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Docket Number

No. 54209.

Attorney(S)

Kenneth Heady, R.Y. Bandy, Jr., Stephen R. Johnson, Bartlesville, Galen E. Ward, Gary R. Proctor, Oklahoma City, for appellant. Donna Cox, Oklahoma City, for Tax Commission.

Judges

BARNES, Vice Chief Justice:

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Smart Summary

Case Summary — Phillips Petroleum Company v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (No. 54209)

Factual and Procedural Background

On April 4 and April 6, 1979, the Oklahoma Tax Commission issued and mailed two proposed tax assessments to Phillips Petroleum Company following a field audit covering 1976 through 1978. The assessments sought additional production tax and excise tax totaling $153,936.24, plus interest and penalties. Both assessment notices informed Phillips that any protest should be made under 68 O.S. 1971 § 221. Section 221(e) provides that, absent a protest within thirty (30) days after mailing, the proposed assessment becomes final and absolute.

Phillips did not request an extension or file a protest within the thirty-day period. On days 41 and 43 after mailing, the Commission received letters from Phillips requesting a sixty-day extension. The Commission responded that, by statutory operation of § 221(e), the assessments had become final and absolute and that it lacked authority to extend the protest period. Phillips appealed the dismissal of its protest by the Oklahoma Tax Commission. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reviewed the Commission's dismissal and affirmed the Commission's orders of dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Oklahoma Tax Commission has authority under 68 O.S. 1971 § 221 to extend, beyond thirty (30) days, the time within which a taxpayer may file a protest when no action to extend the protest period was taken within the initial thirty (30) days following issuance of a proposed assessment.
Whether the Commission's refusal to grant an extension after the thirty-day period constituted an abuse of discretion (as argued by Phillips).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Phillips Petroleum Company)

Paragraph (f) of 68 O.S. 1971 § 221 authorizes the Commission, in its discretion, to extend the time for filing a protest for any period not to exceed an additional ninety (90) days.
Phillips contended that paragraph (f) permits the Commission to extend the filing period even thirty (30) days after mailing of the assessment, so the Commission's refusal to grant the requested extension was an abuse of discretion.

Respondent (Oklahoma Tax Commission)

The Commission maintained that § 221(e) makes a protest or a request for extension a prerequisite to preventing the assessment from becoming final and absolute after thirty (30) days, and because Phillips made no communication within the thirty-day limit, the assessment became final by statutory operation.
Accordingly, the Commission asserted it had no authority to extend the protest period once the statutory thirty-day period had expired without protest or a requested extension.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
In re: Assessment of Champlin Refining Co., 186 Okla. 625, 99 P.2d 880 (1940)	General principle that legislative intent controls statutory interpretation and that unambiguous statutory language is given its plain meaning.	The Court invoked this precedent to support reading § 221 according to its clear language because no ambiguity existed, thus declining to adopt an alternative construction urged by Phillips.
Estate of Kasishke v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 541 P.2d 848 (Okla. 1975)	Support for adherence to the plain language of statutes when the text is clear and susceptible to a single construction.	The Court cited this case to reinforce that paragraph (e) is clear and must be followed as written, leaving no room for the construction Phillips proposed.
Price v. Mahoney, 175 Okla. 355, 53 P.2d 257 (1935)	The principle that the Tax Commission must act strictly within the provisions of tax laws.	The Court applied this precedent to emphasize that the Commission is bound by statute and cannot extend the protest period beyond what § 221 permits when the statutory prerequisites for extension were not satisfied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with the pertinent statutory language from 68 O.S. 1971 § 221, quoting subsections (e) and (f). Section 221(e) provides that if a taxpayer fails to file a written protest within the thirty-day period provided or within a period as extended by the Commission, the proposed assessment becomes final and absolute without further action at the expiration of the thirty days (or at the expiration of any period as extended). Section 221(f) permits the Commission, in its discretion, to extend the time for filing a protest for any period not to exceed an additional ninety days.

The Court read the statute plainly and found it unambiguous. Because Phillips made no protest or request for extension within the thirty-day period, the assessment became final by operation of § 221(e). The Court rejected Phillips' interpretation that the Commission's discretionary extension power under paragraph (f) could be exercised after the thirty-day period elapsed in the absence of any timely request. The Court reasoned that allowing such a post‑expiration extension would render the legislatively imposed thirty-day limitation meaningless. The reference in paragraph (e) to an extension by the Commission confirms that the protest period can exceed thirty days only when the Commission has actually extended it, either upon request or on its own initiative, before the thirty-day period expires. Where no extension is requested or granted within the thirty days, any hypothetical extension is irrelevant to the computation of the thirty‑day period.

The Court relied on precedents emphasizing that clear statutory language must be applied as written and that administrative agencies are bound to act strictly within statutory provisions. Applying those principles, the Court concluded that, under the facts of this case, the Commission correctly treated the assessments as final and absolute and properly dismissed Phillips' late protest.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court affirmed the orders of the Oklahoma Tax Commission dismissing Phillips' protest and held that, under the facts presented, the Commission was without authority to extend the thirty-day protest period after that period had expired; consequently, the tax assessments at issue were final and absolute.

