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Docket Number

Docket No. 61928.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Graham K. Crabtree, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. LaBarge, Dinning, Lyons Greve, P.C. (by Robert G. Lyons), for defendant.

Judges

R.B. BURNS, P.J.

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Smart Summary

People v. Leonard, Docket No. 61928 (Mich. Ct. App. May 17, 1983)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Matthew Leonard was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2). Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress testimony from Michigan State Police polygraph operator John Wojnaroski concerning admissions made by defendant after a polygraph examination conducted on December 10, 1980. Wojnaroski testified at the suppression hearing that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights before the polygraph examination and that defendant waived those rights for purposes of the examination. The polygraph "interview" began at approximately 1:11 p.m. and ended at about 3:30 p.m.; the jury was not informed that most of the interview was a polygraph examination. After the defendant had been disconnected from the polygraph machine and after being told he had not answered the questions truthfully, Wojnaroski asked several questions to which the defendant gave incriminating responses (including nonverbal gestures and a verbal "no" to one question). It was stipulated that the results of the polygraph examination and the polygraph examiner's opinion as to the defendant's veracity would not be used against defendant at trial. The trial court ruled the post-examination admissions admissible on the basis that they were separate and distinct from the polygraph examination and that defendant had been given Miranda warnings prior to the examination. Defendant appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether admissions elicited from the defendant after a polygraph examination (after the defendant had been disconnected from the polygraph machine and told he had not answered truthfully) were admissible where the defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights before the polygraph examination.
Whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which attaches after indictment or the commencement of adversary proceedings, was violated by eliciting admissions during a post-polygraph interrogation in the absence of counsel and without an informed waiver covering that interrogation.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).	Establishes Miranda warnings and protections for custodial interrogation; referenced to note that Wojnaroski advised defendant of his Miranda rights prior to the polygraph examination and defendant waived those rights for the examination.	The court acknowledged that defendant was given Miranda warnings and waived rights for questions during the examination, but distinguished that waiver from any post-examination interrogation which occurred without counsel.
Edwards v Arizona, 451 U.S. 477; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981).	Cited for the principle that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises when adversary proceedings have begun and that, absent a valid waiver, admissions elicited in the absence of counsel violate that right.	The court relied on this principle to conclude that, because criminal proceedings had commenced, defendant had a right to counsel that protected against post-commencement elicitation of incriminating admissions without counsel.
United States v Henry, 447 U.S. 264; 100 S Ct 2183; 65 L Ed 2d 115 (1980).	Supported the same Sixth Amendment principle regarding the right to counsel after adversary proceedings have begun and the inadmissibility of admissions elicited in the absence of counsel without waiver.	Used in combination with Edwards to support the court's determination that admissions obtained after proceedings commenced required counsel or a valid waiver covering those interrogations.
People v Paintman, 412 Mich. 518; 315 N.W.2d 418 (1982).	State precedent cited for the Sixth Amendment rule that a defendant's right to counsel arises after indictment or commencement of adversary proceedings.	The court cited Paintman to reinforce that defendant had a right to counsel during the polygraph examination and subsequent questioning because proceedings had already begun.
People v Pottruff, 116 Mich. App. 367; 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982).	Applied to the context of polygraph examinations: that a defendant has a right to have counsel present during the polygraph examination and any questioning occurring after the examination.	The court applied Pottruff to conclude that although defendant waived counsel for the polygraph examination itself, neither defendant nor counsel were informed there would be interrogation after the examination and that the waiver did not extend to that interrogation; therefore the post-examination inculpatory statements were inadmissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the undisputed procedural facts: defendant had been arrested July 1, 1980, and the polygraph examination occurred December 10, 1980, after criminal proceedings had commenced. The court observed the settled rule that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches once an accused has been indicted or adversary criminal proceedings have otherwise begun, and that admissions elicited from the accused in the absence of counsel are inadmissible unless there is a valid waiver (citing Edwards v Arizona; United States v Henry; People v Paintman).

The court noted the stipulation that polygraph results and the examiner's opinion would not be used at trial and that, with that understanding, defendant agreed to take the polygraph. The polygraph operator testified he advised defendant of Miranda rights prior to the examination and that defendant waived them for purposes of the examination. However, the court emphasized that neither defendant nor his counsel were informed there would be an interrogation after the polygraph examination, and the prior waiver was not shown to have been extended to any post-examination interrogation. Relying on People v Pottruff, the court concluded defendant had a right to counsel during the polygraph examination and during questioning that occurred after the examination; because counsel was absent for the post-examination questioning and no valid waiver covered that questioning, the inculpatory responses were inadmissible.

