Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 82-5125. Non-Argument Calendar.

Attorney(S)

Peter S. Herrick, Coconut Grove, Fla., for claimant/counterclaim plaintiff-appellant. Joseph A. Florio, Asst. U.S. Atty., Stephen LeClair, Miami, Fla., David B. Smith, Narcotic Dangerous Drug Section, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.

Judges

Thomas Alonzo Clark

Acts

Customs Duties — Administrative Provisions — Tariff Act Of 1930 — Enforcement Provisions — Seizure Of Conveyances

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Case Summary: United States v. One (1) 1944 Steel Hull Freighter (M/V Shamrock)

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 2, 1978, Customs discovered 3,168 pounds of marijuana sealed in drums aboard the M/V Shamrock. The vessel was seized by the Customs Service on July 20, 1978. The government sought forfeiture under 49 U.S.C. § 782, 21 U.S.C. § 881, and 19 U.S.C. § 1594. The sworn statements of the Shamrock's captain and first mate contained an apparent contradiction as to whether the captain knew of the marijuana's presence. On October 21, 1981, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment. The claimant (Kemur International, Inc.) appealed that grant to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Legal Issues Presented

In the context of a summary judgment motion in a forfeiture action, whether the claimant (appellant) bears the burden of proving common carrier status at the summary judgment stage in the same manner as at trial.
Whether the government satisfied the moving-party summary judgment burden of demonstrating there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the Shamrock's common carrier status.

Arguments of the Parties

Government's Arguments

The government contended that the burden of proving common carrier status rests on the claimant as it would in a trial.
According to the opinion, in its Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying Memorandum the government presented no evidence showing that appellant was not a common carrier (Record, 159).

Claimant's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the claimant's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
United States v. One (1) Liberian Refrigerator Vessel, 447 F. Supp. 1053 (M.D. Fla. 1977); aff'd, 617 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1980)	Provides the three-tiered analytical framework used in vessel forfeiture cases: (1) probable cause for seizure; (2) claimant's burden to prove common carrier status by a preponderance of the evidence; (3) if common carrier status proved, government must prove owner or captain was privy to or consenting to illegal activity.	The court relied on this decision as the appropriate trial framework and cited the district court's approach in that case for factors a claimant must show to establish common carrier status (e.g., solicitation/advertising, filing tariff with the Federal Maritime Commission, carrying for hire under bills of lading).
Benton-Volvo-Metairie, Inc. v. Volvo Southwest, Inc., 479 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1973)	Authority on summary judgment burdens: the moving party must show there is no genuine issue of material fact.	Cited to support the proposition that, regardless of trial burdens, a movant on summary judgment must demonstrate absence of genuine factual dispute; applied to conclude the government did not meet its moving burden here.
Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699, 709 (5th Cir. 1969)	Authority regarding summary judgment standards and burdens on the moving party.	Cited as part of the controlling law that the movant must show no genuine issue of material fact; used to criticize the government's failure to make such a showing regarding common carrier status.
Dawkins v. Green, 412 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1969)	Authority reiterating the movant's burden in summary judgment practice.	Used to support the court's statement of summary judgment principles that the government failed to satisfy.
Reed v. Rheem Manufacturing Company, 364 F.2d 810, 811 (5th Cir. 1966)	Another precedent cited for summary judgment standards and the allocation of burdens in such proceedings.	Applied as part of the body of authority emphasizing that the moving party must show absence of a genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment is proper.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by describing the typical trial-stage, three-tiered analysis for vessel forfeiture cases: (1) the court would determine whether the government proved probable cause for seizure; (2) if probable cause exists, the claimant would have the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is a common carrier under the applicable statutory provisions (19 U.S.C. § 1594, 21 U.S.C. § 881, or 49 U.S.C. § 782); and (3) if the claimant proves common carrier status, the burden would return to the government to prove that the owner or captain was privy to or consenting to the illegal activity.

