Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Petitioner pro se, claims on appeal that he is entitled to a so-called name-clearing hearing, because of the stigma attached to his dismissal. "Although a protectible liberty interest may arise in such a situation ( Board of Regents v Roth, [ 408 U.S. 564, 573]), no hearing is required unless the reasons for the discharge could be said to affect petitioner's `good name, reputation, honor or integrity' ( id.) and such reasons are publicly disclosed by respondents ( Codd v Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628; Bishop v Wood, [ 426 U.S. 341, 348])" ( Matter of Carter v Murphy, 80 A.D.2d 960, 961; see Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Comm., 83 A.D.2d 723, aff'd 56 N.Y.2d 656). A review of the record indicates that the reasons articulated for petitioner's discharge were not stigmatic within. the meaning of Roth ( Matter of Ause v Regan, 59 A.D.2d 317). Moreover, petitioner failed to allege public dissemination by respondents of the reasons for his dismissal. Therefore, we find that petitioner was not entitled to a name-clearing hearing.
Further, we find petitioner's argument that he raised issues of fact entitling him to a trial to be without merit. Inasmuch as petitioner was a probationary employee, it was permissible to terminate his employment "without a hearing and without specific reasons being stated and, in the absence of bad faith, the determination must be upheld ( Matter of Talamo v Murphy, 38 N.Y.2d 637; Matter of Sargeant v Director, Brooklyn Developmental Center, 84 A.D.2d 843, aff'd 56 N.Y.2d 628; Matter of Sachs v Board of Educ., 71 A.D.2d 898 [aff'd 50 N.Y.2d 830])" ( Matter of Ostoyich v State of New York, 99 A.D.2d 839). A review of the record supports the conclusion that petitioner's performance was unsatisfactory and establishes that his discharge was made in good faith (see Matter of King v Sapier, 47 A.D.2d 114, 116, aff'd 38 N.Y.2d 960). We, therefore, conclude that the termination of petitioner's employment was not arbitrary or capricious. Finally, we note that petitioner, as a probationary employee has failed to establish a property interest in continued public employment deserving of due process protection. Accordingly, we affirm Special Term's judgment. Thompson, J.P., Weinstein, Brown and Boyers, JJ., concur.