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Docket Number

Docket No. 56807.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and William T. Morris, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Norman R. Robiner, for defendant on appeal.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

People v. Taylor, Docket No. 56807 — Michigan Court of Appeals (Dec. 16, 1981)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery (MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797) and to possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2)). In a separate case the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a violation of probation (MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134).

Pursuant to a sentencing agreement, the trial court imposed a two-year sentence on the felony-firearm charge, followed by concurrent terms of 8 to 15 years on the two armed robbery counts, and a 5 to 10 year term for the probation violation to be served concurrently with the armed robbery sentences.

On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court failed to comply with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d), which the defendant read to require strict advising of any mandatory minimum sentence for the offense. The pivotal procedural question presented to this Court was whether the offense of armed robbery carries a mandatory minimum sentence for purposes of the GCR advising requirement.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the charge of armed robbery is accompanied by a mandatory minimum sentence such that, under GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d), the trial court was required to inform the defendant of that mandatory minimum before accepting a plea.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Jones, 410 Mich. 407; 301 N.W.2d 822 (1981)	Cited as the Supreme Court decision discussing compliance with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d) and the need to inform a defendant of mandatory minimum sentences.	Referenced as the decision that frames the defendant's contention that the trial court failed to comply strictly with the advising rule; the court reviewed Jones in the context of conflicting case law.
People v. McKnight, 72 Mich. App. 282; 249 N.W.2d 392 (1976), lv den 399 Mich. 848 (1976)	Held or inferred that when a statute prescribes punishment as "life or any term of years" there is no necessity to advise a defendant of any minimum sentence before accepting a guilty plea.	Cited as one line of appellate authority supporting the proposition that no specific minimum need be named when the statute provides "life or any term of years."
People v. Burridge, 99 Mich. 343; 58 N.W. 319 (1894)	Characterized (by a dissenting judge in later cases) as holding that "any term of years" must be construed as setting a minimum sentence of not less than two years.	Mentioned by Judge Corkin's dissent in People v. Jones to support the view that Freeman was wrongly decided; used to show an alternative interpretation of "any term of years."
Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975)	Referenced as part of the Supreme Court's interpretation relevant to whether minimums must be stated when punishment is "life or any term of years."	Noted by McKnight as part of the Supreme Court interpretation that informed McKnight's inference regarding advising on minimum sentences.
People v. Freeman, 73 Mich. App. 568; 252 N.W.2d 518 (1977)	Stated that "there is no mandatory minimum sentence for armed robbery" (cited verbatim in the opinion).	Identified as another line of appellate authority supporting the absence of a mandatory minimum for armed robbery; several panels relied on Freeman and its rationale in subsequent cases.
People v. Landis, 91 Mich. App. 345; 283 N.W.2d 647 (1979)	Followed the Freeman holding that no mandatory minimum exists for armed robbery.	Cited as a Court of Appeals panel that followed Freeman and its conclusion regarding armed robbery minimum sentences.
People v. Earl Jones, 94 Mich. App. 232; 288 N.W.2d 385 (1979)	Applied Freeman's rationale to second-degree murder and concluded there was no mandatory minimum sentence when the statutory punishment was "for life or any term of years"; further held that advising only the maximum (life) was insufficient in that case.	Discussed in the context of conflicting appellate authority; quoted to show the view that merely advising the maximum (life) is insufficient under some interpretations and that reversal was required where the trial court advised only the maximum.
People v. Harper, 83 Mich. App. 390; 269 N.W.2d 470 (1978)	Characterized (in a cited note) as concluding that "'[a]ny term of years' means no less than one calendar year."	Referenced by Judge Corkin in support of his dissenting view that prior appellate decisions had misinterpreted Burridge and that Freeman overlooked Burridge's holding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying that the central, controlling inquiry was whether armed robbery carries a mandatory minimum sentence such that the trial court was required, under GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d), to inform the defendant expressly of that minimum before accepting the plea.

The opinion reviews conflicting lines of authority from panels of the Court of Appeals:

McKnight was noted for inferring no necessity to advise a defendant of any minimum sentence where the statute prescribes punishment as "life or any term of years," relying on Supreme Court interpretation of earlier cases (including Burridge and Guilty Plea Cases).
Freeman explicitly stated that there is "no mandatory minimum sentence for armed robbery"; Landis followed Freeman; Earl Jones applied Freeman's rationale to another offense (second-degree murder) and concluded no mandatory minimum where punishment is "life or any term of years."
By contrast, Judge Corkin (dissenting in People v. Jones) argued that Freeman overlooked Burridge and related authorities and that Burridge should be read to require a defined minimum (with Corkin characterizing Burridge as setting a minimum of not less than two years and citing Harper as saying "any term of years" means at least one year).

