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Docket Number

No. 79-4765.

Attorney(S)

John F. Bury, Bantz, Klobucher Clemons, Spokane, Wash., for plaintiffs-appellants. Robert M. Sweeney, Asst. U.S. Atty., Spokane, Wash., for defendants-appellees.

Judges

Herbert Young Cho Choy
Robert Boochever

Acts

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Emergency Disaster Loan Association, Inc. v. Block, No. 79-4765 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1981)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit brought by the Emergency Disaster Loan Association (EDLA), a Washington non-profit representing farmers and ranchers in northeastern Washington, and an individual farmer, John Kortus, challenging federal officials' handling of emergency disaster loan publicity and administration.

In 1973 the Secretary of Agriculture declared five counties in eastern Washington eligible for emergency loans under Title III of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (7 U.S.C. § 1961-1969). Under the then-applicable rules, applicants had to show they could not obtain commercial credit. The state and county FmHA offices issued publicity about the availability of emergency loans; however, from August 1973 to January 1, 1974 only 11 loans were made in the five-county area.

On January 2, 1974 Congress enacted the Small Business Appropriation Act (SBAA), Pub.L. No. 93-237, which modified certain terms and eligibility requirements for emergency loans (including removal of the "unable to obtain credit elsewhere" requirement and other incentives applicable to certain dates). On January 4, 1974 the Secretary sent telegrams instructing state FmHA directors to accept applications but not to process them pending further instructions. On February 15, 1974 the FmHA National Office issued Special Instruction 441.5 instructing state directors and county supervisors to inform the news media of the provisions of the SBAA and providing a suggested news release.

The suggested release did not mention some material benefits of the SBAA (e.g., principal cancellation and reduced interest). Washington state and county FmHA offices issued several news releases (most did not mention SBAA provisions), but county supervisors also took other steps (contacting prior borrowers and applicants, soliciting new applications, and mailing fact sheets in some instances). After the SBAA, the FmHA granted 172 emergency loans in northeastern Washington, 161 of them after the Act's enactment.

Appellants filed an action (original complaint Aug. 2, 1976; amended Oct. 6, 1977) seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus to compel the FmHA to reopen the application period on the ground that the Secretary had failed to give "adequate public notice" of the SBAA's provisions. The district court found that although notice was inadequate, the method of dissemination was discretionary and not subject to mandamus review, and that due process requirements were satisfied. Appellants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a writ of mandamus may issue to compel federal officials to provide "adequate public notice" of the SBAA's changes to emergency loan eligibility and benefits (i.e., whether a ministerial, non-discretionary duty to provide such notice existed).
Whether the government's alleged failure to give "adequate" notice of the SBAA deprived appellants of procedural due process by effectively denying them the opportunity to apply for emergency loans.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

Mandamus is appropriate because the Secretary had an obligation to give "adequate" notice of the changes to eligibility and benefits under the SBAA, as required by regulation 7 C.F.R. part 1832.3(b)(3) (1973) and related provisions.
The failure to give adequate notice effectively denied appellants procedural due process by preventing eligible farmers from learning of the new benefits and applying for loans.

Government's Arguments (Appellees)

The regulatory provision requiring state and county officials to "make such public announcements as appear appropriate" related only to the original designation of counties as disaster areas and did not impose a continuing or specific obligation to publicize later statutory changes such as the SBAA.
The issuance and manner of dissemination of Special Instruction 441.5 and related publicity were discretionary actions not subject to mandamus; consequently the court should not compel the government to take particular publicity actions.
The government contended that due process does not require affirmative individual notice of eligibility for benefits in the absence of a statutory requirement to notify.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414 (1931)	Mandamus issues only where the duty is ministerial, peremptory, plainly defined, and the obligation to act is clear and indisputable.	The court applied this standard to determine whether the Secretary or subordinate officials had a clear, ministerial duty to provide "adequate" public notice; it concluded the regulation and statutes did not create such a clear ministerial duty.
Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206 (1930)	Where duties require construction or application of statutes and involve judgment or discretion, mandamus will not lie; mandamus only compels performance of duties that are plainly prescribed and equivalent to a positive command.	The court used this principle to show that obligations arising from statutes and regulations here involved discretion and were not "free from doubt," so mandamus was inappropriate.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Association of Flood Insurers, 420 F. Supp. 221 (M.D. Pa. 1976); citing Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Association of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975)	The time and manner for disseminating information are matters of discretion not subject to mandamus review.	The court relied on this authority to support the view that Special Instruction 441.5 and the methods of publicity were discretionary and not a proper basis for mandamus.
Denton v. United States, 638 F.2d 1218 (1981) (cited "Cf.")	Illustrative authority concerning notice requirements; cited for the proposition that the government is not obligated to notify persons of their eligibility for benefits absent a statutory requirement.	The court cited this case by way of comparison to support its conclusion that no statutory duty requiring affirmative notice existed here, and therefore no due process violation occurred on that basis.
State ex rel. Board of Education v. Pfeifle, 86 S.D. 237, 193 N.W.2d 581 (1972)	Once a superior body issues an order requiring subordinate action, the subordinate's duty to comply may be ministerial and enforceable by mandamus.	Used in the concurrence to argue that after issuance of Special Instruction 441.5, state and county officials had a ministerial duty to inform the news media and could be compelled by mandamus if they failed to comply.
Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (cited in concurrence)	Although designation of an emergency loan area may be discretionary, once the discretion is exercised the Secretary has no discretion to halt the program.	Referenced in the concurrence to support the proposition that once the national office issued an instruction, local officials could have a ministerial duty to follow it.
Colson v. Bradley, 477 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1973) (cited in concurrence)	Adoption of regulations by an agency may be discretionary, but once regulations are adopted mandamus may be appropriate against a subordinate official who refuses to follow them.	Invoked in the concurrence to support mandamus against a state/local official who fails to comply with an adopted instruction or regulation.
Mora County Board of Education v. Valdez, 61 N.M. 361, 300 P.2d 943 (1956) (cited in concurrence)	Where a superior only recommends rather than orders action by a subordinate, mandamus is not appropriate.	Concurrence cited this case to distinguish situations where an instruction creates a ministerial duty from those where it merely recommends action.
U.S. v. United States District Court, C.D. California, 509 F.2d 1352 (1975) (cert. denied)	The extraordinary remedy of mandamus will not lie against an official who has substantially complied with a directive.	Concurrence relied on this principle to explain why mandamus would not lie here given substantial compliance by state officials with the suggested news release, and thus concurred in affirmance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the case in two principal parts: whether mandamus could issue, and whether appellants were denied procedural due process.

Mandamus Analysis

The court began with the Supreme Court's standard in United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur: mandamus is available only to compel performance of a duty that is ministerial, plainly defined, and obligatory. The court emphasized the corollary from Wilbur v. United States that where duties involve statutory construction or the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus is not appropriate.

The court examined 7 C.F.R. § 1832.3(b), noting that its title and text were directed to the "Designation by the Secretary" and spoke specifically to the original designation process. The regulation's language requiring state and county directors to "make such public announcements as appear appropriate" was interpreted by the court as relating to original area designation rather than as imposing a continuing, specific obligation to publicize subsequent statutory changes (like the SBAA).

The court also reviewed Special Instruction 441.5, concluding that its issuance was discretionary with the Secretary and that the instruction did not convert discretionary action into a mandatory duty enforceable by mandamus. The opinion cited analogous authority holding that the timing and manner of disseminating information are matters of discretion not subject to mandamus review.

