Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

Docket No. 64131.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William F. Delhey, Prosecuting Attorney, and Elizabeth Osgood Pollard, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Arthur J. Tarnow for defendant.

Judges

BLAIR MOODY, JR., J. (concurring).
PER CURIAM.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: People v. Hughes, Docket No. 64131 (Mich. S. Ct. Aug. 24, 1981) (Per Curiam)

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant was charged with felony murder in connection with the killing of a policeman during the course of a bank robbery. The first trial ended in a hung jury. At a second trial in 1977 the defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed that conviction. The defendant applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, and the prosecutor filed a response to that application. Instead of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for a new trial. Rehearing was denied (412 Mich. 1101).

The primary procedural posture before the Supreme Court concerned the trial court's admission (or potential admission) of evidence relating to the defendant's prior 1963 conviction for second-degree murder and related claims made by the defendant about transcript access and judicial disqualification.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in its exercise of discretion by allowing (or indicating it would allow) references to the defendant's prior 1963 second-degree murder conviction for the limited purpose of impeachment of credibility.
Whether the defendant was denied equal protection by being denied a complete transcript of the first trial.
Whether the trial judge should have been disqualified (or a visiting judge appointed) because the trial judge and other Washtenaw Circuit Court judges attended the funeral of the slain policeman.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant requested that the trial court exclude references to his 1963 conviction of second-degree murder; he argued that such evidence should not be admitted to impeach his credibility.
The defendant asserted that he was denied equal protection of the law because the trial court denied him a complete transcript of the first trial (which resulted in a mistrial).
The defendant argued that the trial judge should have disqualified himself because he and other judges of the Washtenaw Circuit Court had attended the funeral of the Ypsilanti policeman who was killed during the armed robbery.

The opinion notes that the prosecutor responded to the application for leave to appeal, but the text does not provide a detailed account of the prosecutor's specific arguments in opposition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974)	Provides guidelines for the trial court's balancing of the prejudicial effect of prior convictions against their probative value for impeachment (credibility). Factors include the nature of the prior offense, whether it involved substantially the same conduct, and the effect if the accused does not testify for fear of impeachment.	The Court applied Jackson's balancing approach and factors to evaluate whether the 1963 second-degree murder conviction should have been admitted for impeachment. The Court concluded that, under those guidelines, the prior conviction's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
People v. Baldwin, 405 Mich. 550, 275 N.W.2d 253 (1979)	Reiterates and supplements the balancing guidelines for admission of prior convictions for impeachment purposes (similar factors to Jackson).	The Court relied on Baldwin alongside Jackson to outline the proper exercise of discretion. Baldwin's factors were treated as continuing guidance in determining probative value versus prejudice.
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (cited in concurrence)	Offers guidance that convictions for the same crime should be admitted sparingly; provides additional factors to consider when deciding admissibility for impeachment.	The concurrence cites Gordon approvingly as supportive precedent for the proposition that substantially similar prior convictions should be admitted sparingly; the concurrence uses it to support the conclusion that the prejudicial effect outweighed probative value in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recognizing that the trial judge had discretion to exclude or admit evidence of a prior conviction for the limited purpose of attacking the defendant's credibility if the defendant testified. The trial judge's explanation, however, was characterized as "confusing" and the Court identified two specific errors in how that discretion was exercised:

The trial judge apparently believed that evidence of the defendant's college education and subsequent accomplishments would be pertinent to his credibility. The Supreme Court rejected this premise, explaining that there is no probative relationship between educational or other accomplishments and a person's disposition toward truthfulness.
The trial judge incorrectly framed the issue by weighing the "credibility" import of a prior felony conviction against the "credibility" import of other evidence. The Supreme Court clarified that the proper comparison is between the probative value of the prior conviction for assessing credibility and the potential prejudicial effect that evidence might have on the fairness of the trial (i.e., whether it would interfere with the jury's ability to determine guilt or innocence).

