Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 79CA0659

Attorney(S)

Mellinger and Throne, Daphne Throne, for appellant. Miller and Gray, P.C., William R. Gray, for appellee.

Judges

Opinion by JUDGE STERNBERG.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Case Summary: In re the Marriage of Mary Arden Smith and Gerald R. Smith, No. 79CA0659 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1981)

Court: Colorado Court of Appeals, Division I.
Opinion by: Judge Sternberg. Judges Coyte and Berman concur.
Appeal from: District Court of Boulder County (Hon. Horace B. Holmes).
Counsel: Mellinger and Throne, Daphne Throne, for appellant; Miller and Gray, P.C., William R. Gray, for appellee.

Factual and Procedural Background

At the time the decree dissolving the marriage was entered, the court adopted a settlement agreement dated April 25, 1975, which provided that the father would pay the mother $200 per month as child support for each of two children.

In January 1978 the mother moved to increase support to $325 per child. A referee conducted an evidentiary hearing, entered findings and conclusions, and recommended an increase to $275 per month per child. In May 1978 the trial court adopted the referee's findings and recommendations.

The father filed timely objections. A hearing before the trial judge was held in April 1979. At that hearing counsel commented on testimony taken at the referee's hearing and discussed parts of the referee's recommendations, but no testimony or documentary evidence was presented. The trial court then entered an order denying the mother's motion for modification without detailing which findings of the referee it determined to be erroneous.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a trial court may reverse a referee's (master's) decision on a motion to increase child support without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Whether the individual who conducted the evidentiary hearing functioned as a master under C.R.C.P. 53 (i.e., whether the label "referee" affects the applicability of C.R.C.P. 53).
Whether the appeal must be dismissed because no motion for new trial was filed after the trial court's ruling.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Colorado v. I.D.I., Inc., 642 P.2d 14 (Colo.App. 1981)	Illustrates that the functional role of an official (here, a "referee") controls whether C.R.C.P. 53 applies, regardless of the title used in local court rules.	The court relied on this authority to support its conclusion that the referee was acting as a master under C.R.C.P. 53 and that the rule applies despite the local designation "referee."
Brown v. Brown, 161 Colo. 409, 422 P.2d 634 (1967)	Establishes that (1) on questions of fact involving conflicting testimony and witness credibility, the master is the appropriate factfinder; (2) findings supported by testimony must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; and (3) a trial court may reject a master's report only after holding a hearing.	The court stated that Brown is determinative of the principal issue, quoted the rule, and applied it to hold that the trial court erred in rejecting the master's findings without holding the statutorily required hearing.
O'Hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Housing Systems, Inc., 197 Colo. 530, 595 P.2d 679 (1979)	Used in the context of procedural rules governing motions for new trial (C.R.C.P. 59(b)) and appellate review when no new evidentiary hearing was held before the trial court.	The court cited this case to reject the husband's contention that the appeal must be dismissed because no motion for new trial was filed after the trial court's ruling, finding that contention without merit where no evidentiary hearing had been held by the judge.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by framing the determinative issue: whether a trial court can reverse a referee's decision on a child support modification motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. It concluded that reversal by a trial judge may be done only after the judge holds such a hearing.

The court examined the procedural posture and findings below: the referee conducted an evidentiary hearing, made findings and recommended increasing support to $275 per child, and the trial court initially adopted those recommendations. After objections, the trial judge later denied the mother's motion to modify without holding an evidentiary hearing and without specifying which of the referee's findings were erroneous.

At the outset the court analyzed the status of the "referee" and concluded, based on the functions performed, that the referee was acting as a master under C.R.C.P. 53. The court emphasized that the title used in a local rule does not control applicability of C.R.C.P. 53; rather, the functions performed determine whether the rule applies. The court invoked C.R.C.P. 83 to state that local rule provisions in conflict with C.R.C.P. 53 are null.

The court relied principally on Brown v. Brown, which explains that factual determinations involving conflicting testimony and credibility are for the master, and that such findings are binding unless clearly erroneous. Critically, Brown also holds that a trial court may reject the master's report only after holding a hearing. Applying that principle, the court found that the trial judge's rejection of the master's findings here—without an evidentiary hearing—was error.

The court further addressed the father's procedural contention that the appeal should be dismissed because no motion for new trial was filed. The court held that contention to be without merit in the circumstances because there was no evidentiary hearing before the trial court; it cited C.R.C.P. 59(b) and O'Hara Group in support.