Due Process Analysis

Turning to procedural due process, the court accepted the district court's conclusion that the Secretary had no duty to ensure that "every potential beneficiary" had actual notice of the specific benefits. The court rejected appellants' contention that any law conferring benefits automatically imposes a constitutional notice requirement. Instead, it held that the government is not obligated to provide individualized notice of eligibility for benefits in the absence of a statutory requirement to do so. The court found that loans were made available and that publicity efforts had been undertaken, and therefore no due process violation was shown.

Concurrence (Judge Boochever)

Judge Boochever concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to state that he believed Special Instruction 441.5, once issued by the national FmHA office, could impose a ministerial duty on state or county officials to inform the news media and that mandamus might lie against a state director who failed to comply. He relied on state-court and circuit authorities for the proposition that a superior's order can create a ministerial duty on subordinates. However, because the record showed substantial compliance by state officials with the suggested news release, he agreed that mandamus relief was not warranted and thus joined in affirming the district court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that mandamus relief was not available because the applicable regulation and statutes did not impose a clear, ministerial duty to provide the type of "adequate" notice appellants sought, and Special Instruction 441.5 was discretionary rather than mandatory. The court also held that there was no procedural due process violation because the government had no statutory duty to provide individualized notice of eligibility for benefits.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the appellants' request for a writ of mandamus to compel renewed notice and reopening of the application period was denied and the district court judgment was affirmed.
The opinion underscores the limited role of mandamus against federal officials: mandamus will not compel discretionary actions or statutory constructions that are not "free from doubt."
The court expressly rejected the proposition that conferral of benefits by statute automatically creates a constitutional duty to notify potential beneficiaries absent a statutory requirement to provide notice.
Judge Boochever's concurrence signals a narrower pathway by which mandamus might be available — i.e., to compel a subordinate official to follow a clearly issued administrative instruction — but he agreed that substantial compliance in this record precluded relief. The majority opinion, however, does not adopt that broader rule as controlling in this case.
No new broad precedent expanding notice obligations or mandamus remedies was established; the court applied established mandamus and due process principles to the facts presented.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that source.

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EMERGENCY DISASTER LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., A WASHINGTON NON-PROFIT CORPORATION, AND JOHN KORTUS, REPRESENTING THE CLASS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS. v. JOHN R. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE OF THE UNITED STATES; SAMUEL R. PIERCE,fn_ SECRETARY OF HUD OF THE UNITED STATES; H. ALLAN BROCK,fn_ NATIONAL ADMINISTRATOR OF FEDERAL FARM HOME ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES; JAMES E. LEE, DIRECTOR OF THE EMERGENCY LOAN DIVISION OF FEDERAL FARM HOME ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES; GEORGE A. LINCOLN, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OF THE UNITED STATES; AND MICHAEL HORAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF FEDERAL FARM HOME ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. The named federal officials ha

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

Appellants appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court denying their claim for a writ of mandamus. We affirm.

I. Facts

The appellant Emergency Disaster Loan Association (EDLA) is a non-profit corporation representing a group of farmers and ranchers in northeastern Washington who failed to apply for emergency assistance loans from the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) during the period of 1973-74 when the FmHA was authorized to make such loans. The individual appellant, John Kortus, is a diary farmer residing in Chewelah, Washington. The appellees are various federal officials, including the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (the Secretary) and certain subordinate officials of the FmHA, an agency within the Department of Agriculture. The claims of the appellants are based upon asserted acts and omissions of the appellees, and their predecessors in office, in the performance of their official duties as federal officers.

Appellants' original Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Mandamus Relief was filed on August 2, 1976, and was answered on October 4, 1976. Appellants amended the Complaint on October 6, 1977; the Amended Complaint was answered on November 10, 1977. Appellants' cause of action was ordered to be maintained as a class action on May 8, 1978, and the class was defined on May 30, 1978.

Title III of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1961-1969, authorizes the FmHA to make emergency loans to farmers in areas where the Secretary of Agriculture finds there is a general need for agricultural credit due to a natural disaster and declares that farmers and ranchers in the area are eligible for emergency assistance under the Act.

