SAN MARTIN v. MENENDEZ

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Docket Number

No. 85-74.

Attorney(S)

Terence S. Moore of Rigau Rigau, P.A., Tampa, for petitioner. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Karla J. Staker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner Luis San Martin was charged jointly with two codefendants for multiple drug offenses. While his codefendants waived their speedy trial rights to prepare their defenses, petitioner did not waive his and objected to a trial date beyond the speedy trial deadline. The trial court sua sponte severed petitioner’s trial to protect his speedy trial rights, resulting in a trial within the required period but ending in a mistrial on September 7, 1984. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(g), petitioner was to be retried within ninety days, by December 6, 1984. The state sought to try petitioner and his codefendants jointly on November 5, 1984, but the codefendants were not ready. The state moved for a continuance and speedy trial extension to January 14, 1985, to try all defendants simultaneously. Over petitioner’s objection and without petitioner moving for severance, the trial court granted the extension. Petitioner’s motion for discharge was denied, and he petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial beyond the speedy trial deadline.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether petitioner’s speedy trial rights under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 were violated by the trial court’s extension of the speedy trial period to allow a joint trial with codefendants.
Whether petitioner’s failure to move for severance under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(b) affected his speedy trial rights and the propriety of the trial court’s extension.
The validity of the trial court’s sua sponte severance order initially protecting petitioner’s speedy trial rights and the subsequent extension of those rights in light of the state’s motion.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner objected to the trial date being continued beyond the speedy trial deadline and did not waive his speedy trial rights.
Petitioner opposed the extension of the speedy trial period to accommodate a joint trial with codefendants.
Petitioner did not move for severance but considered and rejected filing such a motion, as indicated by counsel’s statements at the hearing.

Respondent’s Arguments

The state argued that because petitioner had already been tried separately once, the inconvenience and costs of another separate trial outweighed petitioner’s interest in a speedy retrial.
The state moved for a continuance and extension of speedy trial to try all codefendants simultaneously.
The state maintained that petitioner’s speedy trial rights could be extended under Rule 3.191(f) by motion before expiration of the speedy trial period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Machado v. State, 431 So.2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)	Extension of speedy trial over objection; consolidation of informations; severance requirements.	Distinguished because in petitioner’s case, defendants were charged in a single information and petitioner never moved for severance.
State v. Littlefield, 457 So.2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)	Requirement that state affirmatively request extension of speedy trial to accommodate codefendant; balancing interests of state and defendant.	Distinguished because the state in petitioner’s case did move for an extension, unlike in Littlefield.
Rico v. State, 463 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)	Related to severance and speedy trial rights in joint informations.	Referenced to support distinction from Machado and petitioner’s failure to move for severance.
Darby v. State, 463 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)	Related to severance and speedy trial rights in joint informations.	Referenced similarly as Rico in context of severance and speedy trial.
State v. Cole, 413 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)	Waiver of right to severance by failure to timely move for severance.	Applied to find petitioner waived severance by rejecting motion for severance.
Wright v. State, 318 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 334 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1976)	Waiver of severance rights by failure to move.	Applied alongside Cole to support waiver of severance.
Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1973)	Proper timing and conditions for demanding shortened speedy trial period.	Applied to reject petitioner’s motion to reduce speedy trial period while still engaged in discovery.
Turner v. State, 272 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1973)	Proper procedure for speedy trial demands.	Applied with Ranalli to support striking petitioner’s motion.
State v. Conkling, 405 So.2d 773 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)	Standards for speedy trial motions and preparation status.	Applied alongside the above to uphold striking petitioner’s motion for reduced speedy trial time.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed petitioner’s speedy trial rights in light of the procedural history and relevant Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. It distinguished the case from Machado, where separate informations were consolidated over objection, noting here the joint information was filed from the outset and petitioner never moved for severance. The court emphasized the importance of a defendant’s active pursuit of severance to protect speedy trial rights when codefendants delay trial preparation.

In contrast to Littlefield, where the state failed to request an extension of speedy trial, the state here properly moved for an extension before the speedy trial period expired. The court highlighted that petitioner’s counsel was aware of and consciously declined to file a severance motion, effectively waiving that right. The court cited precedent establishing waiver of severance rights by failure to timely move.

Regarding petitioner’s attempt to shorten the speedy trial period after the mistrial, the court found the motion improper because petitioner was still engaged in discovery and preparation, relying on established precedent that a demand for a reduced speedy trial period is invalid under such circumstances.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the state’s extension motion, balancing the interests of judicial economy and petitioner’s speedy trial rights, especially given petitioner’s waiver of severance.

Holding and Implications

The court DENIED petitioner’s writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the trial beyond the original speedy trial deadline.

The direct effect of this decision is that petitioner’s trial may proceed on the extended date ordered by the trial court. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court applied and distinguished existing case law to uphold the trial court’s extension of speedy trial rights in the context of joint trials and severance waivers.

