PER CURIAM.
On March 7, 1980, defendant pled guilty to charges of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit felonious assault, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He appeals as of right. At the time defendant committed these crimes, he was on escape status from prison, where he had been serving a term of three to five years for a 1978 breaking and entering conviction.
Defendant contends that his pleas were involuntary because the trial court failed to inform him 1) that the mandatory two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction must be served consecutively to the other sentences imposed and 2) that all of the sentences must be served consecutively to the 1978 breaking and entering sentence for which defendant was on escape status. We disagree.
The Supreme Court in the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 118; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), cert den sub nom Sanders v Michigan, 429 U.S. 1108; 97 S Ct 1142; 51 L Ed 2d 561 (1977), held that a trial judge is not required to inform the defendant of all sentence consequences — only the maximum sentence, any mandatory minimum, and, if he is on probation or parole, the possible effect on his status as a probationer or parolee. Several panels of this Court have declined to impose a requirement that defendant be advised of the consecutive nature of the sentences to be imposed. People v Lange, 105 Mich. App. 263, 268; 306 N.W.2d 514 (1981), People v Boswell, 95 Mich. App. 405, 410; 291 N.W.2d 57 (1980), People v Cummings, 84 Mich. App. 509, 513; 269 N.W.2d 658 (1978), People v Bennett, 76 Mich. App. 264, 267; 256 N.W.2d 459 (1977), People v Larkins, 59 Mich. App. 199, 201-202; 229 N.W.2d 378 (1975), lv den 394 Mich. 790 (1975).
Defendant relies on People v Mitchell, 102 Mich. App. 554; 302 N.W.2d 230 (1980), wherein we stated that, where consecutive and/or mandatory sentencing is ordered by statute, the defendant must be informed of that fact. However, we find the facts in Mitchell clearly distinguishable from those in the case at bar. In Mitchell, the judge misinformed the defendant that a felony-firearm conviction carries a "mandatory sentence of up to two years", rather than a flat mandatory two-year sentence. The defendant in Mitchell was also incorrectly told that his sentence on the felony-firearm conviction would "run concurrently, that is, together with any sentence imposed on any other charges". We agree that a remand is required where the defendant is materially misinformed about the consecutive sentencing consequences of his guilty plea.
However, in the present case, the trial judge remained silent on the issue rather than misinforming the defendant. Because the trial court is not required to advise the defendant of the consecutive nature of the sentences to be imposed, no error occurred.
We believe it is a better practice for the trial judge to advise the defendant of all the consequences of his plea, including, where applicable, the consecutive nature of the sentences to be imposed. However, such a legal requirement must come from the Supreme Court, either by way of amendment to GCR 1963, 785.7 or by case law. See People v Bennett, supra, 267.
Affirmed.