By proclamations published in the Federal Register in August and September 1973, the Secretary found that a general need for agricultural credit existed in five counties in eastern Washington and declared farmers and ranchers in the five counties eligible for emergency assistance loans. Under the then applicable provisions of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, emergency assistance loans were repayable at five percent interest. Applicants for such loans were required to show they were unable to obtain credit from commercial lenders. 7 U.S.C. § 1964.

The 1973 regulations concerning the administration of emergency assistance loans provided that when the Secretary designated an area eligible for emergency loans the state FmHA director would immediately notify the county FmHA offices involved and would "make such public announcements as appear appropriate." 7 C.F.R. 1832.3(b) (1973). The same regulations provided that the county FmHA supervisors involved would "make such public announcements as appear appropriate," and would explain to other agricultural lenders in the area the assistance available under the emergency loan program.

When the five counties were designated by the Secretary as eligible for emergency assistance loans the state and county FmHA directors publicized the availability of loans in various ways, including news releases to the Associated Press, the United Press International, local newspapers, and a personal appearance by one county director on a farm news program that was broadcast to the five-county area. All of the announcements stated, among other things, that, in order to be eligible for an emergency assistance loan, the applicant must show he could not obtain credit elsewhere. Many farmers were ineligible for the loans because they were able to obtain commercial credit, and from August 1973 to January 1, 1974, only 11 emergency loans were granted by the FmHA to applicants in the five-county area.

On January 2, 1974, Congress enacted the Small Business Appropriation Act (SBAA), Pub.L. No. 93-237. Section 4 of this act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to provide emergency assistance loans to farmers and ranchers in emergency disaster areas in accordance with Section 5 of Pub.L. No. 92-385, despite the repeal of that act on April 20, 1973, by Pub.L. No. 93-24.

Section 5 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to cancel up to $5,000 of the principal indebtedness on emergency loans and to reduce the interest rate on remaining balances to one percent. The provisions of Section 5 were applicable until July 1, 1973. However, on April 20, 1973, by Pub.L. No. 93-24, Congress repealed Section 5.

Section 10(a) of the SBAA removed the requirement that applicants for emergency loans be unable to obtain credit elsewhere. However, the authority of the Secretary to grant loans with Section 5 terms was limited to areas where the natural disaster occurred after December 26, 1972, and prior to April 20, 1973. These provisions were applicable to the emergency designation of the five northeastern Washington counties.

On January 4, 1974, the Secretary of Agriculture sent telegrams to all state FmHA directors advising them of the enactment of the SBAA and directing them to continue to accept applications for emergency loans. They were, however, not to process the applications until they received further instructions. This directive was followed by Washington State FmHA officials.

On February 15, 1974, the National Office of the FmHA issued Instruction 441.5 entitled "Special Emergency Loan Policies and Authorizations Implementing Applicable Provisions of Public Law 93-237," paragraph II A which stated in part:

State Directors and County Supervisors will inform the news media including newspapers, radio and television in the affected counties of the provisions of P.L. 93-237. A suggested news release for local use is attached as Exhibit C.

The sample news release did not state that an applicant would be relieved of the eligibility requirement of showing that he or she could not obtain credit elsewhere, nor did it state that cancellation of up to $5,000 of the loan principal together with a reduced interest rate was available.

Washington state and county FmHA officials sent out several news releases, most of which did not mention the provisions of the SBAA. In addition to sending the news releases, however, the FmHA county supervisors contacted the 11 borrowers who had obtained emergency loans prior to enactment of the SBAA and asked them to come to the county FmHA offices to determine if they would be eligible for additional benefits under the new law. The supervisors also contacted previous unsuccessful loan applicants and solicited new applications in light of the new law. One county supervisor even mailed fact sheets on the SBAA to all active borrowers on file in his office.

The FmHA granted 172 emergency loans to farmers and ranchers in northeastern Washington, 161 of which were made after the enactment of the SBAA.

