TREXLER v. CHRYSLER CORP

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Docket Number

No. 59327. Judgments reversed; causes remanded.

Attorney(S)

Stephen O. Willoughby, of Bennett, Willoughby Latshaw, P.C., of Decatur, for appellant. Cassiday, Schade Gloor, of Chicago (John J. Pappas and Debra K. Marcus, of counsel), for appellee Chrysler Corporation. Craig Craig, of Mattoon (Richard F. Record, Jr., of counsel), for appellees John L. Hubbard and J.H. Weiner. Erickson, Davis, Murphy Paine, Ltd., of Decatur (Garry E. Davis and Theodore E. Paine, of counsel), for appellee Boyd E. Nelson. Armstrong, Winters, Prince, Featherstun Johnson, of Decatur (Evan H. Johnson and Daniel L. Gaumer, of counsel), for appellee Robert R. Kraus. LeFevre, Zeman Oldfield Law Group, Ltd., of Vandalia (S. Gene Schwarm, of counsel), for appellee Fayette County Hospital. Jerald E. Jackson and Mark E. Jackson, of Samuels, Miller, Schroeder, Jackson Sly, of Decatur, for appellee Decatur Memorial Hospital. Ross Hardies, of Chicago (R. Marlin Smith and Eric S. Palles, of counsel), for amicus curiae Firestone Tire Rubber Company.

Judges

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Michael Kent Trexler, a disabled adult represented by his guardian, brought two separate actions seeking damages for injuries sustained when the van in which he was riding overturned. One suit was against Chrysler Corporation alleging defective manufacture of the van, and the other was against two hospitals and several physicians alleging negligent treatment of his injuries. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Chrysler and granted motions to dismiss filed by the other defendants. The appellate court affirmed those decisions. Plaintiff then petitioned for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which was granted.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a general release that does not specifically identify the defendants releases those defendants from liability under the Illinois Contribution Act.
Whether the holding in Alsup v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., requiring specific identification of tortfeasors in releases to discharge their liability, applies retroactively to releases executed before January 20, 1984.
Whether applying the rule established in Alsup to this case violates the constitutional rights of the defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

They contended that applying the rule from Alsup retroactively would violate their constitutional rights because certain rights vested prior to the enactment of the Contribution Act and are entitled to protection.

Plaintiff's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Porter v. Ford Motor Co., 96 Ill.2d 190 (1983)	Consideration of release language and its effect on claims against defendants not named specifically.	The appellate court relied on this case to affirm the judgments, but the Supreme Court distinguished it in light of later precedent.
Alsup v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 101 Ill.2d 196 (1984)	Held that the Illinois Contribution Act requires releases to specifically identify other tortfeasors to discharge their liability.	The court applied the holding to the present case, concluding the general release was insufficient to release the defendants not named.
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill.2d 1 (1977)	Prospective application of holdings relating to contribution and release.	Used as precedent for applying the Alsup rule despite the release being executed before the rule's effective date, based on equity and justice.
Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing Co., 70 Ill.2d 41 (1977)	Application of prospective rules to pending cases.	Cited as analogous precedent for applying new rules to cases pending on appeal.
Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 Ill.2d 47 (1977)	Similar to Stevens, concerning application of new legal rules to pending cases.	Supported the court’s decision to apply Alsup prospectively to the pending appeal.
Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill.2d 193 (1968)	Rule that no person has a vested right in any rule of law entitling them to insist it remain unchanged.	Used to reject defendants’ constitutional challenge to retroactive application of the rule.
Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 (1952)	No constitutional right is violated by changing a remedy available at common law.	Supported the court’s conclusion that no constitutional violation occurred by applying Alsup.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the release executed by the plaintiff, noting it did not specifically identify the defendants but instead released "all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or partnerships." Relying on its prior decision in Alsup v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., the court reaffirmed that under the Illinois Contribution Act, a release must specifically identify other tortfeasors to discharge their liability. Although the release in this case was executed before the Alsup decision’s effective date, the court applied Alsup retroactively to this pending appeal based on principles of justice and equity, citing analogous cases where prospective rules were applied to pending cases. The defendants’ argument that retroactive application violated constitutional rights was rejected, as the court held no vested rights existed in the prior legal regime and that changes in common law remedies do not violate constitutional protections.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and remanded the causes to the circuit court of Macon County for further proceedings.

