QUILLIAN, Chief Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from the grant of defendant County's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff sought to recover based on the defendant's failure to erect a stop sign at a point where one road dead-ended into another. The plaintiff alleged that she suffered injuries when she drove her vehicle through the intersection and into a ditch; that the injuries were caused by the defendant's maintaining a dangerous and defective condition and failing to warn of such condition. Held:
For two reasons the trial judge correctly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
1. From the facts adduced, the plaintiff failed to submit a written claim within 12 months after it accrued as required by Code § 23-1602. Doyal v. Dept. of Transp., 142 Ga. App. 79, 80 ( 234 S.E.2d 858).
2. In Englander v. City of East Point, 135 Ga. App. 487 ( 218 S.E.2d 161), this Court held: "It is obvious that plaintiff bases his complaint against the city because of its failure to place signs or barricades on a dead end street which would warn an individual of the character of the street. Deciding whether to erect or not to erect a traffic control sign or to maintain it after installation is an exercise of a governmental function by a municipality and it is not liable for any negligent performance of this function. Town of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834 ( 165 S.E.2d 141); Arthur v. City of Albany, 98 Ga. App. 746 ( 106 S.E.2d 347); Lundy v. City Council of Augusta, 51 Ga. App. 655 ( 181 S.E. 237). Nor would the lack of a sign or barricade fall within the category of a defect or obstruction of the street so as to constitute the function ministerial within Code § 69-303 as the defect or obstructions contemplated by the statute are physical obstructions or defects." Accord, Tamas v. Columbus, Georgia, 244 Ga. 200, 202 ( 259 S.E.2d 457), where the Supreme Court pointed out: "`In all of these cases a clear line is drawn between a discretionary nonfeasance and the negligent maintenance of something erected by the city, in its discretion, in such manner as to create a dangerous nuisance, and which amounts to misfeasance.'"
Hence, the failure to erect a traffic signal was not negligence and did not constitute a nuisance. See Hancock v. City of Dalton, 131 Ga. App. 178 ( 205 S.E.2d 470).
Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.
DECIDED APRIL 9, 1981.