PER CURIAM.
Whitehead, contending that Section 316.1932(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), which provides, inter alia, that:
"The refusal to submit to a chemical breath or urine test upon the request of a law enforcement officer as provided in this section shall be admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding."
unconstitutionally violates his privilege against self-incrimination, successfully moved in limine to prohibit the State from eliciting any testimony concerning, or commenting upon, the defendant's refusal to submit to a test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood. The order granting the motion in limine is vacated upon the authority of South Dakota v. Neville, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), and State v. Sowers, 442 So.2d 239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge (specially concurring).
Following the course I have taken in Continental Video Corp. v. Honeywell, Inc., 422 So.2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (Schwartz, J., specially concurring), and cases cited at n. 2, I concur in the consideration of this cause on petition for certiorari only because of the existence of State v. Steinbrecher, 409 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), about which I have already expressed my doubts, see State v. C.C. (Fla. 3d DCA Case no. 81-2564, et al., opinion filed September 27, 1983) (en banc) (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring), and which — were I free to do so — I would, at the least, very critically reconsider.
Among other things, it seems clear to me that the prerequisite for certiorari consideration that any remedy by appeal is "inadequate," 3 Fla. Jur.2d Appellate Review § 468 (1978), necessarily implies that a right to appellate review from an adverse final judgment exist in the first place. In any criminal prosecution in which the state seeks an otherwise unauthorized review of a pre-trial ruling, however, it of course does not.
On the merits, I agree completely that the order below was incorrect.