustee and to deny dischargeability of its debt before the evidentiary trail grew cold. Therefore, amendment was not permitted. See Rule 110 at ¶ 20,011, Rule 515 at ¶ 20,155 and Rule 924 at ¶ 20,354.

[Digest of Opinion]

Two years after his case was closed as a no asset case and discharge granted, the bankrupt moved to reopen the case in order to amend his schedule of creditors to include and thereby discharge a debt not scheduled in his bankruptcy petition. The omitted debt, in the amount of $17,000, was based upon a promissory note executed in January, 1977 by the bankrupt husband as a co-maker with a corporation, which he dominated. The excuse given by the bankrupt for failing to schedule this debt is that "he did not recall that he allegedly, personally guaranteed a corporate debt."

Since the bankrupt only had one other debt which was larger than the one in issue, the court did not accept the bankrupt's explanation that he was unaware of this debt. Further, the court concluded that there was no basis for the bankrupt's allegation that he was unaware that he was a co-maker on this note, executed eleven months before bankruptcy. Rather, relying on Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547, the court provided the policy rationales in a case such as this one for granting the application. For example, the court must consider the circumstances attendant to the failure of counsel to have originally listed the creditor, the degree of disruption which would result from allowing the amendment, and whether any creditor including the unlisted creditor would be prejudiced.

Accordingly, the court found no justification for the bankrupt's failure to originally list the creditor. To allow the amendment at this point, would require the reopening of the case, the setting aside of the discharge, the allowance of time to the creditor to challenge discharge or seek a determination of nondischargeability of the debt. Further, the creditor would be prejudiced in two respects. It has irretrievably lost the right it would have enjoyed, had it been originally scheduled as a creditor, to participate in the selection of a trustee and to assert any ground to deny discharge or to deny dischargeability of its debt before the evidentiary trail grew cold. Consequently, the motion was denied.

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IN RE GOULD, (S.D.Fla. 1980)
(Apr 1, 1980)