Order reversed, on the law, with costs, motion granted, and complaint dismissed.
In a personal injury action, the right to recover for noneconomic loss arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle is confined to those cases involving "serious injury" as defined in subdivision 4 of section 671 Ins. of the Insurance Law (Insurance Law, § 673). The affidavits submitted by plaintiffs failed to make a sufficient showing of serious injury so as to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment. The allegations of occasional pain do not constitute a "significant limitation" within the meaning of subdivision 4 of section 671 Ins. of the Insurance Law (see Licari v Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230; Lopez v Senatore, 97 A.D.2d 787). In the face of a medical report indicating only "[s]uperficial scratches" on her right knee, plaintiff Elizabeth Post's bare conclusory statement that she has a "disfiguring" scar there is insufficient as a matter of law. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the infant plaintiffs' activities were restricted for approximately six weeks only, less than the minimum 90-day period required by the statute (Insurance Law, § 671, subd. 4; Licari v Elliott, supra).
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Thompson, J.P., Weinstein, Rubin and Lawrence, JJ., concur.