PEOPLE v. McCALL

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Docket Number

No. 82SA523

Attorney(S)

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Charles B. Howe, Deputy Attorney General, Joel W. Cantrick, Solicitor General, Laura E. Udis, Assistant Attorney General, Enforcement Section, for plaintiff-appellee. David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Elizabeth A. Joyce, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant. En Banc.

Judges

JUSTICE NEIGHBORS delivered the opinion of the Court.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On or about July 3, 1980, the defendant, Timothy McCall, was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. Bail was initially set at $150,000 but later reduced, and the defendant was released on October 8, 1980, after posting a $70,000 surety bond. A jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter on April 18, 1981, and he was sentenced to the Department of Corrections for three years on July 16, 1981. The trial court credited the defendant with ninety days of presentence confinement. On May 11, 1982, the defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Crim. P. 35(a) and (c), seeking good-time credits for his presentence confinement. The trial court denied this motion on May 28, 1982, prompting the defendant's appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court's denial of good-time credits for the period of presentence confinement violates the defendant's right to equal protection of the law.
Whether the trial court complied with the requirements of Crim. P. 35(c)(3) by making findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief.
Whether the defendant is entitled to good-time credits for presentence confinement under section 17-22.5-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1980 Supp.).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Appellant's Arguments

The denial of good-time credits for presentence confinement violates his constitutional right to equal protection.
The trial court failed to comply with Crim. P. 35(c)(3) by denying his motion without making the required findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Under section 17-22.5-101, he is entitled to good-time credits for presentence confinement if he substantially obeyed the rules and regulations of the confinement facility.

Plaintiff-Appellee's Position

The People conceded error regarding the trial court’s failure to comply with Crim. P. 35(c)(3) requirements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Chavez, 659 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983)	Defendant is entitled to credit for presentence confinement and good-time credits under section 17-22.5-101 if the crime occurred on or after July 1, 1979, and if the defendant substantially obeyed facility rules.	The court relied on People v. Chavez as dispositive, holding that the defendant is entitled to good-time credits for presentence confinement and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the defendant's entitlement to good-time credits under the statute governing good-time deductions for crimes committed after July 1, 1979. It found that pursuant to People v. Chavez, the defendant must receive credit for presentence confinement against his sentence and may receive good-time credits if he substantially complied with the rules of the confinement facility. The court also addressed the procedural deficiency in the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief, noting that Crim. P. 35(c)(3) mandates findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were absent. The People conceded this error, and the court agreed, instructing the trial court on remand to enter appropriate findings and conclusions. The court thus reversed the trial court’s denial and remanded the case for compliance with these legal standards.

Holding and Implications

The trial court's judgment denying good-time credits for presentence confinement is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions.

The direct effect is that the defendant is entitled to have his presentence confinement credited toward his sentence and may receive good-time credits if he complied with institutional rules. Additionally, the trial court must comply with procedural requirements by making findings of fact and conclusions of law on the defendant's post-conviction motion. No broader precedent beyond the application of the existing statute and People v. Chavez was established by this decision.

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The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy McCall, Defendant-Appellant.

JUSTICE NEIGHBORS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant appeals the judgment of the trial court denying him good-time credits for the period of his presentence confinement. We reverse and remand with directions.

On or about July 3, 1980, the defendant was arrested and charged with first-degree murder committed on that date. Bail was set at $150,000. On October 3, 1980, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to reduce bail. The defendant was released on October 8, 1980, upon posting a surety bond in the amount of $70,000. A jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter on April 18, 1981. The defendant was sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a term of three years on July 16, 1981. The trial court gave the defendant credit for ninety days of presentence confinement. On May 11, 1982, the defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a) and (c), requesting good-time credits for the period of his presentence confinement. The trial court denied the motion on May 28, 1982.

Section 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

II.

The defendant argues that the trial court's denial of good-time credits for presentence confinement violates his right to equal protection of the law. He also claims that the trial court did not comply with the provisions of Crim. P. 35(c)(3) when it denied his motion for post-conviction relief without making the required findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In addition to his constitutional claim, the defendant contends that he is entitled to good-time credits for presentence confinement under section 17-22.5-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1980 Supp. to 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Our recent decision in People v. Chavez, 659 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983), is dispositive of the issues in this case. In People v. Chavez, supra, we held that under the statute a defendant is entitled to have the amount of presentence confinement credited against the term of his sentence for crimes committed on or after July 1, 1979. We further held that section 17-22.5-101 entitles the defendant to good-time credits for presentence confinement if he has substantially obeyed the rules and regulations of the facility in which he was confined. Therefore, the case must be remanded to the trial court.

Section 17-22.5-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1980 Supp. to 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provided: "Good time. Each person sentenced for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1979, whose conduct indicates that he has substantially observed all of the rules and regulations of the institution or facility in which he has been confined and has faithfully performed the duties assigned to him shall be entitled to a good time deduction of fifteen days a month from his sentence. The good time authorized by this section shall vest quarterly and may not be withdrawn once it has vested. No more than forty-five days of good time may be withheld by the department in any one quarter. No person subject to the good time credits of article 20 of this title shall be eligible for any good time deduction authorized by this article."

The defendant next argues that the trial court's summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief did not comply with the requirements of Crim. P. 35(c)(3). The People confess error on this issue. We agree. Crim. P. 35(c)(3) provides that "[i]n all cases [involving a motion for post-conviction review], the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." The record indicates that no hearing was held on the defendant's motion and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were entered. Therefore, on remand the trial court is instructed to enter appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief.

The trial court may dispense with a hearing on motions filed under Crim. P. 35 only if "the motion and the files and record of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is not entitled to relief." Crim. P. 35(c)(3).

III.

The ruling of the trial court is reversed. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with those outlined in People v. Chavez, supra.