Judgment affirmed.
The showup identification of the defendant by the complaining witness, which took place in the complainant's hospital room shortly after the incident, did not require suppression of the complainant's in-court identification of the defendant ( see, People v. Rivera, 22 N.Y.2d 453, cert denied 395 U.S. 964; People v. Smith, 46 A.D.2d 639, affd 38 N.Y.2d 882). In any event, a review of the totality of the circumstances compels the conclusion that there was a sufficient independent basis for the complainant's in-court identification ( People v. Rivera, supra; People v. Smith, supra). Moreover, the in-court identification of defendant by the complainant's companion, Leroy Richardson, based upon his viewing of defendant at the scene of the crime and during defendant's immediate flight therefrom, was not subject to a motion to suppress under CPL 710.20 (6) ( cf. People v. MacKay, 98 A.D.2d 732; People v. Marshall, 91 A.D.2d 643; Matter of Leo T., 87 A.D.2d 297).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the People, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict ( see, People v. Benzinger, 36 N.Y.2d 29; People v. Betancourt, 111 A.D.2d 762).
In addition, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that his prior felony conviction was unconstitutionally obtained (CPL 400.21 [b]; People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9). No evidence was proffered that the guilty plea which constituted the basis of defendant's prior felony conviction was improvident or baseless; or that defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently relinquish his rights; or that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel during the plea proceeding.
We have considered defendant's other contentions and find them to be without merit. Brown, J.P., Weinstein, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.