WILSON v. SUPERIOR COURT

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

Docket No. 49944.

Attorney(S)

COUNSEL James C. Hooley, Public Defender and Jay B. Gaskill, Assistant Public Defender, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci and Blair W. Hoffman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner Sidney Wilson committed a felony before July 1, 1977, was arrested, and confined in jail awaiting trial. Following conviction, Wilson was sentenced to prison under California's repealed Indeterminate Sentence Law. Prior to the California determinate sentencing law effective July 1, 1977, and before the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Sage (1980), the superior court issued an order (the "first order") reducing Wilson's prison term by awarding conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019 for pretrial jail time served before July 1, 1977.

After the decision in People v. Sage clarified that felons sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentence Law after January 1, 1948, were not entitled to such conduct credits, the People moved to set aside the first order on the ground it unlawfully modified Wilson's sentence. The superior court granted this motion, issuing a "second order" rescinding the first.

Wilson petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to nullify the second order. Both parties waived oral argument and agreed to an expedited determination on the merits without issuance of an alternative writ.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the superior court had jurisdiction to rescind or amend its original order granting conduct credits that reduced Wilson's prison sentence.
Whether a sentence unauthorized by law may be corrected by the court even after the time for appeal has passed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

The superior court lacked jurisdiction to rescind or amend the first order granting early release credits.
Relying on In re Candelario (1970), the petitioner argued that judicial error in sentencing is beyond correction except by timely appeal, which was not taken in this case.

Real Party in Interest’s Arguments

The first order improperly reduced Wilson's sentence contrary to the law as clarified by People v. Sage.
The superior court properly set aside the first order because it imposed a sentence unauthorized by law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498	Felons sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentence Law after January 1, 1948, are not entitled to conduct credits for presentence jail time under Penal Code section 4019.	Clarified that the first order granting conduct credits was unauthorized by law.
People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753	Sentences not authorized by law are subject to correction whenever the error is brought to the court's attention.	Supported the court’s authority to vacate the void first order.
People v. Espinoza (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 59	Unauthorized sentences must be vacated and corrected, even if the correction is more severe to the defendant.	Reinforced the principle that the court may correct unlawful sentences at any time.
People v. Superior Court (Duran) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 480	Unauthorized sentencing orders are void and subject to correction.	Supported the finding that the first order was void and properly set aside.
People v. Superior Court (Gonzales) (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 134	Unauthorized sentences are void and correctable.	Used to confirm the court's jurisdiction to vacate the void first order.
People v. Bell (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 949	Sentences unauthorized by law must be vacated.	Supported the authority to correct void sentencing orders.
People v. Massengale (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 689	Correction of unauthorized sentences is proper.	Reinforced the court’s jurisdiction to vacate void sentences.
In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412	Sentences unauthorized by Penal Code are void.	Established that the first order was void and entered without jurisdiction.
People v. Getty (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 101	Void sentences may be corrected at any time.	Supported the court’s power to set aside the first order.
People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8	Unauthorized sentences are void.	Confirmed the void nature of the first order.
People v. Sproul (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 154	Unauthorized sentences are void and subject to correction.	Supported the court’s jurisdiction to vacate the first order.
People v. Whitfield (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 605	Sentences not authorized by law are void.	Confirmed the authority to correct the first order.
People v. Orrante (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 553	Unauthorized sentences are void and correctable.	Supported the court’s decision to vacate the first order.
In re Robinson (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 484	Unauthorized sentences are void.	Used to affirm the void status of the first order.
In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702	Judicial error in sentencing that involves an exercise of discretion is generally correctable only by timely appeal.	Distinguished from this case because the first order was void, not a discretionary error.
Carter v. Carter (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 845	Void orders are subject to collateral attack at any time regardless of appeal.	Supported the court’s authority to set aside the void first order despite no appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the legality of the superior court's first order granting conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019 for pretrial jail time served before July 1, 1977. The subsequent decision in People v. Sage clarified that such credits are not available to felons sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentence Law after January 1, 1948, rendering the first order unauthorized by law.

Relying on established precedent, the court held that a sentence unauthorized by law is void and subject to correction whenever the error is brought to the court's attention, even if no timely appeal was taken. The court distinguished this case from In re Candelario, which involved judicial discretion rather than jurisdictional error. Because the first order was void and issued without jurisdiction, the superior court properly rescinded it.

The court emphasized that void orders may be attacked collaterally at any time by any interested party and that correcting an unlawful sentence is mandatory despite potentially harsher consequences for the defendant.

