Order and judgment affirmed, with costs.
We find that the police accident report was properly received into evidence under the business record exception to the hearsay rule ( see, CPLR 4518 [a]; Zaulich v. Thompkins Sq. Holding Co., 10 A.D.2d 492; Toll v. State of New York, 32 A.D.2d 47). Moreover, appellant's statement in this report, describing how the accident occurred, was available for use by the petitioner as evidence-in-chief in establishing that there had been no contact between appellant's vehicle and a "hit-and-run" vehicle, since the statement qualified as an admission ( see, Penn v. Kirsh, 40 A.D.2d 814; Flynn v. Manhattan Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 94 A.D.2d 617, affd 61 N.Y.2d 769; Shea v. Johnson, 101 A.D.2d 1018). Special Term's finding that there had been no contact between the vehicles was therefore amply supported by the evidence presented ( see, Matter of State Farm Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 106 A.D.2d 508).
Lastly, Special Term did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's application for a continuance of the hearing ( see, Bilyou v. State of New York, 33 A.D.2d 604; Spodek v. Lasser Stables, 89 A.D.2d 892). Appellant risked the possibility that he would be unavailable to testify by leaving the jurisdiction for a prolonged period of time when he knew or should have known that his case would be called for a hearing. Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Weinstein and Niehoff, JJ., concur.