RYAN, J.
This workers' compensation case presents the issue of when the obligation of the Self-Insurers' Security Fund (SISF) to pay benefits under MCL 418.537; MSA 17.237(537) begins. In this case, we find the obligation to have begun on July 29, 1977, the date upon which a receiver was appointed for the defendant corporation.
Plaintiff's decedent died on November 21, 1971, as a result of a work-related injury. In 1973, plaintiff petitioned for death benefits which were awarded in 1975. That award was appealed, but because Detroit Harbor Terminals was unable to pay 70% of the benefits while appeal was pending, as required by statute, the plaintiff moved for dismissal. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board granted plaintiff's motion on July 15, 1977, and the final order was reduced to judgment in the Wayne Circuit Court.
On July 29, 1977, a receiver was appointed for defendant Detroit Harbor Terminals. For all periods subsequent to that date, defendant SISF has made the weekly payments as ordered in the original decision.
On October 25, 1977, the plaintiff petitioned for a determination of rights. She asked that the SISF be required to make benefit payments for the period beginning on the date of her husband's death, or on the date of the initial filing of the petition for benefits, September 20, 1973. In a decision mailed February 12, 1979, the hearing referee agreed that the SISF was obligated to make benefit payments for the period beginning on the date of the decedent's death.
The WCAB reversed this decision, holding that the SISF was not responsible for any payments prior to the date that receivership was established for defendant Detroit Harbor Terminals. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on July 14, 1980, and plaintiff seeks relief from this Court.
Section 537(1) of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act defines the class of employees covered by the SISF. McQueen v Great Markwestern Packing Co, 402 Mich. 321, 327; 262 N.W.2d 820 (1978). Qualification is based upon employer insolvency:
"The trustees may authorize payments from the self-insurers' security fund upon request to the fund's administrator by a disabled employee * * * who is receiving or is entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits from a private self-insured employer who becomes insolvent after November 16, 1971, and is unable to continue the payments." MCL 418.537(1); MSA 17.237(537)(1). (Emphasis added.)
Subsections (2) and (3) detail the manner in which qualified employees may file their claims against the SISF. McQueen, supra, pp 327-328; Lee v Benton Harbor Malleable Industries, 92 Mich. App. 590; 285 N.W.2d 298 (1979). These sections require that the employee make a request through the fund's administrator or file a petition for a hearing with the bureau. They also provide that no payments may be made for any period prior to the request. MCL 418.537, subds (2), (3); MSA 17.237(537), subds (2), (3). Petitioner first notified the SISF that she might be entitled to benefits from them on November 19, 1976. There may be some question whether petitioner is entitled to any benefits prior to that date. See Lee v Benton Harbor Malleable Industries, supra. However, because defendant-appellee failed to raise the issue, we do not address this question here.
In order to understand what is meant by the term "insolvent" in § 537, this section must be read in conjunction with MCL 418.502; MSA 17.237(502), which defines an "insolvent private self-insured employer".
This approach is consistent with past construction of the statute in question by the Court of Appeals. In Cesnulis v Monarch Products Co, 87 Mich. App. 290, 292; 274 N.W.2d 42 (1978), the Court defined "self-insurer" in MCL 418.537(1); MSA 17.237(537)(1), by referring to another section of the same statute, MCL 418.601; MSA 17.237(601), which provided in part that "[w]henever used in this act: * * * (b) `self-insurer' means an employer authorized to carry its own risk". (Emphasis added.) As this Court unanimously stated in Joslin v Campbell, Wyant Cannon Foundry Co, 359 Mich. 420, 426; 102 N.W.2d 584 (1960):
"[T]his Court must construe a legislative enactment in its entirety. As this Court has previously stated, one provision may not be construed in such manner as to render another of no effect if such result can be avoided. Brady v City of Detroit, 353 Mich. 243, 248 [ 91 N.W.2d 257 (1958)]. Earlier, this Court said:
"`The entire act must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.' City of Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182, 183 [189 NW 221 (1922)]."
" For the purposes of this act, an insolvent private self-insured employer means either an employer who files for relief under the bankruptcy act, or an employer against whom bankruptcy proceedings are filed, or an employer for whom a receiver is appointed in a court of this state." MCL 418.502; MSA 17.237(502). (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the employer, Detroit Harbor Terminals, was placed in receivership on July 29, 1977. Because that was the day on which the employer became insolvent under the statute, the SISF was not required to pay benefits to the plaintiff for any disability prior to that day. The plaintiff failed to qualify under the statute's classification scheme until there was an insolvency as defined by the statute.
Adherence to the statutory definition of insolvency assures that SISF funds are used to pay benefits only when it is determined with certainty that the employer is unable to continue the payments. It sets forth a clear guideline so that the hearing referee and the WCAB can easily ascertain the exact date of insolvency and thereby determine the party's eligibility for SISF benefits. It avoids creating an incentive for any financially troubled self-insured employer to improve its cash flow by refusing to pay compensation benefits and advising injured employees to seek recourse from the SISF. Most importantly, this approach conforms to the clearly expressed legislative intent that the SISF may not pay benefits until the private self-insured employer "has become insolvent". MCL 418.537(2); MSA 17.237(537)(2).
The plaintiff contends that the statute, as interpreted and applied by the WCAB, denies her equal protection under both the state and federal constitutions. When the Legislature set up the SISF, it necessarily engaged in a balancing process. The goals to be achieved by the creation of this fund were carefully considered and weighed against the cost of achieving those goals. The line separating those eligible for SISF benefits from those ineligible had to be drawn somewhere. Unless the resultant classification is arbitrary, unreasonable, or lacks a rational basis, this Court must give deference to the legislative decision. Miller v Detroit Savings Bank, 289 Mich. 494, 497; 286 N.W. 803 (1939).
The classification here is a reasonable one. As noted above, the statute rationally promotes the goals of preserving the fiscal integrity of the SISF and providing a clear guideline for determining eligibility. We believe that the challenged statute is sufficiently related to these legitimate legislative purposes to pass constitutional muster. See Borden's Farm Products Co, Inc v Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194; 55 S Ct 187; 79 L Ed 281 (1934); People v Poucher, 398 Mich. 316; 247 N.W.2d 798 (1976).
The statute, as it is written, may not afford the plaintiff what some would regard as adequate relief, or may render that relief more difficult to obtain. In some cases, those claimants entitled to benefits may be forced to file bankruptcy proceedings against the employer and, just as any other general creditor, may be forced to settle with the receiver for a part of the amount owed. While we may be sympathetic to the plaintiff's predicament, we are reminded that "`[i]t is not within the province of this Court to read [into a statute] a mandate that the legislature has not seen fit to incorporate. Our duty is to apply the law as we find it.'" Joslin v Campbell, Wyant Cannon Foundry Co, 359 Mich. 420, 429; 102 N.W.2d 584 (1960), quoting Jones v Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich. 1, 11; 84 N.W.2d 327 (1957); Cadeau v Boys' Vocational School, 359 Mich. 598, 609; 103 N.W.2d 443 (1960).
The Court should not, by "heavy-handed judicial construction", do violence to the well-settled meaning of "insolvency" as defined by the Legislature. See Ecorse Screw Machine Products Co v Corporation Securities Comm, 378 Mich. 415, 417-418; 145 N.W.2d 46 (1966).
Accordingly, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the judgments of the WCAB and the Court of Appeals. GCR 1963, 853.2(4).
KAVANAGH, LEVIN, and COLEMAN, JJ., concurred with RYAN, J.