Summary of Opinion: RICHARD A. WALSH et al. v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY et al.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Albany County — EDWARD S. CONWAY, J. — April 19, 1982

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs commenced an action for damages allegedly sustained from their purchase of a 1979 Ford tractor trailer from defendant Orange Motors Company, Inc. The plaintiffs sought leave to serve an amended complaint adding a cause of action under the Magnuson‑Moss Warranty — Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (referenced in the opinion as applicable to consumer products manufactured after July 4, 1975), which, if plaintiffs prevailed, could permit the court to award costs and expenses including attorneys' fees.

The defendants moved for permission to reargue the court's prior decision that had permitted the plaintiffs to serve the amended complaint. The defendants contended that an examination before trial (deposition) of plaintiff Richard Walsh established that the vehicle was purchased for interstate commercial trucking purposes and not for ordinary consumer use, and therefore the Magnuson‑Moss Act did not apply. The defendants had a copy of the transcript of Walsh's testimony but did not include it in their original opposing papers and offered no excuse for that omission.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Magnuson‑Moss Warranty — Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312) applies to a tractor trailer purchased for commercial trucking use (i.e., whether such property qualifies as a "consumer product" under the statute).
2. Whether the defendants' motion to reargue the court's prior order should be permitted despite the defendants' failure to submit a transcript of testimony in their original opposition and absent an explanation for that omission.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

• The defendants sought reargument on the ground that Richard Walsh's examination before trial established that the plaintiffs purchased the tractor trailer for interstate commercial trucking purposes rather than for ordinary consumer, family, or household use; accordingly, the Magnuson‑Moss Act would not apply.
• The defendants failed to include the transcript of Richard Walsh's testimony in their papers opposing the original motion, even though they possessed it; they did not provide an excuse for this omission in the materials before the court.

Plaintiffs' Position (as reflected in the complaint and motion)

• The plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to assert an additional cause of action under the Magnuson‑Moss Warranty Act. The amended claim would seek the remedies available under that statute, including possible costs and attorneys' fees if plaintiffs prevail.
• In paragraph 17 of the complaint the plaintiffs allege: "Defendant knew prior to the sale of the vehicle in question that plaintiffs' business was to haul materials and that the tractor was to be used for such purpose." (This allegation is part of the complaint as quoted by the court.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the defendants' reargument request as grounded in testimony (an examination before trial of Richard Walsh) allegedly showing that the tractor trailer was purchased for interstate commercial trucking rather than personal, family, or household use. The defendants had not submitted that testimony with their original opposition, and the court observed that no excuse was offered for that omission.

The court acknowledged the controlling procedural principle (citing Matter of Hooker) that a motion to reargue should ordinarily be denied when the movant fails to explain why newly presented facts were not presented earlier. Nevertheless, the court undertook a substantive review of the original papers that had been before it, including the complaint.

In addressing the statutory issue, the court quoted the Magnuson‑Moss Act's definitional provision (15 U.S.C. tit. 15, ch. 50, § 2301, subd. [1]): "The term 'consumer product' means any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes." Based on that definition, the court concluded that sections 2301 through 2312 of title 15 do not apply to property such as a tractor trailer "which is normally used for a commercial use of trucking."

The court also noted that the plaintiffs' complaint itself asserted, at paragraph 17, that the defendant knew the tractor was to be used in the plaintiffs' business of hauling materials. Taking the complaint's allegation and the statutory definition together, the court determined that the original allowance of the plaintiffs' motion to amend (to add a Magnuson‑Moss claim) was not supported by the facts and law as presented in the court's file.

Holding and Implications

The defendants' motion for reargument is GRANTED; the plaintiffs' prior motion to amend their complaint is DENIED.

Direct consequences: the plaintiffs are not permitted, on the prior motion, to amend their complaint to assert a cause of action under the Magnuson‑Moss Warranty Act with respect to the 1979 Ford tractor trailer at issue, because the court determined the statute does not apply to property "normally used for a commercial use of trucking." The opinion resolves the motion presently before the court in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs' requested amendment.

Broader implications: the opinion applies the Magnuson‑Moss statutory definition of "consumer product" to exclude property normally used for commercial trucking from the Act's coverage. The opinion does not discuss or announce any overarching rule beyond the immediate decision, and it does not state that it is creating new precedent beyond deciding the parties' motions in this case.