Because no evidentiary hearing was held before the trial judge when he rejected the master's findings, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Given the passage of time since the referee's hearing, the court directed that an evidentiary hearing should be held to determine issues based on the current status of the parties.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings because the trial court erred in rejecting the master's (referee's) findings without holding an evidentiary hearing. Until further order, child support payments shall be $275 per month per child.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The trial court's denial of the mother's motion to modify child support is reversed; the matter is remanded for an evidentiary hearing based on the parties' current circumstances. In the interim, the support amount is set at $275 per month per child.
Procedural guidance: A trial court may not reject or reverse a master's (referee's) factual findings that were based on an evidentiary hearing without itself conducting an evidentiary hearing, consistent with C.R.C.P. 53 and the precedent cited in Brown v. Brown. Local nomenclature (e.g., calling the official a "referee") does not avoid application of C.R.C.P. 53 where the official performs the functions of a master.
No broader new legal rule was proclaimed beyond application and reinforcement of existing rules (as discussed in the opinion); the court applied existing Colorado authorities to the facts at hand.

Show full summary ...

In re the Marriage of: Mary Arden Smith and Gerald R. Smith

Opinion by JUDGE STERNBERG.

The determinative issue in this appeal is whether a trial court may reverse a referee's decision on a motion to increase child support, without holding an evidentiary hearing. We hold that such reversal may be done only after the judge holds an evidentiary hearing. Since none was held here, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The operative facts are these: At the time of entry of a decree dissolving the marriage of the parties, a settlement agreement dated April 25, 1975, was adopted by the court. It provided that the father would pay to the mother $200 per month as child support for each of two children.

In January of 1978, the mother moved for an increase in support to $325 per child and that motion was heard by a referee. The referee conducted an evidentiary hearing, entered findings and conclusions, and recommended an increase in child support to $275 per month per child. In May of 1978, the trial court adopted these findings and recommendations.

The father filed timely objections and a hearing was held before the trial judge in April of 1979. At that hearing counsel commented about the testimony taken at the referee's hearing and discussed parts of the referee's recommendations. Neither testimony nor documentary evidence was presented. Nevertheless, without detailing findings of the referee that it determined to be erroneous, the court entered an order denying the mother's motion for modification.

At the outset we hold that the "referee" who conducted the evidentiary hearing in this case was in fact acting as a master under C.R.C.P. 53. The fact that he was denominated as "referee" in Boulder District Court Rule 17 does not make C.R.C.P. 53 inapplicable. The functions that he performed, not his title, are controlling. See Colorado v. I.D.I., Inc., 642 P.2d 14 (Colo.App. 1981). We also hold that the powers of the master, and the manner in which the trial court must treat his findings are governed by C.R.C.P. 53. It is axiomatic that provisions of any local rule in conflict with C.R.C.P. 53 are a nullity. See C.R.C.P. 83.

Brown v. Brown, 161 Colo. 409, 422 P.2d 634 (1967), is determinative of the principal issue in this appeal. There, relying on both the language of C.R.C.P. 53(e)(2) and a long line of federal cases, the court held:

"First, on a question of fact, insofar as it depends upon conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and demeanor of witnesses, the master is the only one who can reach a conclusion in this area. When there is any testimony consistent with the findings, it must be treated as unassailable except when `clearly erroneous.' . . . [T]he rule binds the district court to accept the findings of the master just as effectively as R.C.P. Colo. 52(a) binds this court to accept findings of a trial court. . . .

The second error of the trial court was in disregarding the provisions of rule 53(e)(2) wherein the trial court is granted, among other alternatives, the authority to reject the master's report after hearing." (emphasis in original)

There was no such hearing here. Consequently, the trial court erred in rejecting the finding of the master. And, because there was no evidentiary hearing, the husband's assertion that this appeal must be dismissed because no motion for new trial was filed after the ruling of the trial court has no merit. C.R.C.P. 59(b). O'Hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Housing Systems, Inc., 197 Colo. 530, 595 P.2d 679 (1979).

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. In light of the passage of time since an evidentiary hearing was held, an evidentiary hearing should be held to determine the issues based on the current status of the parties. Until further order of court, the child support payments shall be $275 per month per child.

JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE BERMAN concur.

IN RE MARRIAGE OF SMITH