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Docket Number

Docket No. 63777.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Robert E. Weiss, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Chief Appellate Division, for the people. Phillip J. Olson, II, for defendant.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

People v Dennis, Docket No. 63777 (Michigan Court of Appeals, Aug. 17, 1983)

Factual and Procedural Background

After a jury trial the defendant was found guilty of inciting the commission of first-degree murder, MCL 750.157b; MSA 28.354(2), and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right.

The defendant was accused of inciting another to murder her husband. The primary evidence was a tape-recorded conversation between the defendant and Detective Christman, who was posing as a professional "hit man" named "Moose." The defendant was introduced to "Moose" by Jack Reno, a frequent customer at the defendant's tropical fish store. Reno testified the defendant had approached him asking whether he knew anyone who "eliminated" people, and Reno arranged the meeting with "Moose." In her defense the defendant testified that Reno had extorted money from her and had forced her to make the incriminating taped statements.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the fact that the person allegedly incited was an undercover police officer (and therefore incapable of actually committing the murder) precludes conviction under the incitement statute because the incitement could not have been likely to endanger human life.
Whether the Legislature intended that inducement or incitement to murder be punishable by a mandatory term of life imprisonment under MCL 750.157b; MSA 28.354(2).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant argued that because Detective Christman was a police officer posing as a hit man, actual incitement, inducement, or exhortation was impossible and the murder could not actually occur; therefore the statutory requirement that the incitement "may endanger or be likely to endanger the life of any person" could not be satisfied, and at most the record supported only a conviction for "attempted incitement, inducement, or exhortation."
The defendant argued that the Legislature did not intend to subject one who induces another to commit murder to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.
The defendant also asserted as part of her defense that Reno had extorted money from her and had forced her to make the taped statements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bennetts v State Employees Retirement Board, 95 Mich. App. 616, 622; 291 N.W.2d 147 (1980)	Where a statute is subject to two different interpretations, legislative intent may be found by looking to the purposes and objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislation.	Cited as the proposition that, when statutory language permits multiple interpretations, courts may look to legislative purpose to determine intent.
Perry v Sturdevant Mfg Co, 124 Mich. App. 11, 15; 333 N.W.2d 366 (1983)	If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, judicial construction based on legislative intent is neither required nor permitted.	Quoted to support the principle that clear statutory language obviates resort to legislative intent analysis.
Dussia v Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244, 248-249; 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971)	Authority for the proposition that clear statutory language requires no judicial construction regarding legislative intent.	Cited as supporting authority for declining to construe unambiguous statutory language.
Michigan Harness Horseman's Ass'n v Racing Comm'r, 123 Mich. App. 388, 391; 333 N.W.2d 292 (1983)	Statement emphasizing judicial restraint: courts must not usurp legislative power and should not construe clear statutory language.	Quoted at length to explain the general approach to statutory interpretation and deference to the Legislature.
Wales v Lyon, 2 Mich. 276, 282 (1851)	Historical example referenced in the quoted passage regarding criticism of legislative drafting.	Included in the Court's extended quotation illustrating that courts have sometimes criticized legislative drafting but must still avoid usurping legislative power.
Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich. 453, 455; 235 N.W. 217 (1931)	When wording of a statute is unambiguous, courts should not assume a mistake or attempt to construe it; every word and phrase should be given meaning.	Invoked to support the rule that clear statutory language must be applied as written and words not treated as surplusage.
Pittsfield Twp v Saline, 103 Mich. App. 99, 104; 302 N.W.2d 608 (1982)	Support for the principle that courts must respect clear statutory language and avoid construing it.	Cited as additional authority for the proposition that clear statutes should be applied as written.
Stowers v Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 133; 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971)	Every word and phrase of a statute should be given meaning and not treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory.	Used to reinforce the rule that statutory language should be given effect as written.
People v Saxton, 118 Mich. App. 681, 690; 325 N.W.2d 795 (1982), lv den 414 Mich. 931 (1982)	Criminal statutes are to be "strictly" construed and any ambiguity resolved in favor of lenity.	Cited to note that criminal statutes are subject to strict construction and lenity, but the court found the statute's language clear and applied it accordingly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered two of the defendant's claims in detail.

On the claim that incitement was impossible because the alleged recipient was a police officer:
The Court held that whether Detective Christman, posing as a hit man, could in fact be induced to commit murder is irrelevant to the statutory offense. The statute requires only that the defendant seek to induce, incite, or exhort another person to commit one of the specified offenses. The Court stated that the possibility of success or the actual ability of the person to commit the crime is immaterial because it is not an element of the offense of inciting another to commit murder. Consequently, the defendant's argument that only "attempted incitement" could be proven was rejected.
On the claim that the Legislature did not intend mandatory life imprisonment for inducement to murder:
The Court reviewed principles of statutory interpretation. It noted that when a statute admits two interpretations, courts may look to legislative purposes and objectives (citing Bennetts), but if statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted (citing Perry and Dussia). The opinion quoted precedent emphasizing judicial restraint and the duty to give every word and phrase meaning rather than treating language as surplusage (quoting Michigan Harness Horseman's Ass'n and other authorities). The Court also acknowledged that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of lenity (citing People v Saxton), but concluded that the statutory language here was clear. Applying these interpretive rules, the Court found the defendant's statutory-intent argument without merit.