The critical legal question presented on appeal was whether that claimant-burden allocation at trial means the claimant must bear the same burden at the summary judgment stage. The government argued that the claimant bears that burden at summary judgment. The court, however, emphasized established summary judgment law: regardless of who bears the ultimate burden at trial, the moving party on summary judgment must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

The court pointed out that the government's Motion for Summary Judgment contained no evidence showing that the appellant was not a common carrier. Because the government, as the movant, failed to make a showing eliminating a genuine factual dispute concerning common carrier status, summary judgment was improper. The court further explained that, in the district-court trial of the cited Liberian-vessel case, the district judge found lack of common carrier status based on claimant's failure to introduce evidence on specific factors (1) solicitation/advertising or holding out as a carrier for all shippers, (2) filing or considering filing a tariff with the Federal Maritime Commission as required under 46 U.S.C. sec. 817, and (3) carrying for hire under bills of lading all cargoes tendered in the relevant part of its trade. The opinion states that the government should have presented evidence addressing one or more similar points (or other relevant factors) to support a finding that the Shamrock was not a common carrier; such a showing by the government would have shifted the burden to the claimant to demonstrate that common carrier status was a genuine factual issue for trial.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Direct effect: The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. Specifically, the court held that the government, as the movant on summary judgment, failed to carry its burden of showing that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the vessel's common carrier status; therefore summary judgment was improper.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established summary judgment doctrine to forfeiture proceedings — it does not announce a new legal principle. The decision instructs that the government must produce evidence at the summary judgment stage to negate common carrier status (or otherwise eliminate material factual disputes) before the burden shifts to the claimant. The opinion does not claim to establish a new precedent beyond applying existing summary judgment standards to the facts of this forfeiture action.

Citation: United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Feb. 11, 1983. Panel: GODBOLD, Chief Judge, FAY and CLARK, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Circuit Judge Clark.

Show full summary ...

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ONE (1) 1944 STEEL HULL FREIGHTER CONVERTED WARTIME LANDING CRAFT UTILITY VESSEL (LCU) SHAMROCK, APPROXIMATELY 112 FEET IN LENGTH, TOGETHER WITH ITS TACKLE, APPAREL, HARNESS AND EQUIPMENT, DEFENDANT,

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

After finding 3,168 pounds of marijuana sealed in drums aboard the M/V Shamrock on June 2, 1978, the Customs Service seized the vessel on July 20, 1978. Following the seizure, the government sought forfeiture under 49 U.S.C. § 782, 21 U.S.C. § 881, and 19 U.S.C. § 1594. The sworn statements of the Shamrock's captain and first mate were in apparent contradiction as to the matter of the captain's knowledge of the presence of the marijuana. On October 21, 1981, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment.

In a trial of this case, a court would employ a three-tiered analysis of the facts. See United States v. One (1) Liberian Refrigerator Vessel, 447 F. Supp. 1053 (M.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 617 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1980). First, the court would determine whether the government had proved probable cause for the seizure of the vessel. Next, if the court had found probable cause, the burden would shift to the claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence its status as a common carrier pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1594, 21 U.S.C. § 881, or 49 U.S.C. sec. 782. Finally, if such status is proved, a determination by the court would return the burden to the government to prove that either the owner or the captain of the vessel was privy to the illegal activity or a consenting party thereto.

The issue in this case is whether, in a summary judgment action, the burden of proving common carrier status rests on the claimant, as it would in a trial. The government argues that it does. In its Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying Memorandum, the government presented no evidence to show that appellant was not a common carrier. (Record, 159).

Given this failure by the government, summary judgment should not have been granted because, whether or not the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, in a summary judgment action the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Benton-Volvo-Metairie, Inc. v. Volvo Southwest, Inc., 479 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1973); Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699, 709 (5th Cir. 1969); Dawkins v. Green, 412 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1969); Reed v. Rheem Manufacturing Company, 364 F.2d 810, 811 (5th Cir. 1966). See 6 J. Moore, W. Taggert J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.15[3], at 56-480; 10 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil sec. 2713, at 407; sec. 2716, at 430-32; sec. 2727, at 524-28.

In the trial of One Liberian Refrigerator Vessel, the district court judge based his conclusion that the vessel was not a common carrier on claimant's failure to introduce any evidence that the carrier (1) solicited, advertised, or held itself out as a carrier for all shippers; (2) considered filing or had filed a tariff with the Federal Maritime Commission as required of every common carrier by water in interstate commerce under 46 U.S.C. sec. 817; or (3) carried for hire under bills of lading all cargoes tendered it in the relevant part of its trade. Id. at 1061. The government should have attempted a showing, addressed to one or more of these points, or some other relevant factors, to provide a basis for finding that the Shamrock was not a common carrier. Such a showing would have then shifted the burden to the claimant to demonstrate that common carrier status was indeed a genuine issue of material fact.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

U.S. v. ONE (1) 1944 STEEL HULL FREIGHTER