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Docket Number

Docket No. 50859.

Attorney(S)

Goodman, Miller Miller, for plaintiff. Dunnings Canady, P.C., for defendant.

Judges

BEASLEY, J.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Martin v. Martin, Michigan Court of Appeals (Dec. 22, 1981), Docket No. 50859

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant-appellee, Blanche Martin, filed a petition (and an amended petition) in early 1979 seeking reduction of child support and alimony and apparently to set aside the prior divorce judgment on the basis that he had been coerced into signing a consent agreement while emotionally upset and under the care of a psychiatrist. After a hearing, the trial court found that no fraudulent inducement had occurred, but otherwise granted the defendant's petition and reduced both alimony and child support. Plaintiff-appellant, Josephine S. Martin, appealed as of right.

The parties were married in 1966 and had one son born in 1968. On August 16, 1978, a pro confesso divorce judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff-wife. That judgment provided (1) alimony to plaintiff in the amount of $600 per month for a period of four years (commencing September 1, 1978), and (2) child support to plaintiff in the amount of $1,200 per month until the son reached 18 or graduated from high school, and an obligation by defendant to pay for the son's college education. The divorce proofs were offered pursuant to a stipulation and an order withdrawing the defendant's pleadings, and the divorce judgment was approved in writing by the defendant and his counsel.

The trial court's modification reduced alimony to $100 per week (commencing November 20, 1979) and reduced child support to $200 per week (commencing July 17, 1979), otherwise leaving the divorce judgment in force. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the characterization and modifiability of the alimony provision and the propriety of the child support modification.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the alimony awarded in the divorce judgment constituted alimony in gross (and therefore was not generally subject to modification).
Whether the defendant's written approval and consent to the divorce judgment were procured by fraud (i.e., whether fraud existed to permit modification of alimony in gross).
If the alimony were characterized as ordinary (not gross) alimony, whether the defendant demonstrated a sufficient change of circumstances (reduction in the wife's needs or a sufficient reduction in the husband's ability to pay) to justify modification.
Whether the child support provision was excessive relative to the child's needs and, if so, whether the trial court's modification of child support was proper or whether additional evidentiary findings regarding the child's needs and relevant economic facts (including the child's relocation to Georgia) were required.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Appellee's Arguments

The defendant petitioned to reduce child support and alimony and sought to set aside the divorce judgment on the asserted ground that he had been coerced into signing the consent agreement while emotionally upset and under psychiatric care.
A claim was made (in the record) that the amount of child support fixed at divorce was excessive in relation to the child's needs because it was allegedly arrived at in an effort to induce the plaintiff to reconcile with the defendant.

Plaintiff-Appellant's Position

The plaintiff appealed as of right from the trial court's modifications. The opinion does not detail the plaintiff's specific appellate arguments beyond her appeal seeking review of the trial court's modifications.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Oknaian v. Oknaian, 90 Mich. App. 28, 282 N.W.2d 230 (1979)	Used in discussion defining and characterizing alimony in gross (and cited again for the fraud exception).	The court cited Oknaian to support its conclusion that an award payable in fixed installments for a definite period is alimony in gross, and to note that a showing of fraud can support modification of alimony in gross.
Edgar v. Edgar, 366 Mich. 580, 115 N.W.2d 286 (1962)	Authority for the proposition that an award payable in fixed installments for a definite length of time is nonetheless alimony in gross.	The court relied on Edgar (along with Oknaian) in concluding the divorce alimony provision was alimony in gross.
Firnschild v. Firnschild, 67 Mich. App. 327, 240 N.W.2d 790 (1976)	Statement of the general principle that alimony in gross is not modifiable.	The court invoked Firnschild to hold that, generally, alimony in gross may not be modified, subject to recognized exceptions (e.g., fraud).
(Oknaian, supra, cited again)	The proposition that a showing of fraud will support modification of alimony in gross.	The court noted the fraud exception (citing Oknaian) but relied on the trial court's explicit finding of no fraudulent inducement to deny modification on that basis.
Hettiger v. Hettiger, 37 Mich. App. 431, 195 N.W.2d 10 (1971)	Principles concerning the necessary showing of a change in circumstances to justify modification of alimony.	The court cited Hettiger (along with Butler) to explain the standard for modification and to support its conclusion that defendant did not show the required change in circumstances.
Butler v. Butler, 356 Mich. 607, 97 N.W.2d 67 (1959)	Authority regarding the burden to demonstrate sufficient change in circumstances to modify alimony.	The court used Butler to reinforce that the defendant failed to show either decreased needs of the wife or a sufficient reduction in the husband's ability to pay to warrant modification.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeals proceeded through a structured analysis:

