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Docket Number

36457.

Attorney(S)

William F. Lee, Jr., District Attorney, Michael G. Kam, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant. Frank M. Samford, III, for appellee.

Judges

JORDAN, Presiding Justice.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: THE STATE v. GERMANY, No. 36457 (Supreme Court of Georgia, Oct. 1, 1980)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision in Germany v. State, 154 Ga. App. 579 (269 S.E.2d 75) (1980). The Court of Appeals had reaffirmed its prior holding that, under Code Ann. § 27-1404, a defendant has an absolute statutory right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to what that court described as the "entry" of the defendant's sentencing judgment. The immediate procedural posture included a trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea, the Court of Appeals' reversal of that denial on the ground that the State had not carried its burden of showing the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, and this Court's grant of certiorari to resolve the legal questions presented. Having reviewed the record, the Supreme Court affirms the trial court's judgment denying the motion to withdraw the plea.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the phrase "before judgment is pronounced" in Code Ann. § 27-1404 must be interpreted to mean the period prior to the trial court's oral announcement of sentence (i.e., "pronounced"), or whether a defendant has an absolute statutory right to withdraw a guilty plea up to the later point of "entry" of the sentencing judgment.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea on the ground that the State failed to show the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered.
What procedural requirements, if any, should govern disclosure of plea agreements and the court's actions when it intends to reject a plea agreement (including what the defendant must be told and when the defendant may withdraw the plea).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Williams v. State, 148 Ga. App. 521, 251 S.E.2d 601 (1978)	Previously relied upon by the Court of Appeals to hold that a defendant has an absolute statutory right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to the "entry" of a sentencing judgment under Code Ann. § 27-1404.	The Supreme Court expressly reverses the Court of Appeals' reliance on this decision and overrules Williams to the extent it is contrary to the Court's interpretation of "pronounced" in § 27-1404.
Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 615, 619, 77 S.E. 1080 (1913)	Used as authority for the ordinary meaning of "pronounce" in the context of judgment or sentence (i.e., to declare aloud and in a formal manner).	Used to support the Court's statutory construction that "pronounced" means "orally announced," reinforcing the interpretation of Code Ann. § 27-1404.
Wright v. State, 75 Ga. App. 764, 44 S.E.2d 569 (1947)	Cited as one of the prior Georgia cases holding a position contrary to the interpretation adopted by this Court in this opinion.	Listed among cases that are expressly overruled to the extent they conflict with the Court's holding that "pronounced" means orally announced and does not confer an absolute right to withdraw after oral pronouncement.
Ballard v. State, 131 Ga. App. 847, 848, 207 S.E.2d 246 (1974)	Cited as one of the prior Georgia cases adopting a contrary rule concerning withdrawal of guilty pleas.	Expressly overruled by the Supreme Court insofar as it conflicts with the present interpretation of Code Ann. § 27-1404.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused first on statutory interpretation of Code Ann. § 27-1404, which provides that "[A]t any time before judgment is pronounced, the prisoner may withdraw the plea of 'guilty'...". The Court examined the ordinary meaning of the term "pronounced," relying on Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.) which defines "to pronounce" as "to declare aloud and in a formal manner" and on Griffin v. State for an analogous usage—i.e., that a court "pronounces" judgment or sentence when it orally announces it. The Court also cited Code Ann. § 102-102(1) to support applying the ordinary signification of the word.

On this basis, the Court concluded that the Legislature used "pronounced" to mean orally announced; accordingly, the statutory right to withdraw a guilty plea exists only before the court's oral announcement of sentence. Thus, a defendant does not have an absolute statutory right to withdraw a guilty plea after the trial court's oral pronouncement of the plea/sentence. Because this interpretation conflicts with prior Court of Appeals decisions that had allowed withdrawal up to "entry" of the sentencing judgment, those cases were expressly overruled to the extent of the conflict.

The Court then articulated procedural safeguards that trial courts must follow when a plea is offered and a plea agreement exists. Specifically, the trial court must require disclosure, on the record, of any plea agreement reached by the State and the defendant. If the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement, the court must personally inform the defendant, on the record, of four points: (1) the trial court is not bound by any plea agreement; (2) the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement presently before it; (3) the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement; and (4) the defendant may then withdraw his or her guilty plea as a matter of right.