After identifying these conflicting authorities and the divergent interpretations, the Court expressly concluded—based on the authorities reviewed and the requirements of GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d)—that, for purposes of advising a defendant under that rule, the minimum sentence for armed robbery is "any term of years."

The Court then applied that conclusion to the facts of this case: because the trial court informed the defendant that the penalty for armed robbery was "life or any term of years," the trial court had informed the defendant of both the maximum and the minimum possible sentence as required by GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The trial court's sentencing advisement complied with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d). The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Implications:

Direct effect: The judgment of the trial court was affirmed; the sentencing that advised the defendant that the penalty was "life or any term of years" satisfied the court's duty under GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d) as applied in this opinion.
Broader consequences: The opinion resolves, for purposes of this appeal, that informing a defendant that the statutory punishment is "life or any term of years" meets the minimum-advisement requirement of the cited court rule. The opinion does not elaborate further on broader doctrinal or precedential consequences beyond its holding and does not state that it establishes a new rule beyond the disposition in this case.

Disposition: Affirmed.

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PEOPLE v TAYLOR

PER CURIAM.

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). In a separate case, defendant pled nolo contendere to violation of probation. MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134. Pursuant to a sentencing agreement, the court sentenced defendant to 2 years on the felony-firearm charge, followed by concurrent terms of from 8 to 15 years for the 2 armed robbery counts and from 5 to 10 years for probation violation to be served concurrently with the armed robbery sentences.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court failed to comply strictly with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d) which requires that the court inform a defendant of "the mandatory minimum prison sentence, if any, for the offense". See, People v Jones, 410 Mich. 407; 301 N.W.2d 822 (1981). The sole question to be decided by this Court is whether the charge of armed robbery has a mandatory minimum sentence. Several panels of this Court have addressed the issue with varying results.

In People v McKnight, 72 Mich. App. 282; 249 N.W.2d 392 (1976), lv den 399 Mich. 848 (1976), the defendant had pled guilty to armed robbery. The armed robbery statute provides that the offense is "punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years". The McKnight Court, noting the Supreme Court's interpretation of People v Burridge, 99 Mich. 343; 58 N.W. 319 (1894), and Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 118; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), inferred that there was no necessity to advise a defendant of any minimum sentence before accepting a plea of guilty to an offense punishable by life imprisonment or "any term of years". McKnight, supra, 284.

The Court in People v Freeman, 73 Mich. App. 568, 570; 252 N.W.2d 518 (1977), stated "there is no mandatory minimum sentence for armed robbery, see MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797". This holding has received support and criticism from various panels of this Court. In People v Landis, 91 Mich. App. 345, 346; 283 N.W.2d 647 (1979), the Court followed the Freeman opinion. The Court in People v Earl Jones, 94 Mich. App. 232, 235; 288 N.W.2d 385 (1979), approvingly applied the rationale of Freeman to a second-degree murder conviction and concluded that there was no mandatory minimum sentence vis-a-vis the dictates of GCR 1963, 785.7 when the statutory punishment was "for life or any term of years".

Judge CORKIN dissented in Jones. He concluded that Freeman was wrongly decided because it overlooked Burridge, where the Court held that "any term of years" must be construed as setting a minimum sentence of not less than two years. Burridge also was overlooked by the Supreme Court in Guilty Plea Cases according to Judge CORKIN. After citing and interpreting People v Harper, 83 Mich. App. 390; 269 N.W.2d 470 (1978), Judge CORKIN concluded that:

Judge L.W. CORKIN, former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

The Court in Harper, supra, 397, reviewed Burridge and the relevant statutes and then concluded that "'[a]ny term of years' means no less than one calendar year".

"[A]s long as the trial court informs the accused that the possible sentence for second-degree murder, armed robbery or treason, is imprisonment for life or for any term of years, it is not necessary that the court name some period of time as a mandatory minimum sentence, particularly in view of the fact that there is no definitive statement as to what such mandatory minimum period should be.

"In this case the trial court only advised the defendant that the maximum penalty was life. This is not sufficient compliance with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d) under any interpretation reversal is required." (Emphasis added.) Earl Jones, supra, 240-241.

Having reviewed the conflicting case law, we conclude that the minimum sentence for armed robbery, vis-a-vis the requirements of GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d), is "any term of years". The trial court in this case advised the defendant that the penalty was life or any term of years imprisonment. The court thereby informed defendant of the maximum and minimum possible sentence in conformity with GCR 1963, 785.7.

Affirmed.

PEOPLE v. TAYLOR