Characterization of the alimony provision: The court examined the divorce judgment language and the payment structure (fixed monthly payments of $600 for a definite four-year period) and concluded this arrangement constituted alimony in gross. The court cited Oknaian and Edgar for the proposition that an award payable in fixed installments for a definite duration is alimony in gross.
Modifiability of alimony in gross: Citing precedent (Firnschild), the court stated the general rule that alimony in gross is not modifiable. Although the court acknowledged an exception exists (a showing of fraud can support modification—citing Oknaian), it emphasized that the trial court expressly found no fraudulent inducement and that the appellate review of the record did not reveal that finding to be clearly erroneous.
Alternative analysis if alimony were ordinary: The court added a subsidiary point that, even assuming arguendo the alimony were ordinary (i.e., modifiable), the defendant had not demonstrated the requisite change of circumstances (either a reduction in the wife's needs or a sufficient reduction in the husband's ability to pay). The court cited Hettiger and Butler for the standards governing such modifications and concluded the proofs in the record did not satisfy those standards.
Treatment of child support: The court distinguished child support from alimony in gross, explaining that child support is treated differently and is not given the same binding quality as alimony in gross. The court observed that at the time of the divorce there was no evidentiary showing presented regarding the child's needs. A claim was made that the child support amount at divorce was excessive because it had been set to induce reconciliation. The court also noted that the plaintiff was permitted to move the child to Georgia and that the trial court did not state whether it considered the child's removal in reducing support.
Remedy for child support: Because of the lack of adequate findings and factual development regarding the child's needs and the economic effects of the move to Georgia, the court set aside the trial court's modified child support order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court directed that the trial court determine a reasonable child support sum based on the economic facts and that the determination be effective as of January 3, 1979 (the date the defendant filed his petition to amend), while allowing the defendant to present evidence concerning the child's relocation and its economic impact on support.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court of Appeals issued the following core rulings:

The trial court's modification of the alimony award is reversed; the alimony provision in the original divorce judgment is reinstated.
The trial court's modification of child support is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine an appropriate child support award based on evidentiary findings.
The appellate disposition was summarized as: "Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with costs."

Implications:

The direct consequences are (1) the $600-per-month alimony awarded in the August 16, 1978 divorce judgment is to be reinstated because it was properly characterized as alimony in gross and was not shown to have been procured by fraud, and (2) the child support modification was vacated and the matter remanded for a fact-based determination of child support (to be effective as of January 3, 1979), including consideration of the child's relocation to Georgia. The opinion does not announce any broader doctrinal change beyond application of existing precedent; it resolves the dispute as between the parties and remands for further trial-court factfinding on child support.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond those expressly contained therein.

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MARTIN v MARTIN

BEASLEY, J.

In early 1979, defendant-appellee, Blanche Martin, filed a petition and then an amended petition to reduce child support and alimony and, apparently, to set aside the judgment of divorce on the basis that he had been coerced into signing a consent agreement while emotionally upset and under the care of a psychiatrist. After hearing, the trial court found that no fraudulent inducement had occurred, but otherwise granted defendant-appellee's petition and reduced the child support and alimony. Plaintiff-appellant, Josephine S. Martin, appeals as of right.

