LONG v. LONG

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Docket Number

37096.

Attorney(S)

Smith, Longabaugh, Hendon, Boyce, Dickson, Bell Clark, B. J. Smith, for appellant. Glen A. Garrett, Harrison, Kovacich Naughton, Davies Owens, Jack L. Harrison, for appellee.

Judges

JORDAN, Chief Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Superior Court of DeKalb County entered a final order on April 18, 1980, dissolving a receivership, discharging the receiver, and providing for his compensation. The order allowed each party 30 days to file objections. The appellant filed objections on May 13, 1980, after the term of court had ended on May 5, 1980. Following a hearing on October 10, 1980, the trial court affirmed the final order. The appellant then filed a notice of appeal on November 7, 1980. The appellee challenged the court's jurisdiction on the grounds that the notice of appeal was not timely.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Superior Court of DeKalb County retained jurisdiction to consider objections filed after the term in which the final order was entered had ended.
Whether the notice of appeal filed on November 7, 1980, was timely and conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
City of Cornelia v. Gunter, 227 Ga. 464 (181 S.E.2d 489) (1971)	After expiration of the term at which a decree was entered, the court lacks power to modify or revise it in any substantive manner.	Supported the conclusion that the court could not consider objections filed after the term ended.
Carswell v. Shannon, 209 Ga. 596 (74 S.E.2d 850) (1952)	Reinforces the principle limiting court's power to modify final orders after term expiration.	Used to affirm the court's lack of jurisdiction post-term.
Kittel v. Comstock, 219 Ga. 161 (132 S.E.2d 77)	Invalidity of attempts to retain jurisdiction beyond the term to reconsider final orders.	Supported the holding that allowing objections past the term was contrary to law and a nullity.
Hester v. State, 242 Ga. 173, 175 (249 S.E.2d 547) (1978)	The timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer appellate jurisdiction.	Used to emphasize dismissal due to untimely notice of appeal.
Jordan v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 343 (191 S.E.2d 530) (1972)	Affirms the necessity of timely appeal filing for appellate jurisdiction.	Reinforced the dismissal based on procedural timing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory schedule of the Superior Court of DeKalb County, noting that the March term ended on May 5, 1980. The final order was entered during that term, but the appellant filed objections after the term had expired. Citing established precedent, the court held that once a term ends, the court loses jurisdiction to modify or reconsider final orders in any substantive way. Therefore, the provision allowing objections after the term was contrary to law and void. Because the appellant's notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the final appealable order and no extension was granted, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The court's decision directly affects the parties by dismissing the appeal due to procedural defects in timing. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court reaffirmed existing principles regarding the limits of court jurisdiction after term expiration and the absolute requirement of timely appeal filings.

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LONG v. LONG.

JORDAN, Chief Justice.

Appellee challenges this court's jurisdiction for lack of a timely notice of appeal.

The Superior Court of DeKalb County entered its final order dissolving a receivership, discharging the receiver and providing for his compensation on April 18, 1980. That order further provided that "each party may file objections to this order during the next 30 days." Appellant filed his objections on May 13, 1980.

The trial court, after a hearing on the objection on October 10, 1980, ordered that "all terms and provisions of the Final Order of the Receivership of April 18, 1980, stand unchanged and affirmed." Appellant filed his notice of appeal to the order of October 10 on November 7, 1980.

The terms of the Superior Court of DeKalb County begin on the first Mondays in January, March, May, July, September and November. Georgia Laws 1973, p. 317.

"The regular terms of the superior and state courts shall continue until the commencement of the next regular term, at which time they shall stand adjourned" Code Ann. § 24-3010 (Ga.L. 1972, p. 713). Thus, by statute, the March term of the DeKalb County Superior Court ended on the first Monday in May, May 5, 1980.

We held in City of Cornelia v. Gunter, 227 Ga. 464 ( 181 S.E.2d 489) (1971) that after the expiration of the term at which a decree was entered it is out of the power of the court to modify and revise it in any manner of substance or in any manner affecting the merits. See also Carswell v. Shannon, 209 Ga. 596 (2) ( 74 S.E.2d 850) (1952).

We agree with the appellee that an attempt to retain jurisdiction of a final order to the extent of allowing any party to file objections and thereby have the matter reconsidered by the court beyond the term in which the final order is entered is contrary to law and is a nullity. See Kittel v. Comstock, 219 Ga. 161 ( 132 S.E.2d 77).

We find no provision in Georgia law for changing or modifying a final judgment after the term in which it is rendered by the filing of an objection to it. The DeKalb County Superior Court no longer had jurisdiction of the matter after the March term ended on May 5, 1980, leaving the only appealable order the one of April 18. Since more than 30 days had elapsed from the date of that order and the notice of appeal on November 7, 1980, and no extensions of time having been granted, this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

"A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained..." Code Ann. § 6-803 (a). "`The proper and timely filing of the notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court.'" Hester v. State, 242 Ga. 173, 175 ( 249 S.E.2d 547) (1978); Jordan v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 343 ( 191 S.E.2d 530) (1972).

Appeal dismissed. All the Justice concur, except Hill, P. J., who dissents.