STATE v. SMITH

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Docket Number

80-5-197; CA A25048 control; 80-5-198; CA A25049; 81-239 81-240; CA A25050

Attorney(S)

Stephen J. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem. Stephen F. Peifer, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and William F. Gary, Solicitor General, Salem.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Jerry Joel Smith, was incarcerated in San Mateo County Jail, California, in June 1981. The Clackamas County District Attorney filed a detainer against him. Defendant made three attempts to request a speedy trial on Clackamas County charges on June 30, July 16, and August 4, 1981. The first two requests were mailed directly to the Clackamas County District Attorney's office, while the third was handed to a deputy sheriff to be forwarded to the Oregon prosecutor. Defendant was released from San Mateo County custody on December 2, 1981, and subsequently extradited to Clackamas County for trial on charges of failure to appear in the first degree and two counts of burglary in the first degree. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on February 5, 1982, arguing denial of his right to a speedy trial under ORS 135.775, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The trial court denied the motion, finding defendant had failed to comply with the statute’s requirements. This appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant's attempts to request a speedy trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers complied with the statutory requirement that the request be delivered to the prison official having custody of the prisoner, thus triggering the 180-day speedy trial period.
Whether the defendant was entitled to dismissal of his charges due to the failure to bring him to trial within 180 days of a proper request under ORS 135.775.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The defendant contended that his August 4, 1981, request was properly delivered to an official having custody and therefore sufficient to invoke the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
He acknowledged the earlier requests (June 30 and July 16) were insufficient but argued they constituted substantial compliance with the statute and should be given effect.
Based on any of these requests, the defendant claimed entitlement to dismissal because trial was not commenced within 180 days.

Respondent's Arguments

The respondent argued that the statute requires the prisoner to give written notice and request to the official having custody, not directly to the prosecuting authority.
The defendant failed to comply with this requirement, as his requests were sent directly to the district attorney or improperly delivered.
Therefore, the 180-day speedy trial period was never triggered, and dismissal was not warranted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Miebach, 52 Or. App. 709, 629 P.2d 1312 (1981), rev. denied 291 Or. 771	Prisoner bears the burden to provide custodial official written notice and request for final disposition under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.	The court relied on this precedent to affirm that defendant failed to meet the statutory burden by not delivering the request to the custodian.
Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 443 P.2d 621 (1968)	Trial court's factual findings are binding on appellate court when supported by evidence.	The court accepted the trial court's findings that defendant did not comply with the statutory delivery requirement.
State v. Billings, 42 Or. App. 99, 599 P.2d 1240 (1979)	Same as above regarding deference to trial court's factual findings.	Used to support the binding nature of the trial court's findings.
People v. Wilson, 69 Cal.App.3d 631, 138 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1977)	Purpose of Interstate Agreement is cooperative procedures requiring formal notice through custodial officials.	Reinforced the court’s rejection of informal notification to prosecutor as insufficient.
State v. Gray, 26 Or. App. 901, 554 P.2d 638 (1976), rev. denied	Constitutional speedy trial claim requires showing prejudice from delay.	Court noted defendant did not claim constitutional speedy trial violation or show prejudice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory requirements under ORS 135.775, specifically Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, which mandates that a prisoner must deliver a written notice and request for final disposition to the warden or official having custody. This official must then forward the request with a certificate to the prosecuting authority, triggering a 180-day period in which trial must commence.

Defendant's first two attempts were sent directly to the district attorney, and the third was handed to a deputy sheriff to forward. The trial court found, and the appellate court agreed, that these methods did not satisfy the statutory requirement of delivery to the official having custody, accompanied by the necessary certificate. The court emphasized that informal or direct notification to the prosecutor by the prisoner is insufficient to invoke the Interstate Agreement's protections.

The court also noted that defendant did not assert a constitutional speedy trial violation nor demonstrated prejudice from the delay. Given the failure to comply with the statutory procedure, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.

Holding and Implications

The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments.

The direct consequence is that defendant's convictions for failure to appear and burglary stand, as he did not properly invoke the Interstate Agreement on Detainers' speedy trial provisions. This decision underscores the strict procedural requirements prisoners must follow to trigger the protections of the Interstate Agreement. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding the delivery of notice and the burden on the prisoner.

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STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. JERRY JOEL SMITH, Appellant. (Cases Consolidated)

WARDEN, J.

Affirmed.

WARDEN, J.

