ZUCKERMAN v. ANTENUCCI, N.Y. Misc., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Glaser, Shandell Blitz for plaintiffs. Schiavetti, Begos Nicholson for defendants.

Judges

SIDNEY LEVISS, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Daniel Zuckerman, an infant represented by his mother Elaine Zuckerman, and Elaine Zuckerman individually, initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Joseph Antenucci and Dr. Jose Pena. Both defendants treated Elaine Zuckerman during her pregnancy. Although the summons did not specify that Antenucci and Pena were partners, undisputed evidence at trial established their partnership and that the alleged malpractice occurred within the scope of their partnership business. The jury found Dr. Pena liable for malpractice but acquitted Dr. Antenucci. The total verdict amount was $4,000,000. The present posttrial motion concerns whether the court may enter judgment against defendant Antenucci based on the tort committed by his partner Pena, despite the summons not indicating Antenucci’s status as a partner.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the court has jurisdiction to render a judgment against a defendant individually on the basis of a tort committed by his partner when the summons did not designate the defendant as a partner.
Whether a partner who was not found personally liable for malpractice may nonetheless be held jointly and severally liable for malpractice committed by another partner within the partnership.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant Antenucci's Arguments

Relied on Jet Age Knitwear Mach. Corp. v Philip, which held that describing a defendant as doing business under a partnership name was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the partnership entity.
Referenced Connell v Hayden, which held that a summons naming and served only on an individual could not be amended to substitute an unnamed corporation, thereby arguing that the summons was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over Antenucci in his capacity as a partner.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

Asserted that a party may be sued individually for the tort of his partner regardless of the summons description.
Relied on partnership law principles that a partnership is liable for tortious acts of a partner and that partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership torts.
Argued that jurisdiction over Antenucci individually suffices to hold him liable for the tort committed by Pena.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jet Age Knitwear Mach. Corp. v Philip, 22 A.D.2d 674	Held that describing a defendant as doing business under a partnership name was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the partnership entity.	The court found this precedent inapplicable because a partner can be sued individually for a partner's tort.
Connell v Hayden, 83 A.D.2d 30	Held that a summons naming and served only on an individual could not be amended to substitute an unnamed corporation, thus insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the corporation.	The court distinguished this case, noting it did not bar suing an individual partner for a partner’s tort.
Caplan v Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445	Established that a party may be sued individually for the tort of his partner.	Supported the court’s holding that Antenucci could be held liable individually.
New York Partnership Law, §§ 24, 26	Partnership is liable for torts of partners; partners are jointly and severally liable for torts chargeable to the partnership.	Formed the statutory basis for holding Antenucci liable for Pena’s malpractice.
Pedersen v Manitowoc Co., 25 N.Y.2d 412, 419	When a tort is committed by the firm, all partners are jointly and severally liable individually or the partnership entity may be sued.	Reinforced the principle that individual partners may be sued without naming the partnership.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the legal effect of partnership liability principles in the context of the procedural facts. It acknowledged precedents cited by defendant Antenucci but distinguished them as not controlling because they addressed jurisdiction over partnership entities rather than individual partners. The court emphasized that under New York partnership law, a partner can be sued individually for torts committed by another partner in the course of partnership business. The court cited authoritative treatises and case law confirming that partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership torts, and that a plaintiff may proceed against individual partners without naming the partnership. Therefore, the court reasoned that the absence of a partnership designation in the summons did not deprive it of jurisdiction over Antenucci individually, nor preclude judgment against him based on Pena’s malpractice. The jury’s finding of no personal malpractice by Antenucci did not shield him from joint and several liability for Pena’s tort.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court granted the plaintiffs’ posttrial motion and held that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against defendants Joseph Antenucci and Jose Pena jointly and severally in the amount of $4,000,000 as a matter of law.

Implications: This decision confirms that in New York, individual partners may be held liable for torts committed by their partners within the scope of partnership business even if the summons does not designate them as partners. The ruling clarifies that jurisdiction over an individual partner suffices to impose joint and several liability for partnership torts. No new precedent was created; rather, the court applied established partnership law principles to the facts presented.

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DANIEL ZUCKERMAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOSEPH ANTENUCCI et al., Defendants

SIDNEY LEVISS, J.

This is a posttrial motion for judgment against defendants Joseph Antenucci and Jose Pena, in the sum of $4,000,000 (CPLR 4404).

