Judgment affirmed.
In the portion of its charge defining reasonable doubt, the trial court equated proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" with proof to a "moral certainty." It further told the jurors that they must acquit if their "minds are wavering" or if the "scales are even". It is well established that such language is improper (see, e.g., People v. Wade, 99 A.D.2d 474; People v. Ortiz, 92 A.D.2d 595). However, no exception was taken to the charge and an examination of the entire charge indicates that the concept of reasonable doubt was properly explained to the jury. Thus, the error does not warrant reversal in the interest of justice ( People v Turrell, 66 A.D.2d 862, affd 50 N.Y.2d 400; People v. Ortiz, supra; People v. Patterson, 76 A.D.2d 891).
We have considered defendant's other claims and find them to be without merit. O'Connor, J.P., Brown, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.