FRIEDLANDER v. NIMS, (N.D.Ga. 1984)

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

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Docket Number

Civ. A. No. C82-1900A.

Attorney(S)

Richard B. Dannenberg, Henry A. Brachtl, New York City, Edward L. Greenblatt, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff. J. Wallace Adair, Ralph J. Savarese, Gaspare J. Bono, Washington, D.C., for Timex Corp.

Judges

Marvin Herman Shoob

Acts

Judiciary And Judicial Procedure — Fees And Costs — Procedure — Taxation Of Costs

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 30, 1983, the Court dismissed the claims against Timex Corporation, allowing the plaintiff a fifteen-day period to amend the complaint. The plaintiff did not amend within that time frame. Consequently, on January 6, 1984, the Court entered a final judgment dismissing the claims against Timex. Following the entry of judgment, Timex filed a bill of costs. The present opinion addresses the plaintiff's objection to Timex's bill of costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the fees of the court reporter for a deposition transcript were necessarily obtained and thus taxable as costs.
Whether fees for copies of papers filed and served are taxable costs.
Whether the docket fee associated with the filing of a deposition is properly taxable to Timex.
Whether expenses for computerized legal research are taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 or should be considered attorney's fees.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Objected to the court reporter fees on the basis that the deposition was agreed to be waived for filing, making the transcript unnecessary and the cost excessive.
Contended that fees for copies of papers constituted office overhead and were not necessarily incurred.
Objected to a $2.50 docket fee related to the filing of a deposition.
Challenged the inclusion of computerized legal research costs, implying such expenses are not taxable as costs.

Timex Corporation's Arguments

Asserted that the deposition transcript was necessarily obtained for use in the case despite the waiver of filing.
Maintained that photocopy fees were appropriate as copies were required to be filed and served.
Included a docket fee for filing the deposition.
Claimed computerized legal research costs as taxable expenses, citing precedent allowing limited discretion under Rule 54(d) to award such costs despite their absence from the statutory list in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
28 U.S.C. § 1920	Defines taxable costs including court reporter fees, fees for copies, and docket fees.	Guided the court's analysis of which costs Timex could recover.
Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 543 F. Supp. 706 (N.D.Ill. 1982)	Allowed taxation of computerized legal research costs under limited discretion of Rule 54(d).	The court declined to follow this precedent, holding computerized legal research expenses are attorney's fees, not taxable costs.
State of Illinois v. Sangamo Construction Co., 657 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1981)	Recognized district court discretion to award costs not explicitly listed in § 1920.	Referenced in discussion of computerized legal research costs but ultimately rejected as controlling.
Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980)	Characterized computerized legal research as reasonable or essential in modern legal practice.	Considered but court held the nature of research expenses aligns more with attorney's fees.
O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hospital, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 578 (N.D.Ga. 1983)	Held computerized legal research expenses recoverable as costs when not included in attorney's fees.	The court explicitly declined to follow this decision, emphasizing substance over form.
Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983)	Supports classification of computerized research expenses as attorney's fees.	Cited in support of disallowing computerized legal research as taxable costs.
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 570 F. Supp. 826 (D.S.C. 1983)	Supports treatment of computerized legal research expenses as attorney's fees.	Used to reinforce the court's holding on computerized research expenses.
Babb v. Sun Co., 562 F. Supp. 491 (D.Minn. 1983)	Supports the classification of computerized legal research as attorney's fees.	Referenced to justify disallowance of computerized legal research as costs.
Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083 (D.Minn. 1983)	Supports disallowing computerized legal research as taxable costs.	Used as authority in the court's reasoning.
Guinasso v. Pacific First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 100 F.R.D. 264 (D.Or. 1983)	Supports the conclusion that computerized legal research expenses are attorney's fees.	Further supports the court's decision to disallow computerized legal research costs.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed each category of contested costs under the framework of 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which enumerates taxable costs including court reporter fees, fees for copies, and docket fees. For the court reporter fees, the Court found that the deposition transcript was necessarily obtained for use in the case despite the parties' agreement to waive filing, and that the cost was reasonable, thus allowing this expense.

Regarding fees for copies, the Court distinguished between office overhead and necessary litigation expenses, concluding that since Timex was required to file and serve copies, these costs were appropriately taxable.

The Court disallowed the $2.50 docket fee associated with the deposition filing because the record established that another defendant, not Timex, filed the deposition.

On the issue of computerized legal research expenses, the Court acknowledged precedents permitting limited discretion under Rule 54(d) to award such costs. However, it reasoned that computerized legal research is fundamentally a form of legal research integral to attorney preparation and thus constitutes attorney's fees rather than taxable costs. The Court rejected contrary authority from a fellow district judge and other cases that allowed recovery of these expenses as costs, emphasizing that the substance of the expense, not its form, controls its classification. Consequently, the Court declined to allow computerized legal research expenses as taxable costs.

Holding and Implications

The Court issued a final ruling as follows:

DISALLOWS costs in the amount of $2.50 for a docket fee and $1,039.75 for computerized legal research expenses.

