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Evans v. Evans, Docket No. 46457 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 1980)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed for divorce in September 1975. Two months after filing, plaintiff was injured at work and became unable to work. On December 4, 1978, plaintiff redeemed accrued worker's compensation benefits in the amount of $5,176 and redeemed a retroactive social security award totaling $8,279. The trial judge concluded these amounts were part of the marital estate and awarded defendant a one-half interest in them as part of the divorce judgment. Plaintiff appealed the property-division decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on June 17, 1980; leave to appeal to a higher court was applied for.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether social security and worker's compensation benefits can be considered part of the marital estate for purposes of property division in Michigan.
  2. Whether presently existing, ascertainable benefits (as opposed to future contingent benefits) acquired during marriage are subject to division as marital assets.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Feldman v Feldman, 55 Mich. App. 147, 153 Michigan trial courts have wide discretion in dividing marital assets; standard of review for property settlements. Used to frame the standard of review and to note trial court discretion in property division; court will not normally reverse unless it would have reached a different result.
Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 431 Factors affecting division: source of property, contribution to acquisition, years of marriage, needs, earning ability, and cause of divorce. Identified the factors a trial court may consider when dividing marital property.
Petrie v Petrie, 41 Mich. App. 80 Workmen's compensation benefits payable to the husband could be subject to a lien for support in a divorce judgment; rationale that the Workmen's Compensation Act benefits both worker and dependents. Relied upon to support the view that worker's compensation benefits are intended to assist both worker and dependents and therefore may be accessible in divorce contexts.
Delno v Celebrezze, 347 F.2d 159 (9th Cir 1965) Describes the general purpose of Social Security Act provisions to protect workers and dependents and that entitlement is based on income from labor. Quoted (within Guerrero v Guerrero) to explain the protective purpose of social security benefits and their character as replacement for income from labor.
Guerrero v Guerrero, 18 Ariz. App. 400, 402 Holds social security disability payments are community property because they replace wages the husband would have received. Quoted and relied on by the court to analogize social security disability benefits to wages and to support treating such benefits as marital property when they replace earned income.
Chisnell v Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699 Military retirement pay recognized as a marital asset. Used as an example of Michigan recognition of certain retirement-type benefits as marital assets where the asset has present value.
Miller v Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672 Vested pension plan recognized as a marital asset. Presented as authority that vested pensions constitute marital property when they have present, ascertainable value.
Hutchins v Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361 Vested pension plan recognized as a marital asset. Also cited to show the determinative importance of present, ascertainable value in classifying assets as marital property.
Hisquierdo v Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 United States Supreme Court holding that a wife is not entitled to a share of her husband's expected future benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act (and by implication Social Security) — addressing future, contingent benefits. Used to distinguish between present, ascertainable benefits and future contingent benefits; the court relied on this to limit division to presently existing benefits rather than expected future entitlements.
In re Marriage of Hillerman, 88 Cal.App.3d 372 Illustrative of other jurisdictions' approaches to dividing social security benefits (one side of split). Cited among authorities showing that other jurisdictions have reached opposite conclusions on dividing social security benefits.
Umber v Umber, 591 P.2d 299 Illustrative authority from another jurisdiction addressing division of social security benefits. Included to show conflicting approaches in other jurisdictions.
Harmon v Harmon, 161 N.J. Super. 206 Another example of a jurisdiction considering division of social security benefits. Listed to demonstrate that different courts have reached differing conclusions on the divisibility of social security benefits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting Michigan trial courts' broad discretion in dividing marital assets and the established factors guiding such division. It observed that Michigan had no direct precedent on dividing worker's compensation and social security benefits in property awards, but found related authority instructive.

The court relied on Petrie to show that worker's compensation statutes are intended to benefit both the worker and dependents, concluding that worker's compensation benefits received during marriage should be considered marital assets. The court extended the same reasoning to social security benefits, invoking Guerrero (and Delno as cited in Guerrero) which held that social security disability payments substitute for wages and thus may be treated as community/property when they perform that function.

