SHANK v. SHANK

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Docket Number

No. 15312

Attorney(S)

William R. Devlin and Edwin A. Adamson, Las Vegas, for Appellant/Cross-Respondent. Marilyn V. Romanelli, Las Vegas, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Walter Bert Shank and Respondent Rosemary Shank were divorced on June 27, 1981. The divorce decree required appellant to pay alimony of $400 per month for ten years followed by $200 per month for an additional ten years, with a provision that alimony would terminate upon respondent's remarriage. Respondent remarried on December 12, 1981, after which appellant ceased alimony payments. Subsequently, respondent discovered that her new marriage was invalid because her husband had not divorced his first wife, leading to an annulment of the remarriage on June 17, 1983. Respondent petitioned the district court to reinstate alimony payments and to award arrearages from the date appellant stopped paying. The district court reinstated alimony from the date of annulment but denied arrearages prior to that date. Appellant appealed the reinstatement order.

Legal Issues Presented

What is the meaning of the term "remarriage" as used in the divorce decree and Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 125.150(5)?
Does the act of solemnizing a remarriage, later declared void, terminate alimony obligations?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Alimony obligations were terminated by respondent's act of solemnizing a remarriage, regardless of the subsequent annulment.

Respondent's Arguments

Respondent never legally "remarried" because her second marriage was void from the outset due to bigamy under NRS 125.290.
Therefore, appellant's alimony obligations never ceased.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Glass v. Glass, 546 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)	Held that the act of solemnizing a remarriage terminates alimony obligations even if the remarriage is later void or voidable.	The court adopted the policy considerations from this case to support that alimony terminates upon the remarriage ceremony regardless of later annulment.
Sefton v. Sefton, 291 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1955)	Supported the principle that remarriage ceremony terminates alimony obligations.	Referenced as additional authority supporting the termination of alimony upon remarriage ceremony.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on the interpretation of "remarriage" in the divorce decree and NRS 125.150(5), which mandates cessation of alimony upon remarriage or death of the recipient spouse. The court acknowledged this was an issue of first impression in Nevada but relied on persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, particularly Glass v. Glass. The court emphasized policy reasons: a former spouse should be able to rely on the remarriage ceremony as a conclusive event terminating alimony obligations; otherwise, latent annulment grounds could indefinitely suspend alimony obligations, creating uncertainty. The court reasoned that certainty in legal rights and obligations is paramount and that adopting respondent's position would cause undue uncertainty. Consequently, the court held that the term "remarriage" means the solemnization or ceremony itself, regardless of whether the marriage is later declared void or voidable. Since respondent solemnized her remarriage on December 12, 1981, appellant's alimony obligations terminated at that time, and the district court erred in reinstating alimony after the annulment.

Holding and Implications

The court reversed the district court's order reinstating alimony payments.

The holding establishes that alimony obligations terminate upon the solemnization of remarriage, even if the remarriage is subsequently annulled as void or voidable. The direct effect is that appellant was entitled to cease alimony payments as of the date of the remarriage ceremony. No new precedent beyond this case's parties is explicitly established, but the decision provides clarity and certainty regarding the termination of alimony obligations under Nevada law.

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WALTER BERT SHANK, APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. ROSEMARY SHANK AKA ROSEMARY COLE, RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT.

OPINION

Per Curiam:

This is an appeal from an order reinstating alimony payments. Appellant contends that his alimony obligations were terminated because of respondent's remarriage. We agree, and therefore we reverse the district court's order.

Appellant and respondent were divorced on June 27, 1981. The divorce decree required appellant to pay alimony of $400.00 per month for ten years, followed by $200.00 per month for an additional ten years. The divorce decree provided, however, that alimony would terminate if respondent remarried.

Appellant made timely alimony payments until December 12, 1981, when respondent remarried. Appellant then stopped paying the alimony. Respondent later discovered that her new husband had not divorced his first wife. Accordingly, on June 17, 1983, respondent obtained a decree annulling her marriage to her new husband. Respondent then petitioned the district court to reinstate appellant's alimony obligations and to award arrearages from December 12, 1981, the date on which appellant stopped making his payments. The district court denied respondent's request for all of the arrearages, but the court reinstated alimony from the date of respondent's annulment. This appeal followed.

Pursuant to NRS 125.150(5) and the divorce decree in this case, alimony payments were to cease upon "remarriage." Appellant contends that respondent's act of solemnizing the remarriage was sufficient to terminate alimony obligations, even though the subsequent marriage was later determined to be void. On the other hand, respondent contends that she never "remarried" because her subsequent bigamous marriage was void from the beginning, pursuant to NRS 125.290. Thus, respondent argues that appellant's alimony obligations never really ceased. The sole issue to be resolved on appeal, therefore, is the meaning of the term "remarriage" as used in the divorce decree and NRS 125.150(5).

NRS 125.150(5) provides, in part, as follows:

In the event of death of either party or the subsequent remarriage of the spouse to whom specific periodic payments were to be made, all payments required by the decree must cease, unless it was otherwise ordered by the court.

Although this appeal presents an issue of first impression in Nevada, other jurisdictions have addressed the issue. For example, in Glass v. Glass, 546 S.W.2d 738 (Mo.Ct.App. 1977), the court held that the mere act of solemnizing a remarriage is sufficient to terminate alimony obligations even if the remarriage is later determined to be void or voidable. The court discussed the following policy considerations:

(1) A former husband is entitled to rely on the remarriage ceremony of the former wife to recommit assets previously used for alimony obligations to her.

(2) Unless the remarriage ceremony is taken as conclusive, any latent grounds for annulment between the remarried spouse and her new husband may remain suspended until the offended spouse seeks annulment, so that the former husband's alimony obligations may never be certainly determined.

(3) Even though both former spouses may be innocent, the more active of the two, [the one whose remarriage is later annulled] should bear the loss from the misconduct of a stranger.

Id. at 741. See also Sefton v. Sefton, 291 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1955).

We are persuaded by the policy reasons expressed above. We also believe that our courts should not be burdened with alimony claims asserted months or years after an event that, so far as the parties are concerned, terminated all alimony obligations. Finally, we are persuaded that divorced parties should be able to have certainty in their legal rights and obligations, and that our adoption of respondent's position would cause enormous uncertainty for the parties.

Accordingly, we hold that the term "remarriage," as used in the divorce decree and NRS 125.150(5), means the solemnization or ceremony of remarriage, without regard to whether the remarriage is later determined to be void or voidable. Appellant's alimony obligations, therefore, were terminated when respondent solemnized her remarriage on December 12, 1981, even though the remarriage was later declared to be void. Appellant was entitled to stop making alimony payments at that time, as he did, and the district court erred by reinstating the alimony obligations.

Reversed.

SPRINGER, MOWBRAY, STEFFEN, and GUNDERSON, JJ., and ZENOFF, Sr. J., concur.

THE HONORABLE DAVID ZENOFF, Senior Justice, participated in place of CHIEF JUSTICE MANOUKIAN, who recused himself.