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LUIS SAN MARTIN, PETITIONER, v. HONORABLE MANUEL MENENDEZ, JR., CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, RESPONDENT.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(3), seeking a writ of prohibition directed to respondent to prevent petitioner's trial below because of an alleged violation of petitioner's speedy trial rights provided in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. We deny the petition.

Petitioner was charged by information, jointly, with two codefendants, with several related drug offenses. His codefendants subsequently waived speedy trial for reasons necessary to adequately prepare their defenses and their trial was scheduled beyond the time that the speedy trial period would have expired. Petitioner did not waive speedy trial and objected to his trial date being continued beyond the speedy trial deadline. Petitioner did not move for a severance pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(b). However, the trial court sua sponte, because of petitioner's objection to continuing his trial, ordered a severance of the defendants' trials for the purpose of protecting petitioner's right to a speedy trial. Petitioner's case was then brought to trial within the speedy trial period, but subsequently resulted in a mistrial on September 7, 1984.

Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(g), the state was required to bring petitioner to trial again within ninety days, i.e., by December 6, 1984. Petitioner's codefendants still had not been brought to trial for reasons necessary to their defense. Petitioner and his codefendants were subsequently set for a joint trial on November 5, 1984. However, it again developed that petitioner's codefendants would not be ready for trial on that date or by petitioner's speedy trial date of December 6, 1984, and the state moved for a continuance of trial and an extension of speedy trial for petitioner in order to try all codefendants simultaneously. The state argued that since one trial had already been separately held for petitioner that the resulting costs and inconvenience of again trying him separately outweighed petitioner's interest in being retried within the ninety-day period. The trial court ordered petitioner and his codefendants to be tried on January 14, 1985, and extended the speedy trial time for petitioner until that date over petitioner's objections. Petitioner did not move for a severance pursuant to rule 3.152(b)(1)(i). (While it appears that petitioner was still engaged in discovery and preparation for trial, we do not use that as a basis for our denial of the petition for prohibition.) Petitioner's motion for discharge was denied on December 28, 1984, and he then sought relief by his petition for writ of prohibition filed with this court.

We believe that Judge Boardman's well-written and often-cited decision in Machado v. State, 431 So.2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and State v. Littlefield, 457 So.2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), wherein the defendants were discharged due to speedy trial violations, are both distinguishable and instructive.

In Machado, the codefendants were each charged in separate informations and their cases later consolidated pursuant to rule 3.151(b), over the defendant Machado's objection. A motion for severance pursuant to rule 3.152(b) was not necessary in that situation. As Judge Boardman pointed out in Machado, an extension of speedy trial over Machado's objection was granted in the trial court in order for the state to consolidate the various defendants' informations and set them for trial beyond the speedy trial time. Machado further makes the point that had the state chosen to file a joint information, then an extension of speedy trial would not have been necessary, but the defendant Machado then could have sought a severance from the joint information under rule 3.152(b)(1)(i). In petitioner's case before us, the codefendants were, from the beginning of the proceeding below, all charged in a single information and petitioner, though once severed solely for the purpose of an early trial within his speedy trial deadline, never moved for a severance. Cf. Rico v. State, 463 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Darby v. State, 463 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

Littlefield is distinguishable because there the state never moved for an extension of speedy trial as the state did in petitioner's case below. As the court in Littlefield stated:

By making accommodation of a codefendant a basis for an extension, the provisions of rule 3.191(f) imply that the state must affirmatively request an extension, if such a situation is contemplated, in advance of the expiration of the speedy trial time. Under this procedure, the trial court can deal with the specific situation and balance the interests of the state in avoiding multiple trials against the interest of the defendant in receiving a speedy trial. Of course, the defendant is also entitled to seek a severance under rule 3.152(b)(1)(i) and in doing so the same factors may be considered by the trial court.

457 So.2d at 559, 560.

We also emphasize that the failure of petitioner to move for a severance was not a mere oversight. At the hearing on the state's motion for extension of speedy trial, the court announced that it would grant the extension over petitioner's objection and set the trial for January 7, 1985. Petitioner's counsel then stated "so the record's very clear, that the granting of the motion was over our objection. And the other thing, that I don't want to place ourself in a posture where I — certain additional motions will be filed now. Potentially a motion for severance." (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner thus obviously considered and rejected the filing of a motion for severance. The failure of counsel to make a motion for severance waived the right to severance. State v. Cole, 413 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Wright v. State, 318 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 334 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1976).

Finally, we address one additional point. Following the mistrial in petitioner's first trial, he filed a motion for speedy trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(2), seeking to reduce his speedy trial time for his second trial to sixty days. However, at the time he filed his motion, he was still engaged in discovery and preparation for trial and his demand, therefore, was not proper and was correctly struck upon motion by the state. Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1973); Turner v. State, 272 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1973); State v. Conkling, 405 So.2d 773 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

The petition is thereby denied.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and DANAHY and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.