Defendant appeals his convictions for failure to appear in the first degree and two counts of burglary in the first degree. He moved to dismiss those charges on the ground that he was denied the right to a speedy trial as provided under ORS 135.775, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The trial court found that defendant had failed to comply with the provisions of the statute and denied his motion to dismiss. We affirm.

Defendant was incarcerated in the San Mateo, California, County Jail in June, 1981. The Clackamas County District Attorney filed a detainer against him with the San Mateo County Sheriff. On June 30, July 16, and August 4, 1981, defendant attempted to request speedy trial of the Clackamas County charges. Defendant's first request was addressed to the Clackamas County District Attorney's Office; his second request was addressed to Chief Deputy Cravens of that office. Those requests were mailed directly to the district attorney's office. The August 4 request was addressed to Chief Deputy Cravens, "c/o Det. Peter Katsumis, Sheriff's Office, County Courthouse, Oregon City, Oregon." Detective Katsumis apparently is the San Mateo County extradition officer. According to defendant's testimony, he handed this request to a deputy sheriff at the San Mateo County Jail and asked that it be mailed for him directly to the Oregon prosecutor.

San Mateo County released defendant from custody on December 2, 1981. Clackamas County extradited defendant for trial on the failure to appear and burglary indictments. Defendant filed the motion to dismiss the indictments on February 5, 1982, the 186th day after his last attempt to request a speedy trial.

Under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, a person incarcerated in a party state may request final disposition of the charge that is the basis of the detainer. Trial must commence within 180 days of receipt of the request and required information by the appropriate authorities:

"(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint * * *. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner." ORS 135.775, Art. III (a).

The statute requires the prisoner to initiate speedy trial proceedings by giving written notice and request for final disposition to the prisoner's custodian:

"The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) of this Article shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested." ORS 135.775, Art. III(b).

Defendant contends that his August 4, 1981, request for a speedy trial was properly delivered to an official having custody of him and therefore was sufficient to bring the Interstate Agreement into effect. He acknowledges that the June 30 and July 16, 1981, requests were insufficient because they were mailed directly to the district attorney, but he contends that they nonetheless constituted substantial compliance with the statute and should be given effect. He argues that, considering any of the requests, he was entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him because he was not brought to trial within the statutorily prescribed 180 days. We disagree.

The Interstate Agreement places on the prisoner the burden to provide the custodial official written notice and request for final disposition. ORS 135.775, Art. III (b); see State v. Miebach, 52 Or. App. 709, 717, 629 P.2d 1312, rev den 291 Or. 771 (1981). The trial court expressly found that defendant failed to sustain that burden in initiating the proceedings. It made the following findings of fact:

"1. The defendant forwarded to the District Attorney of Clackamas County a request for speedy trial on June 30, 1981, a second such request on February 16, 1981 and a third such request on August 4, 1981.

"2. These written requests were not given or sent by the defendant to the warden or other official to allow that official to forward such request with the certificate provided in Article III(a) of the Agreement On Detainers set forth in ORS 135.775.

"3. The defendant personally forwarded the request to the District Attorney of Clackamas County without the proper certificates required under Article III (a)."

There was evidence to support the trial court's factual findings, and they are binding on this court. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 443 P.2d 621 (1968); State v. Billings, 42 Or. App. 99, 599 P.2d 1240 (1979). Under the Interstate Agreement, the notice and request must be sent by the prisoner to his custodian, not to the prosecutor. ORS 135.775, Art. III (b). Therefore, defendant's attempts to initiate speedy trial proceedings by directly contacting the Clackamas County District Attorney were ineffective to start the running of the 180 day period.

We accept the trial court's findings of fact, with the exception of an apparent scrivener's error in the date of defendant's second request to the district attorney. The record shows that defendant made his second request on July, not February, 16, 1981. That error does not affect our analysis.

We reject defendant's argument that he is entitled to dismissal of the indictments because he substantially complied with the statute by sending requests to the district attorney. The purpose of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is to provide cooperative procedures to encourage the orderly disposition of detainers. ORS 135.775, Art. I. That goal is furthered by requiring the warden or other official to forward the prisoner's notice and request, together with other information about the sentence being served, to the prosecuting jurisdiction. There is no provision for informal notification to the prosecutor by the prisoner. See People v. Wilson, 69 Cal.App.3d 631, 138 Cal Rptr 259 (1977).

We find that defendant failed to invoke his right to a speedy trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. He does not contend that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated and has neither alleged nor shown any prejudice resulting from the delay. See State v. Gray, 26 Or. App. 901, 554 P.2d 638, rev den (1976). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss.