PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and possession of a firearm while in the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Prior to trial, the felony-firearm charge was dismissed. Defendant was convicted by a jury on the assault charge and was sentenced to a prison term of 20 to 40 years. Defendant appeals as of right.
Defendant's conviction arises out of an incident on May 19, 1978, wherein the complainant, Andre Witcher, was shot while at a party in a basement of a home in the City of Detroit. A total of 29 witnesses testified at trial and, for the most part, their testimony regarding the incident was contradictory and conflicting. By most accounts, defendant and five or six other young men descended into the midst of the party wielding rifles and handguns. Several shots were fired, one of which struck Andre Witcher and another of which struck Darrel McCorvey, one of those persons who arrived with defendant.
At trial, Witcher identified the defendant as the man who shot him. During his opening argument to the jury, the prosecutor asserted that the proofs would show that defendant shot Andre Witcher. One witness indicated that McCorvey had fired two shots but that he did not see who fired a third shot which struck Witcher.
According to McCorvey, he, the defendant and another man had gone to the party to get defendant's brother. A little boy had run up to them and told them that Marvin's brother was being "jumped on" at a party on Kilborne Street. Shortly after they walked into the party, McCorvey heard two gunshots, the first of which hit him in the buttocks. He did not see who fired the shot and did not see anyone else hit by a bullet. McCorvey denied having a weapon while at the party.
The last of the prosecution's witnesses was a ballistics expert. To the surprise of the prosecutor, the expert's testimony established that the bullet which struck Witcher could not have been fired from the gun that the defendant had possessed at the party. In his closing argument, the prosecutor admitted that, given the ballistics evidence, defendant could not have shot Andre Witcher, but argued that defendant was guilty under an aiding and abetting theory or under a theory that defendant assaulted Witcher just by aiming a weapon at him.
Defendant argues that because the prosecution had not shown that one of defendant's companions, rather than another person at the party, in fact shot the victim, the trial court's instruction on aiding and abetting was unsupported by the evidence and should not have been given. We disagree. There was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, one of defendant's companions had fired the shot which struck the victim. Given the fact that at least two shots were fired by McCorvey and that the only persons actually seen with weapons in the basement were defendant and his companions, the jury could have reasonably found that one of them shot the victim. Given the fact that defendant and his companions arrived at the party armed and in a single vehicle, and given their aggressive behavior as testified to by several witnesses, it could be inferred that defendant knew that an assault with intent to commit murder was contemplated and that defendant was a willing participant. He could therefore be convicted as an aider and abettor. See People v Penn, 70 Mich. App. 638, 649; 247 N.W.2d 575 (1976). In the alternative, since McCorvey actually fired shots into a crowded room and since the physical element of assault with intent to commit murder, an assault, may be committed without actually touching the person of the one assaulted, see People v Branner, 53 Mich. App. 541, 544; 220 N.W.2d 183 (1974), lv den 392 Mich. 814 (1974), and People v Carlson, 160 Mich. 426, 429; 125 N.W. 361 (1910), there was sufficient evidence that McCorvey, himself, committed an assault with intent to commit murder, and he could therefore have been convicted as a principal.
Defendant's argument that it is a violation of his due process right to adequate notice of the charges against him, and to an opportunity to defend himself, for the prosecutor to argue in his opening statement that defendant was a principal and then to change to a theory that the defendant was an aider and abettor has been rejected before. People v Lamson, 44 Mich. App. 447; 205 N.W.2d 189 (1973), lv den 389 Mich. 783 (1973). We discern no prejudice to defendant which would warrant distinguishing the instant case from those cited.
Defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is without merit. Defendant has failed to show that the newly discovered evidence would render probable a different result on retrial, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. See People v Alexander, 72 Mich. App. 91, 94; 249 N.W.2d 307 (1976).