The court held that the general release executed by the plaintiff did not release the claims against the defendants because it failed to specifically identify them as required by the Illinois Contribution Act. The decision clarifies that releases must specifically name other tortfeasors to discharge their liability. While the ruling applies retroactively to this case, it does not establish a new precedent beyond reaffirming the Alsup holding. The direct effect is to allow the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants to proceed, reversing the prior dismissals and summary judgment.

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MICHAEL KENT TREXLER, Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellee. — MICHAEL KENT TREXLER, Appellant,

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Michael Kent Trexler, a disabled adult, by his father and guardian, Larry Eugene Trexler, appealed from the judgments of the circuit court of Macon County entered in favor of the defendants in two separate actions brought on Michael's behalf to recover damages for injuries suffered when the van in which he was riding overturned. In the suit against defendant Chrysler Corporation plaintiff alleged the defective manufacture of the van, and in the other action defendants, two hospitals and several physicians, were charged with negligent treatment of Michael's injuries. The circuit court allowed defendant Chrysler's motion for summary judgment and the motions to dismiss of the other defendants. The appellate court affirmed ( 118 Ill. App.3d 697), and we allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal (87 Ill.2d R. 315).

The circuit court allowed defendants' motions on the ground that a release executed by plaintiff served to release all claims against these defendants. The release stated that it released Timothy Clayton, the driver of the van, certain named insurance companies, "and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or partnerships" from claims which "now have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries * * * and the consequences thereof resulting" from the occurrence when the van overturned. None of the defendants was mentioned by name in the release. The appellate court, citing Porter v. Ford Motor Co. (1983), 96 Ill.2d 190, affirmed the judgments.

In Alsup v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co. (1984), 101 Ill.2d 196, we held that the Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 302(c)) requires that any release must "specifically identify the other tortfeasors in order to discharge their liability * * *." ( 101 Ill.2d 196, 202.) Here, as in Alsup, the releases referred to "`all other persons, firms, and corporations, both known and unknown'" ( 101 Ill.2d 196, 197), but no defendant here involved is named or specifically identified. Accordingly, we hold that the release did not serve to release the claims which plaintiff might have against these defendants.

In Alsup we made our holding applicable "prospective[ly] to releases from liability executed after * * * January 20, 1984." ( 101 Ill.2d 196, 203.) Although the release in this case was executed prior to that date, we conclude that Alsup should nevertheless apply. The petition for leave to appeal in this cause was pending when the opinion in Alsup was filed and was allowed before Alsup was modified. We consider that the circumstances here are similar to those present when we decided Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill.2d 1, Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing Co. (1977), 70 Ill.2d 41, and Robinson v. International Harvester Co. (1977), 70 Ill.2d 47. Although the holding of Skinner with respect to contribution was made prospective in application to all other causes, it was applied to Stevens and Robinson. This case was pending before us when Alsup was decided, and justice and equity require similar treatment here.

Defendants contend that application of the rule in Alsup to this case would violate their constitutional rights. Simply stated, their contention is that certain rights vested prior to the enactment of the Contribution Act and that these rights are entitled to constitutional protection. We do not agree. "No person has a vested right in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit." ( Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill.2d 193, 196.) No constitutional right is violated by changing a remedy available at common law. ( Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 179, 190.) A vested right must be based upon more than an expectation of the continuance of existing law, and we find no such vested right in this case.

For the reasons stated we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts, and the causes are remanded to the circuit court of Macon County for further proceedings.

Judgments reversed; causes remanded.