The Court recited the Jackson/Baldwin factors guiding admissibility: nature of the prior offense, whether it was for substantially the same conduct as that presently charged, and the effect on the decisional process if the accused does not testify for fear of impeachment by prior convictions. The opinion explained the two-fold purpose of the inquiry: (1) admit only those prior convictions indicative of the defendant's disposition toward truthfulness; and (2) exclude convictions that, although potentially indicative, would unduly prejudice the jury's factfinding.

Applying these considerations to the facts at hand, the Court observed that the 1963 conviction was essentially the same crime as that charged in the current case and was approximately 14 years old. Taking account of the similarity and age, the Court concluded that the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior conviction outweighed its probative value for impeachment of credibility. On that basis the Court found error in the trial court's exercise of discretion and ordered a new trial.

The Court also addressed two additional claims raised by the defendant: (1) denial of equal protection by being refused a complete transcript of the first trial; and (2) the need for disqualification (or appointment of a visiting judge) because local judges attended the funeral of the policeman who was killed. Rather than resolve those claims on the merits, the Court, having ordered a new trial based on the prior-conviction ruling, directed that on retrial the defendant be furnished a complete transcript of the first trial and that the State Court Administrator assign a visiting judge to hear the case. The Court specifically stated that this appointment was not an implication of bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge or other Washtenaw Circuit Court judges.

The opinion also notes (in a sidebar note and in the concurrence) that the trial occurred before the March 1, 1978 effective date of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, and that the outlined factors remain relevant under MRE 609(a)(2) on retrial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for a new trial. REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.

Implications and direct effects:

The conviction from the 1977 trial was vacated insofar as the Court of Appeals' affirmance is reversed and the case is remanded for retrial due to the trial court's erroneous exercise of discretion regarding admission of the 1963 second-degree murder conviction for impeachment.
On retrial, the defendant must be furnished a complete transcript of the first trial that resulted in a mistrial.
The State Court Administrator is directed to assign a visiting judge to preside over the retrial; the Court expressly indicated no finding of bias against the local trial judge or other circuit judges.
The opinion applies existing precedents (Jackson, Baldwin, and related authority) to guide admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment; it does not purport to announce a new rule of law but enforces the proper balancing approach and its application to the facts of this case. The Court also noted that the factors at issue remain relevant under MRE 609(a)(2) for future trials.

Decision concurrence note: The opinion was per curiam with Justices Kavanagh, Williams, Levin, Fitzgerald, and Ryan joining. Justice Blair Moody, Jr. filed a separate concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Coleman and Justice Ryan) agreeing with the result and emphasizing the Jackson factors and approvingly citing Gordon v. United States.

Show full summary ...

PEOPLE v HUGHES

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was charged with felony murder in the killing of a policeman during a bank robbery. His first trial ended in a hung jury. At his second trial in 1977, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to life. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal with this Court and the prosecutor responded. After careful consideration of the contentions of both parties and review of the record, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse and remand to the trial court for a new trial.

Prior to the presentation of the defense testimony at the second trial, the defendant's counsel asked the trial judge to exclude references to the defendant's 1963 conviction of second-degree murder. The trial judge denied the request declaring:

"As to the second request, [that] the court suppress any testimony, if the defendant takes the stand as to his past record, of course this only applies, any reference on defendant's past criminal record could only be brought if the defendant testifies. If he testifies, the court in exercising discretion, would feel that it would be proper to cross-examine the defendant only as to his felony record [of] which he either has been found guilty or pled guilty, not misdemeanors or anything of this nature. * * * The court feels that this would go to the credibility of the defendant if he testifies. In the same manner, defendant, as if he testifies, testimony as to his college education where or what he's been doing pursuant, those things that he's accomplished, this also being brought forth as to anything which would affect his credibility, may also be presented by counsel for defendant, if the defendant testifies. This would be pertinent to his credibility. So what counsel appears to be arguing [is] that it would be proper to show that the defendant has done excellent work in school, and so forth, and that he's been without a blemish for many years, but then defendant seems to claim that at that point the testimony should stop and say everything that's good should be permitted to be offered as to his credibility, but nothing in any way affecting his credibility should be offered, and the court, in its discretion, feels that this case on the basis of what the court has heard and seen, the court feels that this would be proper for cross-examination as to this felony."