Implications: The direct effect is that Phillips Petroleum Company's protest was dismissed and the assessments became final and enforceable. The opinion applies the plain‑meaning rule to 68 O.S. 1971 § 221 and enforces the statutory thirty-day protest requirement; the decision does not announce broader changes to statutory law beyond applying existing interpretive principles cited in precedent.

All Justices concurred. Orders of dismissal by the Oklahoma Tax Commission were affirmed.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST OF PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO PROTEST PROPOSED GROSS PRODUCTION TAX ASSESSMENTS ISSUED ON THE 4TH AND 6TH DAYS OF APRIL, 1979.

BARNES, Vice Chief Justice:

This matter presents the question of whether the Oklahoma Tax Commission has the authority to extend beyond thirty (30) days the time within which a taxpayer may file a protest of taxes under 68 O.S. 1971 § 221[ 68-221] if no action is taken to extend the protest period within thirty (30) days following the issuance of a proposed assessment. We hold that the Oklahoma Tax Commission is without such authority under the facts of this case; that the tax assessment in this case is final and absolute; and therefore that the order of the Oklahoma Tax Commission dismissing Phillips' protest is affirmed.

The facts of the case are not in dispute. On April 4th and 6th, 1979, the Oklahoma Tax Commission issued and mailed two proposed tax assessments against Phillips Petroleum Company as a result of a field audit for the years 1976 through 1978. The assessments, consisting of additional production tax and excise tax, amounted to $153,936.24 plus interest and penalties. Both letters of the Commission which notified Phillips of proposed assessments stated that any protest should be made under the provision of 68 O.S. 1971 § 221[ 68-221]. Section 221(e) states that if a taxpayer fails to protest within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the proposed assessment, the assessment will become final and absolute without further action of the Tax Commission. Although no request for an extension was made during the thirty (30) day limitation in this case, on days 41 and 43, respectively, the Commission received a letter from Phillips requesting a sixty (60) day extension. The Commission responded that the assessment had become final and absolute by statutory operation of 68 O.S. 1971 § 221[ 68-221](e), and that they were without authority to extend the protest period. Phillips argues that paragraph (f) of § 221 authorizes the Commission, under its own discretion, to extend the filing period to ninety (90) days, at any time, even thirty (30) days after the mailing of the assessment, and that it was an abuse of discretion for the Commission to refuse to do so.

We find that Phillips contention is without merit. The pertinent part of § 221 is as follows:

(e) If the taxpayer fails to file a written protest within the thirty-day period herein provided for or within the period as extended by the Commission, then the proposed assessment, without further action of the Tax Commission, shall become final and absolute at the expiration of thirty (30) days from the date same is mailed to the taxpayer or at the expiration of the period as extended by the Tax Commission. (f) The Tax Commission may in its discretion extend the time for filing a protest for any period of time not to exceed an additional ninety (90) days.

A clear reading of the statute indicates that any protest against a tax assessment must be made within thirty (30) days from the mailing date or the assessment becomes final and absolute. In the case at bar, Phillips made no communication, informal or otherwise, with the Oklahoma Tax Commission within the thirty (30) day limitation. By operation of the statute the assessment became final after the 30th day of silence by Phillips.

Unquestionably, the legislative intent is the controlling element in the judicial interpretation of statutes. But if the statutes contain no inconsistent provisions, no ambiguities, or uncertainties, no occasion exists for the application of rules of construction and the statutes will be accorded the meaning as expressed by the language therein employed. In re: Assessment of Champlin Refining Co., 186 Okla. 625, 99 P.2d 880 (1940). Paragraph (e) of § 221 is clear and unambiguous and we see no room for interpretation. The interpretation proposed by Phillips would render the time limitation imposed by paragraph (e) meaningless. If the Commission were allowed to extend the protest period without regard to the thirty (30) day limitation, as suggested by Phillips, there would be no need for the legislatively imposed thirty (30) day limitation. The language of paragraph (e) which refers to an extension by the Commission only serves to clarify the fact that the protest filing period is not limited to thirty (30) days when it has been extended by the Commission, either upon request or on its own discretion. But certainly when an extension has been neither requested or granted, the hypothetical extension plays no relevant part in calculating the thirty (30) day protest period. We are bound by the clear plain language of the statute, which is susceptible to but one construction. Estate of Kasishke v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 541 P.2d 848 (Okla. 1975). The Commission is similarly bound and must proceed strictly within the provision of the tax laws. Price v. Mahoney, 175 Okla. 355, 53 P.2d 257 (1935). Section 221(e) required Phillips to preserve its administrative remedy within the thirty (30) day limitation by either giving notice of protest or requesting an extension. Phillips failed to take either action, and both the Commission and this Court are powerless to transform an assessment which has become final and absolute by mandate of the legislature into anything less than final. The orders of the Oklahoma Tax Commission dismissing the protest are affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

MATTER OF PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO