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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit brought by John C. Sloan under T.C.A. § 8-50-601 et seq. after he was transferred from his position as a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent in Savannah, Tennessee, to Johnson City, Tennessee. Sloan asserts he was disciplined (transferred) because he communicated with elected public officials about his employment. At trial the defendant obtained a directed verdict pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 50.01 at the conclusion of plaintiff's proof. The Court of Appeals, Middle Section at Nashville, reviewed the directed verdict and affirmed the trial court's judgment. Application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court was denied May 21, 1984. The cause was remanded for collection of costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether plaintiff was disciplined, threatened with discipline, or otherwise discriminated against because he communicated with elected public officials in violation of T.C.A. § 8-50-601 et seq.
  2. Whether T.C.A. § 8-50-601 et seq. applies to a transfer that was contemplated prior to the plaintiff's communications with elected officials.
  3. If a transfer is politically motivated, whether the appropriate forum for relief is the Civil Service Commission under T.C.A. § 8-30-327.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments

  • Plaintiff insisted he was disciplined (transferred) because he communicated with elected public officials concerning his employment.
  • After being told by his supervisor Mr. Ozro Carson that he was likely to be moved to East Tennessee, plaintiff contacted elected officials (including Representative Floyd Crain and local officials) and family members also wrote letters or made contacts to protest or seek assistance regarding the transfer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Country Maid Dairy, Inc. v. Hunter, 57 Tenn. App. 138, 149, 416 S.W.2d 367, 372 (1967) The standard for deciding a motion for directed verdict: view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, allow all reasonable inferences in their favor, discard countervailing evidence, and submit to the jury if any material dispute exists. The court applied this standard, reviewed the record, and concluded the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating and applying the directed-verdict standard from Country Maid Dairy: the reviewing court must view all evidence in the strongest legitimate light for the opponent of the motion and permit all reasonable inferences for that party; if any material dispute remains the case must go to the jury. Applying that rule to the record, the court found no evidence supporting plaintiff's assertion that the transfer was a disciplinary act because of his communications with elected officials.

The court examined plaintiff's testimony and concluded that plaintiff did not contact elected officials until after Mr. Carson had told him around April 8 and again on April 17 that a transfer to East Tennessee was contemplated. The court observed that T.C.A. § 8-50-601 et seq. prohibits disciplining or otherwise discriminating against an employee for communicating with elected officials for job-related purposes, but the evidence showed the contemplated transfer preceded plaintiff's communications. There was no proof that the transfer to Johnson City was caused by plaintiff's communications. The court further noted that the statutory scheme does not bar "political" transfers and, if a transfer is politically motivated, relief lies with the Civil Service Commission under T.C.A. § 8-30-327.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant and remanded the cause for collection of costs, with costs assessed to the plaintiff.

Implications: The decision disposes of the plaintiff's claim under T.C.A. § 8-50-601 et seq. by finding no evidence the transfer was caused by plaintiff's communications; the opinion directs that politically motivated transfer claims, if any, are to be addressed through the Civil Service Commission (T.C.A. § 8-30-327). The opinion does not establish a broader new precedent beyond the application of the directed-verdict standard and statutory interpretation stated herein.

John C. SLOAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee (TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, an Agency of the State of Tennessee), Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

LEWIS, Judge.

This is an appeal by plaintiff from the Trial Court directing a verdict, pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 50.01, for defendant at the conclusion of plaintiff's proof.

[T]he rule for determining a motion for a directed verdict requires the trial Judge and reviewing Court on appeal to look to all the evidence, to take the strongest legitimate view of it in favor of the opponent of the motion, and to allow all reasonable inferences from it in his favor; to discard all countervailing evidence, and if then, there is any dispute as to any material determinative evidence, or any doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn from the whole evidence, the motion must be denied and the case submitted to the jury. [Citations omitted.]
Country Maid Dairy, Inc. v. Hunter, 57 Tenn. App. 138, 149, 416 S.W.2d 367, 372 (1967). With this rule in mind, we have reviewed the record and find that the Trial Court properly directed a verdict for defendant.

This suit was brought pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-50-601, et seq. T.C.A. § 8-50-602 provides, in part, that "[n]o public employee shall be prohibited from communicating with an elected public official for any job-related purpose whatsoever." T.C.A. § 8-50-603 provides:

It shall be unlawful for any public employer to discipline, threaten to discipline or otherwise discriminate against an employee because such employee exercised his right to communicate with an elected public official. If the court of competent jurisdiction determines that a public employer has disciplined, threatened to discipline or otherwise discriminated against an employee because such employee exercised the rights provided by this part, such employee shall be entitled to treble damages plus reasonable attorney fees.

Plaintiff insists he was disciplined because he communicated with public officials concerning his employment when he was transferred from his job as a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent in Savannah, Tennessee, to Johnson City, Tennessee.

There is no support in the evidence for this assertion.

Plaintiff served with the Tennessee Highway Patrol from 1951 to 1967, when he "received an additional promotion to the rank of criminal investigator with the Tennessee Bureau of Criminal Investigation." He has served with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation since that time, except for the period September, 1973, to December, 1975. He had had no complaints about his job qualifications "up until March, 1980." He had had no problems during the time Mr. Ozro Carson served as head of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation until "on or about April 8th, I [plaintiff] heard I was going to be transferred to East Tennessee." Plaintiff heard "it was already fixed. That another agent . . . was going to move to Selmer and take over my territory which consisted of Hardin and McNairy Counties."

The plaintiff further testified:

Q. Did you ever have a meeting or a conversation with Mr. Carson after the 8th of April about this?
A. On or about Thursday, April 17th, 1980, I was ordered by my immediate superior, who was then Inspector Jack Blackwell of Summerfield, Tennessee, to meet with he and Mr. Carson in Jackson, Tennessee and inquired, wanted to know what it was about, was it a special assignment I was going to be put on. He says, No, I don't know, I'm not at liberty. And I said, Could it be a transfer. And Mr. Blackwell said, Yes, could be.
Q. All right. Did you in fact meet with Mr. Carson in Jackson?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when was that and what was the gist of the conversation?
A. I have to make sure about the date.
Q. Agent Sloan, you're used to testifying in criminal cases, are you not?
A. Yes, that's the reason I have to refer to notes. It was on April the 17th that I met in Jackson with Mr. Carson and Inspector Blackwell.
Q. What was the gist of the conversation, please, sir?
A. All right.
Q. I'd prefer, Mr. Sloan, if you'd just tell us. We don't have to be that — It's not a criminal case.
A. Well, he said they didn't want to embarrass me in any way, but said he felt like he was going to have to move me to East Tennessee, either in the Knoxville or Kingsport area. And we went on there and he wasn't satisfied with my work and I says, Quantity or quality? He says, well both. And the conversation went on and mention was made of retirement.
Q. Who mentioned that?
A. Mr. Carson. And Mr. Blackwell. I don't know exactly which one first, but Mr. Carson. They wanted to know how old I was. Mr. Carson said he thought everyone should retire at 50 years of age. And mention was made of the fact that I had around 30 years and Mr. Blackwell said, You'll be the first one to ever retire from the TBI with 30 years of service.
The conversation went on and Mr. Carson said. This is not politics. And I said, I disagree with that. And he became a little bit angry and I told him I had a right as a human being to disagree and he simmered down and the conversation, strange as it was for me, was fairly orderly from there on for a few minutes.
And I left and went back home and told my wife what had happened and went to see some politicians and some of them wrote letters, some of them made phone calls and I went to see Mr. Floyd Crain, who is the West Tennessee Democrat caucus leader of the House, and he's a Representative in the legislature. He contacted the others and people wrote letters for me. And my wife went to see people. She went to see Granville Hinton who lives there in Savannah, he's on the governor's staff of some kind. And she went to see the local representative there in Hardin County, Mr. Herman Wolf. And my mother wrote a five or six-page letter that I didn't know she had written it until she sent it in and I suppose a mother would do for any son. I was an only son. I have two sisters. And my mother since passed away. She passed away in 1981. I did make it home that night before she — before she passed away.

Plaintiff's own testimony shows that after he was told by Mr. Carson that Mr. Carson "felt like he was going to have to move me to East Tennessee, either in the Knoxville or Kingsport area," he proceeded to contact public officials in an effort to stop the transfer.

Nothing contained in T.C.A. § 8-50-601 et seq. prohibits "political" transfers. T.C.A. § 8-50-601 et seq. prohibits a public employer disciplining, threatening to discipline or to otherwise discriminate against an employee for exercising his right to communicate "with elected officials for any job-related purpose . . ."

The strongest legitimate view of the proof is that plaintiff's transfer to East Tennessee was contemplated by Mr. Carson before plaintiff communicated with anyone concerning his job. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff was transferred to Johnson City from Savannah because he communicated with a public official. T.C.A. § 8-50-601 et seq. is not applicable in the instant case.

If plaintiff's transfer from Savannah to Johnson City was politically motivated, then the proper forum to address a political transfer is in the Civil Service Commission. T.C.A. § 8-30-327.

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed with costs to plaintiff and the cause remanded to the Trial Court for the collection of costs and any further necessary proceedings.

TODD, P.J. (M.S.), and CANTRELL, J., concur.

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SLOAN v. ST (TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)
(May 21, 1984)