Given these conclusions, the trial court's ruling that the admissions were separate and admissible despite the absence of counsel was rejected.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial because the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by eliciting inculpatory responses during a post-polygraph interrogation in the absence of counsel and without an informed waiver extending to that interrogation.

Implications: The direct effect is to vacate the convictions and order a new trial. The opinion applies existing Sixth Amendment and Miranda-related authority to the facts of this case; the court did not announce a new legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the circumstances of a polygraph examination followed by interrogation without counsel.

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PEOPLE v LEONARD

R.B. BURNS, P.J.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2). He appeals and we reverse.

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the testimony of John Wojnaroski, a Michigan State Police polygraph operator, concerning certain admissions made by defendant following his polygraph examination. At the hearing on the suppression motion, Wojnaroski testified that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights prior to the polygraph examination. The admissions in question were made after the defendant had been disconnected from the polygraph machine and after defendant had been told that he had not answered the questions truthfully. The trial court ruled that the admissions were separate and distinct from the polygraph examination and that since defendant had been given his Miranda rights prior to the examination the statements were admissible.

Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

Wojnaroski, the polygraph operator, testified over objection that on December 10, 1980, he conducted an "interview" of the defendant. The jury was not informed that the interview was, for the most part, a polygraph examination of defendant. Wojnaroski stated that he began the interview at approximately 1:11 p.m. Before conducting the interview, he advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and defendant indicated that he understood and waived these rights. The interview ended at approximately 3:30 p.m. At the close of the interview (after the polygraph examination had ended and after the defendant had been disconnected from the polygraph machine) Wojnaroski asked defendant several questions. Wojnaroski's testimony in regard to these questions and the defendant's answers to them was as follows:

"Okay. At the conclusion of my meeting with Mr. Leonard on December 10th, 1980, I had asked Mr. Leonard a question as to if he had at least advised his attorney as to what the whole truth of this investigation was. He indicated in a gesture of no by looking down and shaking his head in that manner (indicating).

"After that I asked Matthew Leonard if he was sorry for what he did to the victim, and that victim would have been in this situation Mary O'Connor. Again, he looked down, and at this time nodded in the affirmative, yes, more or less looking down at his legs and making a couple of nods of his head.

"I then asked him if he knew what caused him to do this to the victim; that is, again, Mary O'Connor; and his answer at that time was a verbal no."

On cross-examination, Wojnaroski admitted that throughout the "interview" defendant denied sexually assaulting Ms. O'Connor and it was only at the end of the "interview" that defendant gave incriminating responses to Wojnaroski's questions.

Defendant was arrested on July 1, 1980, and subsequently was released on bond. The polygraph examination was held on December 10, 1980. Consequently, the polygraph examination in question occurred after criminal proceedings had commenced against defendant. It is well settled that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises whenever an accused has been indicted or adversary criminal proceedings have otherwise begun and that, in the absence of a valid waiver, this right is violated when admissions are subsequently elicited from the accused in the absence of counsel. Edwards v Arizona, 451 U.S. 477; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981); United States v Henry, 447 U.S. 264; 100 S Ct 2183; 65 L Ed 2d 115 (1980); People v Paintman, 412 Mich. 518; 315 N.W.2d 418 (1982). Accordingly, it is clear that defendant had a right to have counsel present during the polygraph examination and the questioning which occurred after the examination had ended. People v Pottruff, 116 Mich. App. 367; 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982). It was stipulated that the results of the polygraph examination and the polygraph examiner's opinion as to the defendant's veracity would not be used against defendant at trial. With this understanding, defendant agreed to take the polygraph examination. He was given his Miranda rights prior to the examination and he clearly waived his right to counsel for questions during the examination. However, neither the defendant nor his counsel was informed that there would be an interrogation after the polygraph examination and the waiver was not extended to the interrogation conducted after the examination had ended. Accordingly, the absence of counsel during this time rendered the defendant's inculpatory responses inadmissible. People v Pottruff, supra.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

PEOPLE v. LEONARD