PRINCE v. UNITED STATES

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Docket Number

No. 80-589.

Attorney(S)

Silas J. Wasserstrom and Richard S. Greenlee, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellant. Charles F. C. Ruff, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry, Michael W. Farrell, and Keith A. O'Donnell, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellee.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Marilyn Prince entered guilty pleas to charges of grand larceny and a Bail Reform Act violation. The trial judge initially sentenced her under the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA) with a confinement term for grand larceny of not less than two nor more than six years, and a consecutive one-year term for failure to appear. The government filed a motion under Super.Ct.Cr.R. 35 to correct the sentence, arguing that the maximum commitment of less than ten years was contrary to the NARA statutory mandate. The trial judge corrected the sentence, resentencing appellant to a term not to exceed six years for grand larceny and suspending the consecutive one-year term in favor of probation. Subsequently, the government filed another motion to impose the ten-year statutory maximum under NARA. The trial judge then modified the sentence to an indeterminate commitment not to exceed ten years as required by statute. Appellant appealed, contending that the increase violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in increasing the NARA commitment from six to ten years, thereby violating the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy.
Whether a sentence that is illegal for being at variance with the controlling sentencing statute can be corrected at any time under Super.Ct.Cr.R. 35, even if it increases the punishment.
Whether trial judges have discretion to fix a maximum sentence under the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The trial court's increase of the NARA commitment from six to ten years violated the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy.

Appellee's Arguments

The original sentence was illegal because it imposed a maximum commitment of less than ten years, contrary to the NARA statutory mandate.
Under Super.Ct.Cr.R. 35, the trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time, even if it results in increased punishment.
The maximum sentence under NARA is fixed by statute and not subject to judicial discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947)	Established that an illegal sentence can be corrected at any time under Rule 35, even if it increases punishment.	The court relied on this precedent to uphold correction of the sentence despite an increase in the maximum term.
Christopher v. United States, 415 A.2d 803 (D.C. App. 1980)	Supported the principle that illegal sentences are nullities subject to correction.	Used to affirm the trial court's authority to amend the sentence under Rule 35.
United States v. Curtis, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 523 F.2d 1134 (1975)	Held that trial judges have no discretion to fix a maximum sentence under NARA; the statute sets the maximum.	The court applied this to confirm that the trial judge correctly imposed the statutory maximum ten-year indeterminate sentence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recognized that the initial sentence was illegal because it did not comply with the NARA statutory requirement of a maximum ten-year indeterminate sentence. Under Super.Ct.Cr.R. 35, an illegal sentence can be corrected at any time, even if the correction increases the punishment. The court emphasized that under 18 U.S.C. § 4253(a), the commitment period under NARA is indeterminate and cannot exceed ten years, which is the maximum sentence for grand larceny. The statute vests discretion in correctional and medical authorities to determine the length of confinement, not the trial judge. Consequently, the trial court's amendment to impose the ten-year maximum was proper and did not violate the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition because the original sentence was a nullity. The court also cited legislative history to underscore that the ten-year maximum allows flexibility in treatment and ensures adequate punishment for recalcitrant offenders.

Holding and Implications

The court's final decision is AFFIRMED.

The trial court did not err in increasing the NARA commitment from six to ten years because the original sentence was illegal and subject to correction under Rule 35. The ruling confirms that sentencing under NARA is governed strictly by statute, which sets a ten-year maximum indeterminate term, and that correcting an illegal sentence does not violate double jeopardy protections. This decision directly affects the parties by upholding the corrected sentence but does not establish new precedent beyond affirming existing principles regarding sentence correction and NARA sentencing limits.

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Marilyn PRINCE, a/k/a Marilyn McCray, a/k/a Marilyn Ree v. s, a/k/a Marilyn Jean Ree

PER CURIAM:

Appellant entered guilty pleas to charges of grand larceny and a Bail Reform Act violation. Pursuant to recommendation, the trial judge subsequently decided to sentence her under the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA). The commitment order specified that the duration of confinement on grand larceny was for not less that two nor more than six years; and the commitment for failure to appear was for one year, to be served consecutively.

D.C. Code 1973, § 22-2201.

Id., § 23-1327(a).

The government filed a motion under Super.Ct.Cr.R. 35 to correct the sentence on the ground that a maximum commitment of less than ten years was contrary to the NARA statutory mandate (18 U.S.C. § 4253 (1976)). Thereupon, the trial judge ordered the original sentence corrected and appellant was resentenced to a term not to exceed six years for grand larceny and a consecutive term of one year for failure to appear, the latter to be suspended and replaced by two years' probation after release from the confinement under NARA.

The government then filed another motion to correct the sentence in which it again sought imposition of the ten-year statutory maximum under the NARA provisions. In response, the trial judge modified her sentence and imposed an indeterminate commitment not to exceed ten years pursuant to NARA (18 U.S.C. § 4253). Appellant contends the trial court erred in increasing the NARA commitment from six to ten years as this violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.

It has long been established that a sentence is a nullity if it is illegal for being at variance with the controlling sentencing statute, and it may be corrected at any time under Rule 35, supra, even if it increases the punishment. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67, 67 S.Ct. 645, 648-49, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947); Christopher v. United States, D.C.App., 415 A.2d 803 (1980). It is provided under NARA that upon a determination of eligibility, the court "shall commit [an offender] to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment under this chapter," and that "[s]uch commitment shall be for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed ten years, but in no event shall it exceed the maximum sentence that could otherwise have been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 4253(a).

In sentencing under NARA, the trial judges have no discretion to fix a maximum sentence. United States v. Curtis, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 523 F.2d 1134 (1975). It is the statute and not the court which provides the maximum sentence. Here, grand larceny carries a ten-year maximum sentence. Congress clearly provided for a flexible program which allows the administrative officials and not the court to decide the length of commitment.

The maximum 10-year sentence provided in section 4253 of the new chapter which would be added to title 18 allows correctional and medical authorities a desirable flexibility in treating individual addicts. It also should be recognized that it provides a lengthy period of sentence for those recalcitrant offenders who do not respond to treatment. [H.R. Rep. No. 1486, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. [1966] U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News 4245, 4252.]

We conclude there was no error in amending the previous illegal sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is

Affirmed.