Accordingly, the plaintiff is ordered to pay Timex Corporation costs totaling $760.20. This decision directly affects the parties' financial obligations but does not establish new legal precedent beyond clarifying the classification of computerized legal research expenses as attorney's fees rather than taxable costs.

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Herman FRIEDLANDER, Plaintiff, v. Jerry C. NIMS, et al., Defendants.

ORDER

SHOOB, District Judge.

On September 30, 1983, the Court dismissed the claims against Timex Corporation subject to plaintiff's right to amend within fifteen days. 571 F. Supp. 1188. Plaintiff did not amend the complaint within the time allowed. On January 6, 1984, the Court directed the entry of final judgment of dismissal as to Timex. After judgment was entered, Timex filed its bill of costs. Presently before the Court is the objection by plaintiff to Timex's bill of costs.

Timex seeks the following costs:

Fees of court reporter $597.40 Fees for copies of papers 142.80 Docket fees 22.50 Computerized legal research 1039.75 -------- TOTAL $1802.45

Plaintiff objects to the fees of the court reporter, fees for copies of papers, that portion ($2.50) of the docket fees that corresponds to the filing of a deposition, and the expenses of computerized legal research.

Taxation of costs is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. That section states:

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:

. . . . .

(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;

. . . . .

(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

. . . .

The Court will analyze the challenged costs separately.

Fees of court reporter

Timex seeks to recover the fees of a court reporter for a copy of the transcript of a deposition of plaintiff. Plaintiff objects to this item because the parties had agreed to waive the filing of that deposition, because a copy was unnecessary for use in the case, and because the cost was high.

The Court concludes that the deposition copy was necessarily obtained by Timex for use in the case, even if it was not required to be filed. Although the cost was high, it was reasonable. The Court will therefore allow the item.

Fees for copies of papers

Timex seeks reimbursement for photocopies of documents filed with the Court and served upon the other parties. Plaintiff objects to this item as constituting office overhead. If the photocopies were for the attorneys' own use, the Court would agree; but because Timex was required to file and serve copies of its pleadings, the costs of those copies are appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).

Docket fee

Plaintiff objects to the $2.50 docket fee for filing the deposition of plaintiff. Because the record shows that another defendant actually filed the deposition, the Court will disallow that item.

Computerized legal research

Timex claims $1039.75 as costs of computerized legal research. In support of that claim, Timex cites Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 543 F. Supp. 706 (N.D.Ill. 1982). That case has summarized the leading cases allowing the taxation of the costs of computerized legal research:

Although the cost of computerized legal research is not on the list of taxable costs in section 1920, "a district court retains limited discretion under Rule 54(d) to award as costs of suit expenses not specifically allowed by statute. . . ." State of Illinois v. Sangamo Construction Co., 657 F.2d [855] at 864 n. 11 [7th Cir. 1981]. The use of computer aides [sic] in research is "reasonable, if not essential, in contemporary legal practice," Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 1980), and "replaces by instantaneous and supposedly infallible retrieval, many hours which would be billable if performed by human talent." Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (W.D.Pa. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 1790, 60 L.Ed.2d 242 (1979).

Independence Tube Corp., 543 F. Supp. at 723.

The Court finds that computerized legal research is, like other legal research, part of an attorney's preparation of a case. Although the line between attorney's fees and costs may be indeterminate, the Court believes that expenses for computerized legal research fall within the rubric of attorney's fees rather than that of costs. That use of a computer is "reasonable, if not essential, in contemporary legal practice" makes no difference: books, typing or word processing, office space, and even paralegal assistance are "reasonable, if not essential," and their costs are part of the total cost of an attorney's services. Nor does it matter that attorneys often bill their overhead for computer research as a separate item: many attorneys also bill typing and paralegal assistance costs separately.

The Court notes that another judge of this district has held that expenses of computer research are recoverable by a party as costs when the expenses have not been previously included in an award of attorney's fees. See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hospital, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 578, 581-2 (N.D.Ga. 1983) (Hall, J.). In that case the court rejected, as exalting form over substance, an argument that expenses of computer research were exclusively a component of attorney's fees. Id. at 581. This Court disagrees. The substance of the work is legal research; the form of that research, whether with computer or microfilm or books, should not alter that fact, and litigants should not have the option of designating expenses of legal research as costs. Accordingly, the Court declines to follow O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hospital and Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp.; the Court instead holds that expenses of computerized legal research are properly considered a component of attorney's fees and are not recoverable as costs. See also Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 695 (8th Cir. 1983); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 570 F. Supp. 826, 827-8 (D.S.C. 1983); Babb v. Sun Co., 562 F. Supp. 491, 495 (D.Minn. 1983); Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1110 (D.Minn. 1983); Guinasso v. Pacific First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 100 F.R.D. 264 (D.Or. 1983).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court DISALLOWS costs in the amount of $2.50 for a docket fee and $1039.75 for expenses of computerized legal research. Plaintiff shall pay Timex Corporation costs totaling $760.20.