The court contrasted present, ascertainable benefits with future, contingent entitlements. It cited Michigan decisions recognizing military retirement pay and vested pensions as marital assets where a present, ascertainable value exists, and it cited the United States Supreme Court's Hisquierdo decision to note that expected future benefits are not divisible. Based on this distinction, the court treated the redeemed worker's compensation and the retroactive social security award here as presently existing assets rather than as future contingent interests.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the contested social security benefits were acquired during the marriage and that the amount ($8,279) and the worker's compensation redemption ($5,176) were presently ascertainable. The court characterized the situation as parceling a presently existing bank account comprised in part of these benefits and concluded there was no error in the trial court's classification of the benefits as marital assets subject to equal division.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the worker's compensation and social security benefits redeemed during the marriage and presently ascertainable are marital assets subject to equal division.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the trial court's award giving defendant a one-half interest in the redeemed worker's compensation and social security amounts was affirmed.
  • The court distinguished between present, ascertainable benefits (divisible as marital property) and future, contingent entitlements (not divisible), citing Hisquierdo for the latter principle.
  • The opinion addressed an issue of first impression in Michigan and set forth the court's reasoning for treating presently existing social security and worker's compensation benefits acquired during marriage as marital assets; no broader rule beyond the court's stated reasoning was articulated in the opinion.

EVANS v EVANS

D.C. RILEY, J.

This case involves an issue of first impression in Michigan: whether social security and worker's compensation benefits can be considered part of the marital estate for purposes of property division.

In September, 1975, plaintiff filed for divorce. Two months later, he was injured at his employment and was no longer able to work. On December 4, 1978, plaintiff redeemed his worker's compensation accrued benefits for $5,176. He also redeemed a retroactive social security award of $8,279. The trial judge determined that these amounts were part of the marital estate and awarded defendant a one-half interest in them as part of the judgment of divorce. Plaintiff appeals as of right, disputing this decision.

Michigan trial courts have wide discretion in dividing marital assets at the time of divorce. Feldman v Feldman, 55 Mich. App. 147, 153; 222 N.W.2d 2 (1974). Factors affecting division include the "source of property, contribution towards its acquisition, the years of married life, the needs of the parties, their earning ability and also the cause of divorce." Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 431; 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956). A trial court's property settlement will not normally be reversed or modified unless this Court would have reached a different result. Feldman, supra.

Although there are no Michigan cases directly addressing the question of the division of worker's compensation and social security benefits in the property award in a divorce judgment, several related cases are illuminative. The most enlightening is Petrie v Petrie, 41 Mich. App. 80; 199 N.W.2d 673 (1972), where this Court held that workmen's compensation benefits payable to the husband could be subject to a lien for support required by a divorce judgment. The Court reasoned that, since the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed to benefit both the worker and his dependents, an award should be accessible to the wife. Id., at 83.

Since the Worker's Disability Compensation Act was enacted to assist both the worker and his dependents, i.e., his spouse, we conclude that such benefits received during the course of the marriage should be considered a marital asset. We believe that a similar purpose mandates an identical consideration of social security benefits. As stated by the Arizona Court of Appeals:

"We note that the general purpose of the old age, survivor and disability insurance provisions of the Social Security Act is to protect workers and their dependents from the risk of loss of income due to the insured's old age, death or disability. Delno v Celebrezze, 347 F.2d 159 (9th Cir 1965). Entitlement to benefits is based upon the receipt of income from labor which the old age, death, or disability would interrupt. Delno v Celebrezze, supra. Thus we see that the purpose of the payment of these disability benefits under the Social Security Act is to take the place of the income from labor which the husband otherwise would have been receiving. Under the law previously set forth, there is no doubt that had the husband not suffered from any disability but continued to work, his wages would still have been community property even though he was living separate and apart from his wife. Since his social security disability payments take the place of these wages, it is clear that such payments are community property." Guerrero v Guerrero, 18 Ariz. App. 400, 402; 502 P.2d 1077 (1972).

In Michigan, no court has considered the divisibility of social security benefits. Military retirement pay has been recognized as a marital asset, Chisnell v Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699; 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978), as has a vested pension plan, Miller v Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672; 269 N.W.2d 264 (1978), Hutchins v Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361; 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976). The determinant appears to be whether an asset has a present, ascertainable value or whether it is merely a contingent interest. The United States Supreme Court has held specifically that a wife is not entitled to a share of her husband's expected future benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act or presumably the Social Security Act. Hisquierdo v Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572; 99 S.Ct. 802; 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979).

Other jurisdictions have considered the propriety of dividing social security benefits and have reached opposite conclusions. See In re Marriage of Hillerman, 88 Cal.App.3d 372; 151 Cal.Rptr. 764 (1979), Umber v Umber, 591 P.2d 299 (Okla, 1979), Harmon v Harmon, 161 N.J. Super. 206; 391 A.2d 552 (1978).

In the instant case, the contested social security benefits were acquired during the marriage. The amount of benefits is currently ascertainable — $8,279. This is not a case where the court has divided some future, possible benefit, but is merely the parceling of a presently existing bank account comprised partially of worker's compensation and social security benefits. We find no error in the lower court's conclusion that the benefits were marital assets, subject to equal division.

Affirmed.

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EVANS v. EVANS
(Jun 17, 1980)