Appellants brought this action against the Secretary of Agriculture asserting that the Secretary had failed to perform his duty to give "adequate public notice" of the provisions of the SBAA. They sought a writ of mandamus to compel the FmHA to reopen the period in which the farmers could apply for emergency loans. The district court entered judgment for the government, finding that although the notice was inadequate, the method of its dissemination was not subject to judicial review by mandamus and that all due process requirements were satisfied. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis A. Mandamus Action

In United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 420, 51 S.Ct. 502, 504, 75 L.Ed. 1148 (1931), the Supreme Court discussed the issuance of mandamus against federal officials. The Court stated:

Under the established rule the writ of mandamus cannot be made to serve the purpose of an ordinary suit. It will issue only where the duty to be performed is ministerial and the obligation to act peremptory, and plainly defined. The law must not only authorize the demanded action, but require it; the duty must be clear and indisputable. (Citations omitted.)

Appellants argue that mandamus is proper because the Secretary was obligated to give them "adequate" notice of changes in the eligibility requirements for emergency disaster loans. They contend that this was required under 7 C.F.R. Part 1832.3(b)(3) (1973) which provided:

(3) When an area is designated by the Secretary, the National Office will notify the State Director and the Finance Office regarding such area designation. The notification will specify the period within which initial loans may be made to new applicants as a result of the disaster for which the area was designated. The State Director will notify immediately the county offices involved and this notification will be confirmed by a State requirement issued as soon as possible. The State Director also will notify the State USDA Defense Board Chairman and will make such public announcements as appear appropriate.

(i) Immediately upon receiving notice of the designation of counties under his jurisdiction, the County Supervisor will notify the appropriate County USDA Defense Board Chairman and make such public announcements as appear appropriate. Also, the County Supervisor will explain to other agricultural lenders in the area the assistance available under the EM loan program. (Emphasis added.)

The government maintains that the provision of this regulation concerning appropriate public announcements was applicable only to the original designation of the five counties as a natural disaster area eligible for emergency assistance loans and did not apply to the manner in which information concerning the SBAA was disseminated. We agree.

In Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19, 50 S.Ct. 320, 324, 74 L.Ed. 809 (1930), the Supreme Court stated:

The duties of executive officers . . . usually are connected with the administration of statutes which must be read and in a sense construed to ascertain what is required. But it does not follow that these administrative duties all involve judgment or discretion of the character intended by the rule just stated. Where the duty in a particular situation is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to a positive command it is regarded as being so far ministerial that its performance may be compelled by mandamus, unless there be provision or implication to the contrary. But where the duty is not thus plainly prescribed but depends upon a statute or statutes the construction or application of which is not free from doubt, it is regarded as involving the character of judgment or discretion which cannot be controlled by mandamus. (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.)

7 C.F.R. § 1832.3(b) is entitled Designation by the Secretary. The wording is specifically directed to the original designation. No mention of any continuing obligation is made. In addition, the SBAA contains no notification requirement. The regulation does not set forth the type of "free from doubt" duty of performance which may be compelled by mandamus.

Neither can Special Instruction 441.5 provide the basis for a mandamus action. The issuance of this special instruction was discretionary with the Secretary and therefore did not violate any mandatory language of the SBAA. Such action is not subject to judicial review in a mandamus action.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Association of Flood Insurers, 420 F. Supp. 221 (M.D. Penn. 1976), involved a somewhat similar issue. The Commonwealth sought a writ of mandamus against the National Association of Flood Insurers, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the United States of America based on an alleged failure of the Secretary to comply with his statutory duty to publicize and sell flood insurance to persons in flood areas in Pennsylvania. The district court held that "`the time and manner of acting' to disseminate information are matters of discretion which are not open to review by this court in a mandamus action." Id. at 225, quoting Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Association of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 26 (3rd Cir. 1975).