Although we find this explanation confusing, it appears that the judge properly recognized that he had discretion to exclude the evidence of defendant's prior conviction or to admit it for the limited purpose of attacking the defendant's credibility. In his exercise of this discretion, however, he erred in two particulars. First, he apparently believed that evidence of defendant's college education and subsequent accomplishments would be pertinent to his credibility. There is no probative relationship between a person's educational achievements or other accomplishments and his or her disposition to truthfulness. Second, the "credibility" import of a prior felony conviction is not to be weighed against the "credibility" import of some other evidence. It is to be weighed against its potential prejudicial effect on the fairness of the defendant's trial.

In People v Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 333; 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974), and People v Baldwin, 405 Mich. 550, 552-553; 275 N.W.2d 253 (1979), we set forth guidelines for the exercise of the trial court's discretion in balancing the prejudicial effect of evidence of prior convictions against their probative value on the issue of credibility. Among the factors to be considered are the nature of the prior offense, whether the conviction was for substantially the same conduct as that for which the accused is on trial, and the effect on the decisional process if the accused does not testify for fear of impeachment by prior convictions.

The trial in this case preceded the March 1, 1978 effective date of the Michigan Rules of Evidence. The listed factors continue to be relevant in the balancing required by MRE 609(a)(2).

The purpose of this inquiry is two-fold:

1) To put before the jury only those prior convictions indicative of the defendant's disposition toward truthfulness and veracity; and

2) To keep from the jury those convictions which, although they may be indicative of defendant's disposition toward truthfulness, may interfere with the jury's ability to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence on the basis of the evidence. Such interference is what is meant by "prejudice".

If, after evaluating these factors, the judge believes the prejudicial effect of admitting prior conviction evidence outweighs its probative value, the evidence should be excluded.

Here the conviction was of essentially the same crime as that with which the defendant was charged and was approximately 14 years old. For these reasons we are persuaded that the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probative value.

The defendant also contends that he was denied equal protection of the law because the trial court denied him a complete transcript of the first trial. He further argues that the trial judge should have disqualified himself because he, along with the other judges of the Washtenaw Circuit Court, attended the funeral of the Ypsilanti policeman who was killed during the armed robbery.

Inasmuch as we have ordered a new trial on the basis of defendant's first assertion of error, to obviate the problems implicated in the other questions we direct that on retrial the defendant be furnished a complete transcript of the first trial which resulted in a mistrial and that the State Court Administrator assign a visiting judge to hear the case. In ordering the appointment of a visiting judge we intimate no finding of bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge or of the other judges of the Washtenaw Circuit Court.

Pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for a new trial.

KAVANAGH, WILLIAMS, LEVIN, FITZGERALD, and RYAN, JJ., concurred.

BLAIR MOODY, JR., J. (concurring).

I concur with the result reached by the Court. The defendant was charged with felony murder. The trial judge denied the request of the defendant to exclude references to the defendant's prior conviction of second-degree murder that occurred 14 years previously.

In People v Jackson, 391 Mich. 323; 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974), it was stated:

"Among the factors to be considered are the nature of the prior offense, whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the accused is on trial, and the effect on the decisional process if the accused does not testify from fear of impeachment by prior convictions."

It is to be noted that upon retrial MRE 609 will be applicable.

Furthermore, this Court has approved the factors outlined in Gordon v United States, 127 US App DC 343; 383 F.2d 936 (1967), which include: "As a general guide, those convictions which are for the same crime should be admitted sparingly."

The fact that 14 years separated the two offenses, the fact that the crimes were substantially similar, the fact that the nature of the prior conviction, although probative, offers modest insight as to credibility, and the fact that the defendant did not testify lead to the conclusion that the prejudicial nature of this evidence outweighed its probative value.

COLEMAN, C.J., and RYAN, J., concurred with BLAIR MOODY, JR., J.

PEOPLE v. HUGHES