The Court noted it had reviewed the defendant's remaining allegations of error and found them to be without merit.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed.

Holding: The defendant's conviction for inciting the commission of first-degree murder and the mandatory life sentence were upheld.

Implications: The direct effect is the affirmation of the conviction and the life sentence imposed on the defendant. The opinion applies established rules of statutory interpretation—including deference to clear statutory language and the rule of lenity when ambiguity exists—but does not announce any new statutory interpretation beyond applying those principles to the facts of this case.

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PEOPLE v DENNIS

PER CURIAM.

After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged of inciting the commission of first-degree murder, MCL 750.157b; MSA 28.354(2). Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right.

Defendant was accused of inciting another to murder her husband. The primary evidence against the defendant was a tape-recorded conversation between the defendant and Detective Christman, while Christman was posing as a professional "hit man" named "Moose". Defendant was introduced to "Moose" by Jack Reno, a frequent customer of the defendant's tropical fish store. Reno testified that the defendant had approached him while he was in the defendant's store and had inquired whether he knew anyone who "eliminated" people. Reno subsequently arranged a meeting between "Moose" and the defendant. In her defense, defendant testified that Reno had extorted money from her and had forced her to make the incriminating taped statements.

Defendant raises five claims of error, only two of which we find merit discussion.

Defendant's first claim is that the prosecutor's failure to establish that the incitement was likely to endanger human life requires the reversal of the defendant's conviction. Defendant maintains that, because Detective Christman was a police officer, actual incitement, inducement, or exhortation was not possible and it was impossible for the murder to actually occur. Therefore, the defendant contends, the statutory requirement that the defendant's incitement endanger or be likely to endanger human life cannot be satisfied and, at most, the record could only support a conviction for "attempted incitement, inducement, or exhortation".

MCL 750.157b; MSA 28.354(2) provides:

"Any person who incites, induces or exhorts any other person to unlawfully burn any property, to murder, to kill, to wound or to commit an aggravated or felonious assault on any person or to do any act which would constitute a felony or circuit court misdemeanor, that may endanger or be likely to endanger the life of any person, or who aids and abets in any such inciting, inducing or exhorting shall be punished in the same manner as if he had committed the offense, incited, induced or exhorted."

We find that the fact that Detective Christman could not actually be incited or induced to commit the crime because he was a police officer is irrelevant. The statute requires only that the defendant seek to induce, incite, or exhort the commission of one of the specified offenses. The possibility of success is immaterial because it is not an element of the offense of inciting another to commit murder. Thus, the defendant's first claim is without merit.

Defendant also claims that the Legislature did not intend to punish the inducement of another to murder by a mandatory term of life imprisonment.

Where a statute is subject to two different interpretations, the Legislature's intent may be found by looking to the purposes and objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislation. Bennetts v State Employees Retirement Board, 95 Mich. App. 616, 622; 291 N.W.2d 147 (1980). If, however, the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, judicial construction based on an analysis of legislative intent is neither required nor permitted. Perry v Sturdevant Mfg Co, 124 Mich. App. 11, 15; 333 N.W.2d 366 (1983), citing Dussia v Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244, 248-249; 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971).

In Michigan Harness Horseman's Ass'n v Racing Comm'r, 123 Mich. App. 388, 391; 333 N.W.2d 292 (1983), this Court stated:

"Michigan courts have sometimes castigated the State Legislature, a coequal branch of government, for producing hasty legislation and crude, ambiguous legislative acts. See, e.g., Wales v Lyon, 2 Mich. 276, 282 (1851). In interpreting legislation, however, the courts must be careful not to usurp legislative power. See Const 1963, art 3, § 2 (no person exercising powers of one branch of government shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch). Under modern jurisprudence, therefore, if the wording of a statute is unambiguous, there is no room for courts to attempt to `construe' it. Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich. 453, 455; 235 N.W. 217 (1931); Pittsfield Twp v Saline, 103 Mich. App. 99, 104; 302 N.W.2d 608 (1982). Where a statute is clear and complete on its face, the courts are not to assume a mistake has been made or that the Legislature inadvertently used one word or phrase instead of another. Detroit, supra, p 456. Rather, every word and phrase of the statute should be given meaning and not treated as mere surplusage or rendered nugatory. Stowers v Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 133; 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971)."

These principles are apparently directly applicable to criminal statutes, with the caveat that criminal statutes are to be "strictly" construed and any ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of lenity. People v Saxton, 118 Mich. App. 681, 690; 325 N.W.2d 795 (1982), lv den 414 Mich. 931 (1982). Here, the statutory language is clear and we find the defendant's argument to be without merit.

We have reviewed the defendant's remaining allegations of error and find them to be without merit.

Affirmed.

PEOPLE v. DENNIS