Judgment affirmed.
The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that defendant was guilty, as charged, of rape in the third degree (Penal Law § 130.25; People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621). The victim's testimony was sufficiently corroborated, pursuant to the then-existing requirements of Penal Law § 130.16 with respect to offenses of this nature, by the introduction of the signed statement which defendant gave to the police following the incident ( see, People v. Weyant, 68 A.D.2d 608; see also, People v. St. John, 74 A.D.2d 85, appeal dismissed 53 N.Y.2d 704).
Defendant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his request that sexual misconduct (Penal Law § 130.20) be charged as a lesser included offense of rape in the third degree (Penal Law § 130.25) is without merit, as there was no reasonable view of the evidence which could have supported a finding that he committed the lesser offense but not the greater ( see, People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61; CPL 300.50, [2]). Lazer, J.P., Gibbons, Bracken and Niehoff, JJ., concur.