B. Due Process Claim

Appellants argue that the failure of the Government to give "adequate" notice of the new law denied them their right to procedural due process by effectively denying them their right to apply for a loan. The district court addressed this issue by concluding that:

This Court knows of no duty on the Secretary to insure that every potential beneficiary in northeastern Washington had actual notice of the specific benefits under P.L. 93-237 for which they might be eligible.

While due process does not require the Secretary to affirmatively go forward and contact each and every farmer in the area, it does require the Secretary to make the loans available and announce the availability of the loans. Although the best methods were not employed, the Court finds that the Secretary did satisfy all due process requirement with regard to the emergency disaster loans.

We agree. The due process argument appears to be based on the contention that the agency had some type of duty to inform the farmers of the change in eligibility requirements. As discussed above, neither the law nor any cited regulation creates such a duty.

The implication of appellants' argument is that any law which confers benefits on an individual automatically imposes a due process notice requirement on the government. We reject this argument. The government is not obligated to notify persons of their eligibility for benefits unless required to do so by statute. There was no such requirement in this case. Cf. Denton v. United States, 638 F.2d 1218 (1981).

III. Conclusion

The actions of the Secretary were discretionary and are not subject to review in a mandamus action. In addition there was no due process violation. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

[30] BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Unlike the majority, I believe that the issuance of Special Instruction 441.5, although discretionary with the Secretary, could form the basis for a mandamus action against the state director of the Federal Farm Home Administration of the State of Washington, in the event of his failure to comply.

The special instruction issued by the national office of the FmHA stated in part:

State Directors and County Supervisors will inform the news media including newspapers, radio and television in the affected counties of the provisions of P.L. 93-237. A suggested news release for local use is attached as Exhibit C.

Although the initial issuance of the order may have been discretionary, once it was issued it had to be followed. State ex rel. Board of Education v. Pfeifle, 86 S.D. 237, 193 N.W.2d 581 (1972), clearly indicates that once the Secretary issued the special instruction, the local officials had a ministerial duty to follow it and therefore mandamus would lie to compel performance of that duty.

See Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143, 152 (although Secretary of Agriculture has discretion to designate an emergency loan area, once the discretion has been exercised Secretary has no discretion to halt program).

In Pfeifle, the county board of education had discretion to determine whether to combine areas into one school district. Id. 193 N.W.2d at 585. It elected to exercise that discretion and adopted a motion directing the school superintendent to issue such orders as necessary to combine the areas. The superintendent issued the orders but the county officers took no action. The court stated:

Finally, we conclude that the court did not err in granting relief by way of mandamus. The defendant officers were not clothed with any discretion in complying with the order served upon them by the county superintendent of schools pursuant to the decision of the county board of education. Their duties were completely ministerial in nature the performance of which could properly be compelled by mandamus.

Similarly here, once the Secretary exercised his discretion to require that the state directors and county supervisors, "inform the news media . . . of the provisions of P.L. 93-237," the local officials' duty was ministerial and could be compelled by mandamus. See also Colson v. Bradley, 477 F.2d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 1973) (although adoption of regulations by agency may be discretionary, once adopted, mandamus is appropriate remedy against lesser official who refuses to follow such regulations). Cf. Mora County Board of Education v. Valdez, 61 N.M. 361, 300 P.2d 943 (1956) (where superior merely recommends rather than orders the performance of an act by a subordinate, mandamus is not appropriate remedy).

The special instruction, however, included a suggested news release. While that release did not set forth some of the material provisions of the new law, it is not disputed that the state officials sent out news releases embodying the provisions of the suggested one. There was thus substantial compliance with the directive. Obviously the extraordinary remedy of mandamus will not lie against an official who has substantially complied with a directive. For that reason I join in affirming the judgment of the district court.

U.S. v. United States District Court, Central District of California, 509 F.2d 1352, 1354 (1975) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1949, 44 L.Ed.2d 448.

EMERGENCY DISASTER LOAN ASS'N, INC. v. BLOCK