The parties had been married in 1966 and had one son, born in 1968. On August 16, 1978, a pro confesso divorce judgment was awarded to the plaintiff-wife, which provided that the defendant-husband pay to the plaintiff-wife, as alimony, the sum of $600 per month for a period of four years. The divorce proofs were offered pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and order of the court withdrawing defendant's pleadings, and the divorce judgment was approved in writing by defendant and his counsel. The divorce judgment also provided that the defendant-father pay to the plaintiff-mother the sum of $1,200 per month, to continue until the parties' son reached 18 years of age or graduated from high school, whichever occurred later, and that defendant would also pay for a college education for the son.

In granting defendant's petition to modify the judgment, the trial court reduced the alimony to $100 per week, commencing November 20, 1979 and reduced the child support to $200 per week, commencing July 17, 1979, but otherwise left the divorce judgment in full force and effect.

The alimony provision in the divorce judgment provided as follows:

"It is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Defendant, BLANCHE MARTIN, shall pay to the Plaintiff, JOSEPHINE S. MARTIN, * * * the sum of Six Hundred and No/100 ($600.00) Dollars, per month, Alimony, commencing on the first day of September, 1978, and continuing on the same day of each month thereafter for a period of Four (4) years."

As indicated, the judgment of divorce was approved for entry in writing by defendant, Blanche Martin, and his attorney.

Alimony in gross is a court-ordered obligation to pay a fixed sum to a divorced spouse. Where the award is payable in installments of a fixed amount and the payments run for a definite length of time, the sum is no less fixed and the award no less alimony in gross. We hold that the alimony provided in the judgment of divorce was gross alimony.

Oknaian v Oknaian, 90 Mich. App. 28; 282 N.W.2d 230 (1979).

Edgar v Edgar, 366 Mich. 580; 115 N.W.2d 286 (1962).

In general, alimony in gross is not modifiable. While a showing of fraud will support a modification of alimony in gross, in this case, the trial court expressly found that defendant's consent and agreement to the divorce judgment was not induced by fraud. Review of the record does not indicate that this finding was clearly erroneous.

Firnschild v Firnschild, 67 Mich. App. 327, 329; 240 N.W.2d 790 (1976).

Oknaian, supra, 37.

While we are satisfied that the alimony provided in the divorce judgment was alimony in gross and, therefore, not subject to modification under the circumstances of this case, we note that, even if it were to be assumed that ordinary alimony had been provided, defendant, Blanche Martin, has not made the necessary showing of a change of circumstances such as would justify a reduction in alimony. The proofs offered in this case show neither a reduction in the needs of the wife nor a sufficient reduction in the ability of the husband to pay.

Hettiger v Hettiger, 37 Mich. App. 431; 195 N.W.2d 10 (1971), Butler v Butler, 356 Mich. 607; 97 N.W.2d 67 (1979).

Consequently, we find that even if the alimony provided in the divorce judgment were to be construed as ordinary alimony defendant would not be entitled to relief in this case at this time.

The divorce judgment also provided for child support based upon the suggestion, consent, and approval of the parties. There was not, however, any showing regarding the needs of the parties' son at the time of the divorce. A claim is made that the amount of child support is excessive in relation to the child's need because it was arrived at in an effort to induce plaintiff to reconcile. It should also be noted that plaintiff was permitted to remove the parties' son to Georgia when she moved there. The trial court did not indicate whether it gave weight to this factor in reducing child support.

We treat child support differently than alimony in gross and do not attribute to it quite the same binding quality that we attribute to alimony in gross. Consequently, while we set aside the order for modified child support, we remand this case to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to make a finding regarding a reasonable sum for child support commensurate with the economic facts.

It is our intention that the trial court determine child support effective as of January 3, 1979, the date defendant filed his petition to amend, but we also intend defendant to have opportunity to offer evidence relative to plaintiff's moving the boy to Georgia and its economic effect on child support.

In accordance with this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court modifying alimony and reinstate the alimony provided in the judgment of divorce. We reverse the judgment of the trial court modifying the child support provided in the judgment of divorce and remand this case to the trial court for determination of child support.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with costs.

MARTIN v. MARTIN