The Court referenced analogous provisions in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 32(d)) and the Federal Rule concerning plea agreements (Rule 11(e)), and the ABA Standards (Plea of Guilty, § 4.1 (1974)) as authority for these procedural prescriptions. The Court made clear that if the defendant does not withdraw the plea after being so informed, sentence may be pronounced and the plea may not thereafter be withdrawn except upon the sound legal discretion of the court. The Court stated that the holdings in this procedural division are prospective only.

Finally, addressing the specific disposition in the case before it, the Court noted that the Court of Appeals had held the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw because the State allegedly failed to show the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' rule that a defendant has an absolute statutory right under Code Ann. § 27-1404 to withdraw a guilty plea prior to the "entry" of sentencing judgment, concluding instead that "pronounced" in the statute means "orally announced." The Court further affirmed the trial court's judgment denying the defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

Implications:

Direct legal effect: A defendant does not have an absolute statutory right to withdraw a guilty plea after the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence. Withdrawal after oral pronouncement is not automatic under § 27-1404 and is subject to the court's sound legal discretion thereafter.
Procedural requirements: When a plea agreement exists, the trial court must ensure disclosure of the agreement on the record and must personally inform the defendant, on the record, if the court intends to reject the agreement and of the four specified consequences (court not bound; intention to reject; disposition may be less favorable; defendant may withdraw plea as of right). If the defendant declines to withdraw, sentence may be pronounced and the plea cannot later be withdrawn except within the court's discretion.
Precedential effect: The Court expressly overruled prior Georgia appellate decisions that were contrary to this interpretation (including decisions such as Wright, Ballard, and Williams insofar as they conflict). The procedural rules stated concerning plea agreements are prospective only.
Case disposition: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea; the opinion concludes with the notation that the judgment is affirmed and that all the Justices concur.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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THE STATE v. GERMANY.

JORDAN, Presiding Justice.

This Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision in the case of Germany v. State, 154 Ga. App. 579 ( 269 S.E.2d 75) (1980).

1. The Court of Appeals, citing Williams v. State, 148 Ga. App. 521 ( 251 S.E.2d 601) (1978), reaffirmed its prior holding that a defendant has an absolute statutory right, under Code Ann. § 27-1404, to withdraw a guilty plea prior to entry of the defendant's sentencing judgment. We reverse this holding.

Code Ann. § 27-1404 provides that "[A]t any time before judgment is pronounced, the prisoner may withdraw the plea of `guilty'..." (Emphasis supplied.)

Black's Law Dictionary 4th Ed., p. 1380, states that "to pronounce" means "to declare aloud and in a formal manner. In this sense, a court is said to `pronounce' judgment or a sentence." Accord: Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 615, 619 ( 77 S.E. 1080) (1913). Code Ann. § 102-102 (1) provides that, in construing a statute, "The ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art, or words connected with a particular trade..."

Accordingly, we hold that the term, "pronounced," as employed by the Legislature in Code Ann. § 27-1404, means "orally announced" and that, therefore, a defendant does not have an absolute statutory right, under said Code Section, to withdraw a guilty plea, after the trial court's oral announcement of the same. Accord, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32(d), 18 USCA. All cases such as Wright v. State, 75 Ga. App. 764 (2) ( 44 S.E.2d 569) (1947); Ballard v. State, 131 Ga. App. 847, 848 (3) ( 207 S.E.2d 246) (1974); and Williams v. State, 148 Ga. App. 521 ( 251 S.E.2d 601) (1978) and others contrary to what is held herein are expressly overruled.

We also hold, however, that at the time a plea is offered, the trial court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of any plea agreement which has been reached by the state and the defendant. Further, if the trial court intends to reject said plea agreement, the trial court shall, on the record, inform the defendant personally that (1) the trial court is not bound by any plea agreement, (2) the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement presently before it, (3) the disposition of the present case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement, and (4) that the defendant may then withdraw his or her guilty plea as a matter of right. Accord: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e), 18 USCA; ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty, § 4.1 (1974). If the plea is not then withdrawn, sentence may be pronounced and the plea cannot thereafter be withdrawn except upon the sound legal discretion of the court. The holdings within this division are prospective only.

2. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea because "under the totality of the circumstances under which the defendant's plea was received,... the State failed to carry its burden of showing that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered ..."

Having reviewed the record, we affirm.