MARS v. HANBERRY

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 83-1255.

Attorney(S)

Jonathan Golden, Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant. Marc L. Goldman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Flint, Mich., Leonard R. Gilman, U.S. Atty., Janice Mann, (argued), Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellee.

Judges

Leroy John Contie

Acts

Judiciary And Judicial Procedure — Fees And Costs — Procedure — Proceedings In Forma Pauperis
Judiciary And Judicial Procedure — District Courts; Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction And Venue — United States As Defendant
Judiciary And Judicial Procedure — Tort Claims Procedure — Particular Proceedings — Definitions

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Joseph Herbert Mars, a federal prisoner, filed a complaint on July 15, 1981, against Jack A. Hanberry and others seeking $5.2 million in damages for physical abuse and mental injury allegedly sustained during his incarceration. Mars' complaint was brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants, represented by the United States Attorney's Office, moved to dismiss or for a more definite statement, challenging jurisdiction, venue, service, failure to state a claim, and failure to join an indispensable party. The district court granted the motion for a more definite statement and denied Mars' request for appointment of counsel. Mars then filed a motion for default judgment clarifying that his claims arose from an altercation with prison officers and a privacy violation during a visit with his father. Ultimately, on March 2, 1983, the district court dismissed Mars' complaint for failure to provide a short and plain statement of the claim and basis for jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Mars appealed the dismissal and the denial of his request for counsel.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the district court erred in dismissing Mars' pro se complaint for failure to provide a short and plain statement of the claim and basis of jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).
Whether the district court erred in denying Mars' request for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983)	The United States is the only proper party under the FTCA.	Supported the conclusion that Mars' complaint lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the United States was not named as a defendant.
Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1983)	FTCA does not confer jurisdiction over claims against individual federal employees.	Reinforced that claims against individual defendants under FTCA are improper.
Davis v. United States, 667 F.2d 822, 825 (9th Cir. 1982)	Same principle as Wright regarding jurisdiction under FTCA.	Supported dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over individual defendants.
Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (W.D. Pa. 1980)	FTCA jurisdictional limits.	Used to confirm the requirement that the United States be named as defendant for FTCA claims.
Anderson v. Bailar, 459 F. Supp. 792, 793 (M.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980)	FTCA does not provide independent cause of action against federal employees.	Supported the court's jurisdictional analysis and dismissal of claims against individual defendants.
Diminnie v. United States, 728 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1984)	Claims against federal employees under FTCA fail if claim against United States fails.	Applied to conclude that Mars' claims against Hanberry were jurisdictionally defective.
Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Department, 739 F.2d 1109, 1119 (6th Cir. 1984)	Appointment of counsel not appropriate for frivolous claims.	Used to justify denial of Mars' request for counsel due to frivolous nature of claims.
Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1983)	Appointment of counsel inappropriate when chances of success are slim.	Supported the conclusion that appointment of counsel would be futile.
McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1982)	Same as Childs regarding appointment of counsel.	Reinforced denial of counsel due to low likelihood of success.
Marlin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981)	Appointment of counsel not warranted for frivolous claims.	Supported the denial of Mars' counsel request.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the complaint’s failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction, emphasizing that under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), only the United States is a proper defendant. The complaint named only individual defendants, specifically Jack A. Hanberry, and did not include the United States as a party. Citing multiple precedents, the court explained that the FTCA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction over claims against federal employees individually, and claims against such employees cannot proceed independently if the claim against the United States fails. Consequently, the court found the district court's dismissal proper under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction regardless of the complaint’s compliance with the pleading standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Regarding the denial of appointment of counsel, the court reasoned that such appointment is inappropriate where claims are frivolous or have extremely slim chances of success, as was the case here due to the jurisdictional defects. Therefore, appointment of counsel would have been futile.

Holding and Implications

The court AFFIRMED the district court’s dismissal of Mars' complaint and the denial of his request for appointment of counsel.

The direct effect of this decision is that Mars' claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because he failed to name the United States as a defendant under the FTCA. The decision does not establish new precedent but reaffirms established jurisdictional principles limiting FTCA claims to actions against the United States and clarifies that appointment of counsel is not warranted in cases with no reasonable chance of success.

Show full summary ...

JOSEPH HERBERT MARS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JACK A. HANBERRY, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

CONTIE, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Herbert Mars appeals the district court's dismissal of his pro se complaint alleging negligent treatment by federal prison officials due to Mars' failure to provide a short and plain statement of his claim and the basis of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Mars contends that dismissal was improper and that the district court erred in denying Mars' request for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On July 15, 1981, Mars filed a complaint against "Jack A. Hanberry, et al." seeking $5.2 million for physical abuse and mental damage pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 2671-2680. On August 27, 1981, "defendants", represented by the United States Attorney's Office filed a motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement, claiming that the court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, that venue and service were improper, that the complaint failed to state a claim, and that Mars had failed to join an indispensable party. On November 22, 1981, Mars requested the appointment of counsel. The district court granted defendant's motion for a more definite statement and denied Mars' request for appointment of counsel. Mars responded to the court's order by filing a motion for default judgment in which he revealed that his claim was based on an altercation between Mars and prison officers while Mars was a federal prisoner. Mars also alleged that his right to privacy was violated when a prison officer took notes during a visit between Mars and his father. On March 2, 1983, the district court dismissed Mars' complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) for failure to include a short and plain statement of his claim and the basis of jurisdiction.

It is clear that Mars' complaint stated no basis on which the district court could assert subject matter jurisdiction over Mars' complaint. The United States is the only proper party in an action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451, 1452 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1983), and the FTCA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction over actions against individual defendants such as federal employees. Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1983); Davis v. United States, 667 F.2d 822, 825 (9th Cir. 1982); Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (W.D.Pa. 1980); Anderson v. Bailar, 459 F. Supp. 792, 793 (M.D.Fla. 1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956, 101 S.Ct. 364, 66 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980). "While a claim against a federal employee based on an independent ground of jurisdiction may be joined with a claim against the United States under the FTCA, the Act itself does not provide for an independent cause of action against federal employees once the claim against the United States fails." Diminnie v. United States, 728 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1984). Since Mars does not name the United States as a defendant the district court had no jurisdiction of Mars' claims against defendant Hanberry under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Since Mars' complaint is jurisdictionally defective, we find that dismissal is warranted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as asserted in the government's motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) regardless of whether the complaint complied with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).

Appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is not appropriate when a pro se litigant's claims are frivolous, Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Department, 739 F.2d 1109, 1119 (6th Cir. 1984), or when the chances of success are extremely slim. Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1983); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1982); Marlin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981). Since Mars' complaint suffers from fatal jurisdictional defects, Mars has no chance of success based on the facts alleged in the pleadings and appointment of counsel would be a futile act.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.