Daniel Zuckerman, an infant, by his mother and natural guardian, Elaine Zuckerman, and Elaine Zuckerman, individually, brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Joseph Antenucci and Dr. Jose Pena. Both had treated the mother during pregnancy. Although the summons did not state that the two defendants were partners, the undisputed, unopposed and uncontradicted evidence at the trial established that relationship, and that the alleged acts of malpractice were done in the course of partnership business. The jury returned a verdict finding that defendant Pena was guilty of malpractice, but defendant Antenucci was not guilty of malpractice. The amount of the verdict totaled $4,000,000.

The issue is whether this court has jurisdiction to render a judgment against defendant Antenucci on the basis of a tort committed by his partner, even though the summons served did not designate defendant Antenucci as a partner. Defendant Antenucci relies upon Jet Age Knitwear Mach. Corp. v Philip ( 22 A.D.2d 674), where the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the description in the caption and complaint of a defendant as doing business under the name of a partnership was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the partnership as an entity. Connell v Hayden ( 83 A.D.2d 30), a medical malpractice case decided by the Appellate Division, Second Department, is also noteworthy. There, the court held that in the absence of an apparent misdescription or misnomer on the process, "a summons which named and which was served only upon an individual could not be amended so as to substitute an unnamed corporation through which the named party conducted his business". ( Connell v Hayden, supra, p 36.) The court found that the summons served on the individual was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the professional corporation through which he conducted business.

However, Jet Age Knitwear Mach. Corp. v Philip ( supra) and Connell v Hayden ( supra) are of no aid to defendant Antenucci. A party may be sued individually and directly for the tort of his partner. (See Caplan v Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445; Beane, Essentials of Partnership Law, p 62.) A partnership is liable for the tortious act of a partner, and a partner is jointly and severally liable for tortious acts chargeable to the partnership. (Partnership Law, §§ 24, 26.)

"Thus, if a partner, while acting in the course of the partnership business injures a third person, such third person would have the right to sue all of the partners together in one lawsuit, or any one or all of the partners individually, including even one who did not cause the injury". (Beane, Essentials of Partnership Law, p 63.)

"If it is a joint and several obligation of the partnership (based on a tort), any one (or some or all) of the individual partners may be sued personally without suing the partnership itself". (Beane, Essentials of Partnership Law, p 62; emphasis added.)

"When a tort is committed by the firm, the wrong is imputable to all of the partners jointly and severally, and an action may be brought against all or any of them in their individual capacities * * * or against the partnership as an entity". ( Pedersen v Manitowoc Co., 25 N.Y.2d 412, 419.)

To illustrate how a plaintiff may proceed where a tort is chargeable to a partnership, Professor Beane supposes a partnership, the ABC Shoe Store, composed of Able, Baker, and Charles. A customer, Mrs. Jones, who is injured by Kit, an employee of the partnership, may elect to sue in several different ways: "For example, Mrs. Jones may commence an action listing as defendants: `Able, Baker, and Charles individually and as partners, doing business under the name of ABC Shoe Store'; or she could commence an action listing `ABC Shoe Store' as the defendant; or she could sue any of the individual partners directly (without naming the partnership) as they are each jointly and severally liable for the tort. Therefore, she could commence an action against `Able' or she could commence an action against `Able and Baker', or against `Able and Charles', or `Baker and Charles'. Since a person is liable for one's own tort, Mrs. Jones could also sue Kit, the employee; Kit could be named as a defendant in any of the preceding suggested actions." (Beane, Essentials of Partnership Law, p 63.)

It may thus be seen that the plaintiffs herein did not have to sue a partnership entity and did not have to write "Joseph Antenucci, a partner" on the summons in order to hold him liable on a partnership theory for the act of defendant Pena. Jurisdiction over defendant Antenucci individually is sufficient for a judgment against him based on a tort committed by his partner.

Therefore, even though the jury found that defendant Antenucci was not guilty of any malpractice in his treatment of the patient, but that defendant Pena (his partner) was guilty of malpractice in his treatment of the patient, they were then both jointly and severally liable for the malpractice committed by defendant Pena by operation of law.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion is granted and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against defendant Joseph Antenucci and Jose Pena in the amount of $4,000,000 as a matter of law.

ZUCKERMAN v. ANTENUCCI