Holding and Implications

The peremptory writ of mandate is denied.

The court held that the superior court acted within its jurisdiction in setting aside the first order as void and unauthorized by law. The direct effect is that Wilson's sentence will not be reduced by conduct credits for pretrial jail time served under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. No new precedent was established; the decision applies settled principles regarding void sentences and the court's authority to correct unauthorized sentencing orders.

Show full summary ...

SIDNEY WILSON, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

ELKINGTON, J.

Petitioner Sidney Wilson committed a felony prior to July 1, 1977, for which he was arrested and confined in jail while awaiting trial. He was thereafter convicted of the offense and sentenced to prison under California's now repealed Indeterminate Sentence Law. Following the state's determinate sentence law (operative July 1, 1977) and before the high court's decision in People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874], the superior court ordered that Wilson's prison term be reduced by allowance of Penal Code section 4019's conduct credits covering the period, prior to July 1, 1977, he had spent in jail awaiting trial and sentence. For reasons as will appear, that order will be termed by us as the "first order." People v. Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d 498, 509, footnote 7, holds that "felons sentenced to prison terms under the Indeterminate Sentence Law after January 1, 1948, were not entitled to [the conduct] credits" of section 4019, for presentence jail time served while that law was in effect.

Following announcement of People v. Sage, and after the usual time for appeal or review by extraordinary writ of the superior court's first order had passed, the People moved to set the order aside on the ground that it had, in effect, modified Wilson's sentence in a manner unauthorized by law. The motion was granted by the "second order" of the superior court.

Wilson has petitioned this court for a writ of mandate seeking nullification of the second order.

He and the People seek an expedited determination of the matter. The issues have been fully briefed by the parties, who have waived oral argument and stipulated that the petition might now be determined by this court on the merits without issuance of an alternative writ.

(1) It is contended that "Respondent superior court had no jurisdiction to rescind or amend its order granting the early release date."

As pointed out, the superior court's first order had the effect of reducing Wilson's prison sentence by allowance of conduct credits contrary to the law as later elucidated by People v. Sage.

Imposition of "a sentence not authorized by law . . . [is] subject to judicial correction whenever the error [comes] to the attention of the trial court or a reviewing court." ( People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 763 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65, 512 P.2d 289].) "`"When a court pronounces a sentence which is unauthorized by the Penal Code, that sentence must be vacated and a proper sentence imposed whenever the mistake is appropriately brought to the attention of the court."'" ( People v. Espinoza (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 59, 68 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 803]; People v. Superior Court ( Duran) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 480, 486 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 698]; People v. Superior Court ( Gonzales) (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 134, 143 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 89]; People v. Bell (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 949, 955 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 270]; People v. Massengale (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 689, 693 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 237].) In such a case the court lacks "jurisdiction" and the sentence, or at least its unlawful part, is "void." ( In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412, 417-419 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 462, 412 P.2d 806]; People v. Getty (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 101, 106, fn. 3 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 704] ; People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 13 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 627]; People v. Sproul (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 154, 164 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 55]; People v. Whitfield (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 605, 610-611 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 438]; People v. Orrante (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 553, 557 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 480]; In re Robinson (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 484, 486 [ 298 P.2d 656], and see authority there collected.) And such an unlawful sentence will be corrected even though the correction operates more severely against the defendant "than the original unauthorized pronouncement." (See People v. Serrato, supra, 9 Cal.3d 753, 764; People v. Espinoza, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 59, 68; see also People v. Superior Court ( Gonzales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d 134, 143.)

Under the foregoing authority it is manifest that the superior court properly set aside the first order as "void" and entered "without jurisdiction."

It will be noted that Wilson appears to agree that the superior court's first order was erroneous. But, relying upon In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729], he argues that the order was "judicial error . . . beyond correction, save by the regular course of [a timely] appeal," an appeal which here was not taken. But as we have pointed out, the court's first order differed from the subject of Candelario, in which the trial court had "`deliberately exercised judicial discretion.'" ( Id., p. 705.) Instead the first order was beyond the court's "jurisdiction" to grant, and therefore "void." Apposite is a holding of Carter v. Carter (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 845, 850 [ 307 P.2d 630], as follows: "The absence of any appeal from either of those judgments does not add any strength to the portions just mentioned, for a void order or judgment is subject to collateral attack at any time and in any place by any interested party."

The peremptory writ of mandate is denied.

Racanelli, P.J., and Grodin, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied August 22, 1980, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.