Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: This appeal is from an order which vacated an attorney's charging lien filed, pursuant to section 475 Jud. of the Judiciary Law, against a portion of the proceeds due under a judgment rendered in this tax certiorari proceeding. Appellant contends that there was a fee-splitting agreement between its firm and T. Crouse Barnum, the attorney of record, which permitted them to share in any contingent fee received as a result of the tax assessment litigation. In its petition, appellant alleges claims which may form the basis for a contractual claim (see People v Keeffe, 50 N.Y.2d 149, 155), but we find no allegations sufficient to support a lien against the moneys available for satisfaction of the judgment (cf. Matter of Gutchess, 90 A.D.2d 663, 664). Only the attorney of record herein is entitled to an attorney's statutory or charging lien ( Melzer v 195 Broadway Corp., 18 A.D.2d 1108; Friedland v 601 West 149th St., 15 A.D.2d 742; Matter of Sebring, 238 App. Div. 281; 7 N.Y. Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 176, pp 98-99). Appellant acknowledges that T. Crouse Barnum was the attorney of record, and that the firm of Smith, Sovik, Kendrick, McAuliffe Schwarzer, P.C., was retained as trial and appellate counsel.