Defendant claims that at a new trial a jury might find, based on the allegedly newly discovered evidence, that McCorvey properly acted in self-defense. It is true that if an attack by a principal is justified by self-defense both the principal and the aider and abettor are relieved from liability. See People v Pearce, 369 Mich. 692; 120 N.W.2d 838 (1963). However, the defense of self-defense is available only where it appears that the accused was without fault or, in other words, was not the aggressor in bringing about the conflict. People v Bright, 50 Mich. App. 401, 406; 213 N.W.2d 279 (1973). Even accepting as true the facts in the affidavit, the defense of self-defense would not be available to defendant or any of his companions in view of the fact that they came into the party wielding guns and making threatening demands. Cf. People v Maclin, 101 Mich. App. 593; 300 N.W.2d 642 (1980).
Defendant is correct in asserting that the required foundation was not established before testimony regarding a witness's prior inconsistent statement was admitted. However, the lack of objection to the admission of evidence precludes appellate review of a claim that it was improperly admitted, absent manifest injustice. People v Williams, 46 Mich. App. 165; 207 N.W.2d 480 (1973). We find none here. See Weeks v Hutchinson, 135 Mich. 160, 162; 97 N.W. 695 (1903).
While support for defendant's claim that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that a prior inconsistent statement was admitted solely for impeachment purposes requires reversal even in the absence of a request by counsel is found in People v Eagger, 4 Mich. App. 449; 145 N.W.2d 221 (1966), this Court has more recently held that, absent objection, such claims of error will be considered only where manifest injustice occurs. People v Cox, 61 Mich. App. 37; 232 N.W.2d 188 (1975), People v Turner, 59 Mich. App. 589, 596; 229 N.W.2d 861 (1975). We find no manifest injustice here. There is neither a demonstration of prejudice nor a suggestion made by the court or the prosecutor to the jury that the prior statement could be used as substantive evidence, as was the case in Cox, supra.
Defendant's claims of error with regard to sentencing procedures do not require reversal. First, defendant suggests that the sentencing judge failed to fully exercise the theory of individualized sentencing, by using sentencing primarily as a means of putting across a message to the community, thereby virtually ignoring defendant's individual history and record.
In People v Triplett, 407 Mich. 510, 513; 287 N.W.2d 165 (1980), the Supreme Court stressed that a sentence must fit the offender rather than the offense alone, and that a sentence should be "tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender in an effort to balance both society's need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender's rehabilitative potential". In People v Snow, 386 Mich. 586, 592; 194 N.W.2d 314 (1972), the Court approved the use of four factors in determining an appropriate sentence: (1) the reformation of the offender; (2) protection of society; (3) the disciplining of the wrong-doer; and (4) the deterrence of others from committing like offenses.
The discussion between the court, defense counsel and defendant reflects that the trial judge was concerned with the protection of society, the disciplining of the defendant, the deterrence of others from committing like offenses, and the seriousness of the crime itself considering the particular circumstances under which it was committed. The trial court expressly took into consideration the fact that defendant had no prior record. Any of the trial judge's statements which overemphasized one or the other of these factors were made in response to arguments by defendant and his counsel. Viewed as a whole, the record does not reflect an "undue emphasis on vengeance or reassurance of the community that criminals would be dealt with firmly", People v Ensign, 109 Mich. App. 80, 83; 310 N.W.2d 900 (1981).
Defendant's claim that the trial judge failed to respond to a claimed inaccuracy in the presentence report, in violation of the rule summarized in People v McIntosh, 62 Mich. App. 422, 428; 234 N.W.2d 157 (1975), modified 400 Mich. 1; 252 N.W.2d 779 (1977), is not supported by the record. While the trial judge did not respond immediately to the defendant's claim that the presentence report inaccurately indicated that he had, himself, fired the shot which struck Witcher, during subsequent discussion the judge indicated that whether defendant acted as a principal or as an aider and abettor was not considered by the court to be relevant to sentencing under those circumstances. This complies with the suggestion in McIntosh, supra, that the trial judge "may ascertain that the disputed matter is not relevant to his decision, or is of little weight, or could be safely disregarded without regard to its accuracy in light of other facts".
We find no error requiring reversal in the instant case.
Affirmed.